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Abstract
Future networks will comprise a wide variety of wireless networks. Users will expect to be
always connected from anywhere and at any time as connections will be switched to available
networks using vertical handover techniques. However, different networks have different
Qualities-of-Service (QoS) so a QoS framework is needed to help applications and services
deal with this new environment. In addition, since these networks must work together, future
mobile systems will have an open, instead of the currently closed, architecture. Therefore
new mechanisms will be needed to protect users, servers and network infrastructure. This
means that future mobile networks will have to integrate communications, mobility, quality-
of service and security.
However, in order to achieve this integration without affecting the flexibility of future net-
works, there is a need for novel methods that address QoS and security in a targeted manner
within specific situations. Also, there is a need for a communication framework wherein
these methods along with the communication and handover mechanisms could be integrated
together. Therefore, this research uses the Y-Comm framework, which is a communication
architecture to support vertical handover in Next Generations Networks, as an example of
future communication frameworks that integrate QoS, security, communication and mobility
mechanisms. Within the context of Y-Comm, research has been conducted to address QoS
and security in heterogeneous networks.
To preserve the flexibility of future network, the research in this thesis proposes the concept
of Targeted Models to address security and QoS in specific scenarios: to address the QoS
issue, a new QoS framework is introduced in this thesis, which will define targeted QoS
models that will provide QoS in different situations such as connection initiation and in the
case of handover. Similarly, to deal with the security side, targeted security models are
proposed to address security in situations like connection initiation and handover.
To define the targeted models and map them to actual network entities, research has been
conducted to define a potential structure for future networks along with the main operational
entities. The cooperation among these entities will define the targeted models. Furthermore,
in order to specify the security protocols used by the targeted security models, an Authen-
tication and Key Agreement framework is introduced to address security at different levels
such as network and service levels. The underlying protocols of the Authentication and Key
Agreement protocol are verified using Casper/FDR, which is a well-known, formal methods-
based tool.
The research also investigates potential methods to implement the proposed security proto-
cols. To enable the implementation of some of the targeted security models, the research
ii
also proposes major enhancements to the current addressing, naming and location systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The world is experiencing a huge growth in the development and deployment of several wire-
less technologies. Such technologies vary from second and third generation cellular networks,
Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) to personal area networks. This widespread deploy-
ment of wireless networks will have a significant impact on the evolution of the Internet.
In the early Internet, end systems were primarily composed of Ethernet and Token Ring sys-
tems which were similar in performance to the systems used in the core network. However,
with the wide-scale deployment of wireless networks as end-systems, there is a significant
difference in network characteristics in terms of bandwidth, latency, packet loss and error
characteristics of peripheral networks when compared with the core network. These devel-
opments mean that soon it will not be possible to think of the Internet as a single unified
infrastructure (GM10). It would be better to view the Internet as an entity comprising a fast
core network with slower peripheral networks attached around the core. The core network
will consist of a super-fast backbone using optical switches and fast access networks which
uses Multi-protocol Label Switching (MPLS).
The Next Generation Networks (NGNs) need to facilitate ubiquitous connectivity to enable
users to connect from anywhere and at any time. Therefore, there is a need for a general
architecture to support seamless and secure mobility between heterogeneous networks. The
Y-Comm framework (GM07), (GM06) discussed in the following chapter, provides one such
communication framework to support vertical handover in heterogeneous environments.
1.1 Background
As proposed by different research efforts such as the IEEE802.21, HOKEY, Mobile Ethernet
and the work in ITU (IEE07), (HOK07), (Kur05), (IT04), communication in future networks
will be based on IP addresses, these networks will comprise a wide variety of wireless network
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technologies such as 3G,WiMAX and Long Term Evolution (LTE). In this environment,
Mobile Terminals (MTs) will expect to be connected to several networks at the same time
and ubiquitous communication will be achieved by seamless switching between available
networks using vertical handover techniques. However, since these networks might be of
different technologies and controlled by different operators, vertical handover therefore raises
serious threats mainly related to providing the best-possible security and QoS across different
technologies.
On one hand, the network operators vary in terms of their security levels and mechanisms
such as admission control, authentication and authorization algorithms. Therefore, there
is a need to define a generic security module to provide security at different levels such as
network and service levels. On the other hand, due to the open and flexible nature of the
4G systems, there is a need to protect the network infrastructure as well as the data. Also,
there is a need to address security using a dynamic rather than a static approach that targets
security in specific situations such as connection initiation, server accessibility and handover.
Another challenge in this heterogeneous environments is the end-to-end, cross-operator QoS
provision. When the users subscribe to a specific service, this implies that the two end
systems have agreed on certain conditions of using the service, this is known as the Service-
Level of Agreement (SLA). The SLA indicates contracted delivery time (of the service) along
with its performance. In the case of a single operator scenario, where all the resources are
controlled and managed by one administrative entity, maintaining the SLA would not be a
problem. However, this may not be the case with multiple operators such as 4G systems,
where the MT roams among access networks, controlled by different operators. Similar to
the security provision in heterogeneous networks, there is a need for a dynamic approach for
providing QoS in specific scenarios such as connection initiation and in the case of handover.
Additionally, a QoS framework for 4G systems should not only provide resource allocation
and reservation, but also consider the security requirement and deploy performance improve-
ment techniques by using trade-offs between security and QoS. Furthermore, as pointed out
in (JM04), vertical handover can cause radical changes in QoS. Hence, it is important that
as much control as possible is exercised by mobile devices to achieve optimum vertical han-
dover. It is therefore necessary to develop new techniques which could make other layers
of the protocol stack aware of impending handover decisions and thus allow them to take
steps to minimize the effects. The aforementioned challenges highlight the fact that future
mobile systems must encompass communications, mobility, QoS and security, an example
of such future framework is Y-Comm (GM07), (GM06). Therefore, it has been used in this
research as a representative of future communication frameworks. The Y-Comm architecture
provides a well defined architecture, wherein different security and QoS mechanisms could
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be integrated with the mobility and the communication system.
1.2 Research Question
Targeting the unaddressed challenges in QoS and Security provision in future heterogeneous
networks, this research aims to find out answers to a set of important research questions
which are detailed below:
’How to introduce a generic architecture for heterogeneous networks and define
the main operational entities for QoS and Security provision ?’
This research question required the development of a new architecture for heterogeneous
networks along with the network entities, their structures and the interfaces between them.
These networks entities are the actual parties which will be involved in the proposed security
and QoS mechanisms.
’How the proposed network architecture could be utilized to support an End-to-
End and cross-operator QoS provision?’
The answer to this question was the development of a new QoS framework which supports
QoS signalling in three different scenarios, and thus three Targeted QoS-Signalling Models
are proposed namely, the Initial Registration , the Connection Initiation and the Handover
Models.
’Considering the proposed network architecture, how to investigate a new ap-
proach to provide security for heterogeneous networks in the context of the
Y-Comm framework ?’
The proposed approach aims to protect the data and the network resources from malicious
attacks, while considering QoS and the underlying network structure, this has to be achieved
without affecting the flexibility and openness of 4G environment.
1.3 Main Contributions
The research introduced a set of underlying security protocols and mechanisms. Some of these
were achieved by Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) frameworks that operated at
network and application levels and in different situations such as handover and connection
initiation. Others were manifested as access control mechanisms in the network infrastruc-
ture. The proposed protocols were verified using formal methods based on Casper/FDR tool
(LBDH09), (PR10), (Sys93).
Furthermore, in order to provide a practical security solution and support the integration
between the QoS and security, there was a need to consider the actual network structure
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and its operational entities. This has led to an investigation into the area of networking and
QoS. Consequently, three models for signalling QoS in different situation have been proposed.
These models cooperate with the security models to support full integration.
The research presented in this thesis proposes a novel approach to address QoS and security
integration. The approach is based on the integration between the QoS signalling models
and the AKA framework, thus three Targeted Security Models (TSMs) have been intro-
duced. The TSMs address security in different scenarios such as connection initiation, server
protection and vertical handover.
1.4 Originality of Intended Work
Many research efforts such as (HOK07), (YZ05), (Kur05), (rGPPG) have been trying to
address the security side of the problem, by proposing different security mechanisms. Others
such as (IEE07) tried to approach the QoS issue by providing mechanisms to support a
proactive and seamless vertical handover.
The main problem with these efforts was the lack of cooperation; the author believes that,
in heterogeneous systems, the security and QoS should not be addressed separately. This
is due to the fact that although security and QoS are managed by different groups, their
implementation will have an impact on each other. Without information about the available
security level and the desired requirements, a poor assignment of the QoS parameters may
lead to denial of service for vital but low bandwidth data. In contrast, an ignorance of the
QoS requirements with the implementation of high security level may reduce the effectiveness
of the offered QoS.
The author believe that, by integrating network QoS and security, issues such as the se-
cure delivery of QoS parameters during connection set up, data protection during trans-
mission as well as immunity against denial of service attacks can be achieved. If security
mechanisms such as authentication, authorization and access control are enforced during
the QoS signalling stage, this will help in providing secure access and authorized resource
reservation. Additionally, considering the QoS requirement while determining the security
parameters such as the encryption algorithms and the length of the keys will provide secure
transmission path as well as content protection without any contradictions with the QoS
performance. Therefore, there is a need for a new architecture wherein different security and
QoS mechanisms could be integrated with the communication system. The Y-Comm frame-
work (GM07), (GM06) discussed in the following chapter, provides one such communication
framework to align with the works of the above groups, and provides the whole package to
support security, QoS and connectivity, as well as introducing a model to support vertical
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handover.
The research presented in this thesis addresses the shortages of the afore-mentioned related
work. For this to be accomplished, the proposed approach introduces some novel concepts,
as follows: Firstly, the concept of the multi-layer, Integrated Security Module (ISM) to
protect the data and provide security at different levels .i.e network, transport and appli-
cation levels. Secondly, to provide security for heterogeneous networking without affecting
its dynamics or openness, the proposed approach introduced the concept of the Targeted
Security Models (TSMs) to protect both the data and the entities such as users, servers and
network infrastructure. These models will address the security in specific situations such as
connection initiation and the handover. Thirdly, unlike all the related security work in the
literature, the proposed security protocols in this thesis were verified using formal methods
approach based on the Casper/FDR tool (LBDH09), (PR10), (Sys93). Fourthly, in order to
support the QoS-Security integration, a QoS framework for 4G system was proposed. This
framework will provide QoS in different situations such as connection and handover and
thus, proposes targeted QoS-Signalling models which will be integrated with the targeted
security models. Finally, considering a well defined architecture for communication systems
in heterogeneous environments such as Y-Comm which, provides a framework to align our
proposed security and QoS models. This will enable the full integration between security,
QoS and communication.
1.5 The Scope of this Thesis
The research in this thesis is mainly concerned with proposing new QoS and security mech-
anisms that consider the unique nature of heterogeneous networks, and shows how these
mechanisms could be aligned using future communication architectures such as the Y-Comm
framework. This has led to the design and analysis of new security and QoS mechanisms
which will be integrated with the Y-Comm communication framework. The security proto-
cols were formally verified and integrated in designated security framework.
It is worth pointing out that although Y-Comm has been used as a model framework, the
mechanisms proposed in this research to address security and QoS integration for hetero-
geneous networks could be used with any future communication framework that shares the
author’s view of how the network will evolve in the future as presented in section 1.
Casper/FDR which is a formal methods-based tool was used to verify the proposed security
protocols in this thesis. We chose Casper from a range of options such as AVISPA tool
(AVI06), due to its wide-spread usage and wealth of resources. However, verification using
Casper only considers the protocol within the system as defined in the protocol description.
5
It does not consider threats or attacks resulting from the implementation environment as
explained in Chapter 8.
This thesis is not focused on experimental implementation and performance analysis. For the
QoS framework, there is a need to analyse the performance of the proposed QoS-Signalling
models. Future implementation paths for the proposed security protocols are investigated in
Chapter 9. Among the potential implementation options is using the Compiler Of Security
Protocols into Java (COSP-J) (Did09) or the Automatic Code Generator into C# code
(ACG-C#) compilers (CJ05), which respectively produce Java and C# implementations
of protocols from Casper-like descriptions. Another option is using Ontological methods
to describe the security protocols and to define the integration with the communication
framework as well as enhanced network services.
1.6 The Structure of this Thesis
This thesis is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2: reviews the literature of most relevance to the research questions. This
includes the following areas:
1. The work of the IEEE 802.21 WG (IEE07) to introduce a vertical handover mech-
anism in heterogeneous environments.
2. The security approach introduced by the HOKEY WG (HOK07) to support secure
vertical handover.
3. The security work introduced by the Mobile Ethernet Architecture group (Kur05)
to build a secure service architecture in heterogeneous environments.
4. Describing the related work in our group ,the Y-Comm Research Group, to build
a secure 4G communication framework where security and QoS are addressed in
an integrated manner.
• Chapter 3: Analyses the proposed approaches and the devised constraints needed to
address the research questions
• Chapter 4: Describes the conducted research to define the actual network architecture
along with the Targeted QoS models to provide QoS signalling in different scenarios.
• Chapter 5: Introduces an Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) framework, which
comprises a number of AKA protocols to meet the functionality of some of the layers
of the Y-Comm’s Integrated Security Module.
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• Chapter 6: Develops Network-Level AKA protocols for authenticating the mobile ter-
minal and the network in case of initial connection as well as in the case of handover.
• Chapter 7: Introduces two Service-Level AKA protocols, which are responsible for
achieving mutual authentication and securing the session between the mobile terminal
and the service provider in two scenarios; the initial authentication and in case of a
handover.
• Chapter 8: Describes the Connection, Vertical handover and Ring-Based security mod-
els and shows how they could be defined by integrating the Targeted QoS models and
the AKA framework.
• Chapter 9: Investigates possible procedures towards implementing the proposed AKA
protocols and proposes enhancements on the addressing, location and naming systems
in the network that could aid in implementing the Ring-Based Model.
• Chapter 10: concludes the thesis with a summary of the main contributions of this
research study, along with a discussion on future work.
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Chapter 2
Overview of QoS and Security
Research in Heterogeneous Networks
2.1 Introduction
With the development of heterogeneous networks such as fourth Generation Networks (4G),
providing security and QoS has become an essential component when accessing different
networks. This provision has become a key issue for network professionals and researchers
especially when dealing with vertical handover issues. This chapter acknowledges that having
common mechanisms for security and QoS provision in such scenarios is a difficult task
because of the various wireless systems that use different technologies. Therefore, current
network mobile systems are critically analysed and evaluated in this chapter. A system
will be proposed to bridge the security and QoS gaps between such heterogeneous wireless
systems to create a scalable, manageable and adaptive solution for vertical hangovers. The
work in this chapter is also presented in (MA12a).
2.2 Network Evolution to Support Heterogeneous Net-
works
There are a growing number of wireless systems being developed and deployed including 3G,
WLAN, WiMax and Ultrawideband. Users will expect to be kept seamlessly connected to
the Internet as they move around using whatever networks are available at that moment and
whoever is the provider.
This widespread use of wireless technologies has highlighted a significant evolution in Internet
Architecture. In terms of performance, it is now possible to divide the Internet into two
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Figure 2.1: The Future Internet Structure
distinct parts: a core network and edge or peripheral networks. As shown in Fig 2.1, the
core network consists of a super-fast backbone and fast access networks which are attached
to the core. The backbone network is being made fast by the use of optical switches while
the access networks are being upgraded using MPLS techniques. On the other hand, the
peripheral network will be dominated by the deployment of wireless technology. This means
that the characteristics of the core network will be very different to the peripheral wireless
network on the edge.
This change needs to be reflected in new networking architecture to clearly define the func-
tions, the order and the interlocking relationships that are necessary to support different
functionalities such as handover, security and QoS in heterogeneous environment. By con-
sidering the above-described changes of the network structure, different research efforts such
as the Daidalos II architecture (S.S07), the Mobile Ethernet framework (MK04) and the In-
ternational Telecommunication Union (ITU-T) (IT04) have been working on defining a new
architecture for heterogeneous networks. These working groups have agreed on the need for
a central management entity to control and manage the resources of the different networks.
This concept of a central management entity has been adopted by the Y-Comm group via
introducing the concept of the Core-End Points (CEPs) as central administrative domains
that control the operation of different network operators in the local area as shown in Fig 2.2.
The main entities in the CEP, their structures as well as the interactions between them have
been defined as part of this research in Chapter 4.
2.3 The Integrated Service (IntServ)and the Differen-
tiated Service (DiffServ)QoS mechanisms in the In-
ternet
These are two IETF architectures that have been proposed for providing QoS in the Internet.
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Figure 2.2: The Core End Point
2.3.1 The IntServ
The IntServ architecture provides an explicit, End-to-End resource reservation. It is based
on two main features:
1. Reserved Resource: As each router needs to know how much of its own resources are
allocated for each of the ongoing sessions.
2. Call Admission: before setting up a session with a guaranteed QoS, there is a need to
reserve sufficient resources at each router between the source and the destination to
ensure an end-to-end QoS.
The call admission process requires each router in the session path to determine the
required resources by the session consider the amount of resources allocated for other
sessions and decide whether it has sufficient resources to accommodate the new session.
The IntServ architecture defines two service classes:
1. Guaranteed QoS: provides mathematically provable, firm bounds on the queuing delays
that a packet will experience in a router (SS97).
2. Controlled-Load Network Service: a session in this class will receive a quality of service
approximating the QoS that the same flow would receive from an unloaded network
element (RB94). In this sense, the session will expect that a high percentage of its
packets will pass through the router with a close to zero queuing delay in the router.
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Analysis
The ability to request and reserve per-flow resources makes it possible for the IntServ to
provide QoS guarantees to individual flows. However, this advantage comes with major
difficulties associated the per-flow reservation as follows:
1. Scalability: The per-flow resource reservation requires each router to deal with resource
reservations and to maintain per-flow state for each session. This incurs significant
overhead in large networks.
2. Flexible service models: The IntServ framework provides a small number of pre-
specified service classes. This set of service classes does not allow for more qualitative
or relative service distinctions. Furthermore, new service classes may arise and old
ones may become obsolete.
These considerations led to the so-called DiffServ activity within the IETF which will be
explained in section.
2.3.2 The DiffServ
The DiffServ architecture (SB98) is flexible and more scalable as it aggregates flows into
classes that receive treatment per class. This architecture is composed of a number of
functional elements implemented in network nodes, including a small set of per-hop forward-
ing behaviours, packet classification functions, and traffic conditioning functions including
metering, marking, shaping, and policing. This architecture achieves scalability by imple-
menting complex classification and conditioning functions only at network boundary nodes,
and by applying per-hop behaviours to aggregates traffic which have been appropriately
marked using the Differentiated Services Field (DS) field in the IPv4 or IPv6 headers. Per-
hop behaviours are defined to permit a reasonably granular means of allocating buffer and
bandwidth resources at each node among competing traffic streams. Per- application flow
or per-customer forwarding state need not be maintained within the core of the network.
Analysis
Unlike IntServ which requires advance setup such as call admission, DiffServ does not need
such effort and thus less time is needed to setup the connection with the required QoS. Also,
by removing the complexity of classification to the edge routers, this will reduce the load on
the core routers in the Internet.
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However, DiffServ only marks the packets with the hope of being treated differently. This
does not necessarily ensure a QoS as it is up to the service provider to appreciate these marks
and apply the policies to accommodate the packets as needed.
2.4 Handover Classification
As stated in (GMMAM09), handover could be classified as hard and soft handovers. Hard
handovers occur when the current attachment is broken before the new connection is estab-
lished while in soft handovers, the current connection is broken after the new connection is
established.
Another potential classification is based on the entity that makes the decision to do a verti-
cal handover. The options basically are network-controlled handover in which the decision
to implement handover is taken by the network(s) to which the mobile node is currently
attached. The second is called client-based handover in which the client is the deciding en-
tity. Client-based handover is favoured as a more elegant solution (LP03). This is because
client-based handover is more scalable as the mobile node can easily monitor the necessary
parameters from its wireless interfaces.
A more advanced classification is shown in Fig 2.3, imperative handovers occur due to tech-
nological reasons only. Hence the mobile node changes its network attachment because it
has determined by technical analysis that it is good to do so. This could be based on pa-
rameters such as signal strength, coverage, the quality-of-service offered by the new network.
In contrast, alternative handovers occur due to reasons other than technical issues (SBC04).
Hence there is no severe loss of performance or loss of connection if an alternative handover
does not occur. The factors for performing an alternative handover include a preference for
a given network based on price or incentives.
Imperative handovers are in turn divided into two types. The first is called reactive handover.
This responds to changes in the low-level wireless interfaces as to the availability or non-
availability of certain networks. Reactive handovers can be further divided into anticipated
and unanticipated handovers. Anticipated handovers are soft handovers which describe the
situation where there are alternative base-stations to which the mobile node may handover.
With unanticipated handover, the mobile is heading out of range of the current attachment
and there is no other base-station to which to handover. These handovers are therefore
examples of hard handovers. The other type of imperative handover is called proactive han-
dover. These handovers use soft handover techniques. Proactive handover policies attempt
to know the condition of the various networks at a specific location before the mobile node
reaches that location.
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Figure 2.3: Vertical Handover Classification (GMMAM09)
2.5 IEEE 802.21 Standard
The IEEE 802.21 working group has developed standards to enable handover and interoper-
ability between heterogeneous network types including both 802 and non-802 networks. As
stated in (KT09), the purpose of IEEE 802.21 is to improve users’ experience by providing
Media Independent Handover (MIH) functionality that facilitates both mobile-initiated and
network-initiated handover.
To optimise handover in heterogeneous environment, the IEEE 802.21 proposed an intelligent
and generic interface that operated between the data link (L2) and Network layers (L3) of
the protocol stack. This interface holds all the required functions to support MIHF and thus
is referred to as Media Independent Handover Function (MIHF).
According to the IEEE 802.21 (IEE07), the MIHF should be available in the Mobile Terminal
(MT) and the network entities. The MIHF encompasses three types of services:
• MIH Event Services (MIES) detect changes in link layer, report them to the upper
layers. These events might be used as indicators for a potential handover.
• Media Independent Command Service (MICS) provides a set of commands that enables
the upper layers (policy or mobility management layers) to control the status of the
link such as on/off switching. Furthermore, some of the MICS commands enable the
upper layer to poll the link layer about its status before making the handover decisions
which is crucial to support proactive, mobile-initiated handover.
• Media Independent Information Service (MIIS) provides information such as topology,
location and link layer parameters (data rate, throughput, delay) about different net-
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works in the vicinity. This information, if provided, would aid the mobility management
protocol making handover decisions.
Fig 2.4 shows the Media Independent Handover Framework and the role of the MIHF as an
interface between the upper and lower layers.
Figure 2.4: The MIH Framework
2.5.1 Analysis
The IEEE 802.21 standard provides functions and libraries to support vertical handover in
heterogeneous networks. Also, its proposed vertical handover system could be considered as
a reference model for future communication frameworks.
However, the IEEE 802.21 model initially came with no security features in mind and only
recently, some security-related features were introduced i.e. solutions of the HOKEY WG.
Recently, some other enhancements were proposed to add a QoS negotiation stage to the
handover model. Furthermore, the IEEE 802.21 does not introduce a communication archi-
tecture to support the integration between QoS, security and mobility within a well-defined
communication framework.
2.6 Ambient Networks
Ambient Networks (NN04) is an architecture designed to support heterogeneous networking.
It is specially focused on providing seamless connectivity using a common control interface
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around different networks, thus converting them into Ambient Networks which are charac-
terised by three interfaces: the Ambient Service Interface, the Ambient Network Interface
and the Ambient Resource Interface. There are 4 layers in the Ambient Network design.
The Connectivity Layer describes the links and infrastructure used to connect two Ambient
Networks together. The Flow abstraction layer is used to define the connectivity provided
by different networking technologies and to control and manage the connectivity layer. A
flow is an abstract view of the connectivity provided by the underlying network technology.
Flows are also defined by flow endpoints and may also pass through intermediaries called
flow transits. The Bearer abstraction is a higher level abstraction which is not as location
specific as flows. Bearer endpoints therefore use a unique naming space which allows mobil-
ity, address translation and media manipulation to be supported. Finally, the Application
layer allows applications on Ambient Networks to use the architecture. The system therefore
supports a much more flexible approach to internetworking in general which means that a
global networking address can be replaced by high-level entity-names.
Ambient networks allow us to make better use of communication environment but does not
address the integration of communication, mobility , QoS and security.
2.7 The HOKEY WG
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) handover keying working group (HOKEY WG)
(HOK07) is currently developing solutions to provide a secure, media-independent handover,
also called inter-technology handover. The solutions are applicable to wireless access tech-
nologies based on the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (BA04) which is an au-
thentication framework that supports multiple authentication protocols, these are referred
to as EAP methods. Regardless of the method, the EAP key hierarchy derives two keys:
the Master Session Key (MSK) and the Extended MSK (EMSK) which are used by different
methods to derive further keys.
Based on EAP’s terminology, three entities are defined: The EAP peer which is the client
asking for authentication using an EAP method, the EAP Server which is an entity that
terminates the EAP authentication method with the peer; the EAP servers are often, but
not necessarily, co-located with AAA servers. And finally, the EAP authenticator which is
the network Access Point that supports the authentication functionality and enforces access
control based on the authentication result.
When a mobile terminal (MT) moves between different authenticators, it is desirable to avoid
a full EAP authentication to support fast handover. Therefore, the HOKEY group proposed
a new method for the EAP known as EAP Re-Authentication Protocol (ERP) (VN08) which
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will be discussed in the following sections.
2.7.1 ERP Key Hierarchy
To provide security without disturbing the handover procedure, the ERP achieves low latency
handover by launching the keying materials in the target network before the actual handover
takes place. Furthermore, the ERP introduces additional keys shown in Fig 2.5 , these are
defined in (VN08) as follows:
• The rRK - re-authentication Root Key, derived from the EMSK.
• The rIK - re-authentication Integrity Key, derived from the rRK.
• The rMSK - re-authentication MSK. This is a per-authenticator key, derived from the
rRK and is delivered to the authenticator.
Figure 2.5: The ERP Key Hierarchy
2.7.2 An Overview of the ERP method
The ERP is a new extension to EAP to support an EAP method-independent protocol
for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP re-authentication (ER) server
(VN08). It is assumed that, the ER server is collocated with an Authentication, Authoriza-
tion, Accounting and Cost (A3C) server (GG09).
Initially, the MT performs a full normal EAP authentication with the A3C server in its home
network. As a result of this authentication, the EAP’s keys namely, MSK and EMSK are
derived. However, when the MT roams, the ERP extension is used to achieve authentication
between the MT and the ERP-Server in the target network instead of performing a full EAP
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authentication. This process is referred to as pre-authentication because the keying materials
will be launched in the target network before the MT actually joins and it comprises:
The Pre-Authentication Process For the MT to use the ERP protocol with the access
point in the target network, it needs to derive a new re-authentication root key, this key is
derived using the EMSK and the domain name of the target network and hence, is called
the Domain Specific Root Key (DSRK). Using this key, further domain specific keys such as
the DsIK and DSrMSKs are derived, these will be used to secure the connection between the
MT and the network. Additionally, proving the possession of derived keys helps in achieving
authentication between the MT and the network.
2.7.3 Analysis of ERP
The HOKEY’s work seemed fairly stable particularly in terms of keys hierarchy and it has
influenced the direction of research when developing a Network-Level Authentication and Key
Agreement (NL-AKA) protocol. However, the solutions for keys distribution are still being
discussed by the HOKEY. Additionally, the ERP extension suffers from some drawbacks
which are summarised as follows:
1. Although the ERP is based on the EAP platform, it introduces new messages such as
EAP-Finish/Re-auth that includes a DSRK and the new domain name. This implies
that, all the network entities such as the Access points have to be updated or replaced
to support this extra message.
2. The ERP presumes that the MT will get the domain name of the target network
either implicitly when receiving the announcement or explicitly by soliciting for it.
This step should be part of the handover procedure rather than a part of the security
mechanism and thus removes some of the complexity from the security mechanisms.
Additionally, it is not clear how the MT would communicate with the ER server in the
target network and therefore, this raises the question whether the EAP-Finish/Re-auth
message include the address of the server?.
3. The EAP-Finish/Re-auth message is sent directly between the MT and the Authen-
ticator in the new network. This message includes the domain name of the target
network and is sent in an unprotected manner since there is no security agreement yet
between the MT and the target network.
4. In the ERP protocol, the MT’s home ERP server generates the keys and passes them to
the ERP server in the target network . However, in case of heterogeneous environments,
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this might not be feasible since these ERP severs might belong to different operators.
There is a need for a communication framework which provides a wider context to
implement these protocols.
5. The ERP protocol operates at the network level; it is only concerned with achiev-
ing secure handover at the lower layers without considering the upper (transport and
application) layers.
6. Although the security consideration section of the proposal (VN08) provides some
analysis of the protocol features, the protocol lacks formal analysis such as using a
formal methods approach.
2.8 The Mobile Ethernet Architecture
Mobile Ethernet Architecture is a Beyond 3G network system for the all IP integrated net-
work using MAC layer technologies (MK04), (Kur05). The architecture is based on the Wide
Area Ethernet (WAE) which is a virtual private network aimed at providing connectivity
based on the Ethernet (MAC) addressing and thus achieves interoperability among different
IP-based operators as shown in Fig 2.6.
Figure 2.6: The Mobile Ethernet Layer (Kur05)
As shown in Fig 2.7, in order to achieve scalability and interoperability among different
operators, the Mobile Ethernet proposes a network partitioning scheme. In this scheme the
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network will comprise a fast ring core network which aggregates a number of segments, each
segment is attached to a one or more of peripheral networks via a number of edge switches.
Figure 2.7: The Mobile Ethernet Network Structure (Kur05)
Handover in Mobile Ethernet Two types of handover are introduced in Mobile Ether-
net’s work:
• Intra-Segment handover : Mobility is managed in a distributed manner because each
switch in the segment tracks the location of the terminal as long as it is still within
the same segment. More details about Inter-Segment Mobility Management including
the procedures for locations’ regeneration and update are found in (Kur05).
• Inter-Segment handover : An Inter-Segment Mobility management provides the re-
quired functionalities to manage the handover among different segments in the core
network, this includes setting up the path between segments and sending location
update information to track the terminal’s movement. Further details are found in
(Kur05).
Security in Mobile Ethernet In (MK04), (I.D06), a secure service framework for Mo-
bile Ethernet was proposed. The framework comprises the following elements: the mobile
terminal (MT), a Contact-less smart card to hold user credentials, and a self-delegation unit
between the smart card and the terminal.
As explained in (MK04), (I.D06), the framework aims to provide security at different levels,
namely: Network, Service and personal levels. To achieve this, a self-delegation protocol
was introduced. This protocol achieves authentication between the mobile terminal and
the smart card and then delegates the terminal to perform authentication with the service
provider and the network operator.
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2.8.1 Analysis
This section discusses the security-related work of the Mobile Ethernet. Unlike the ERP
protocol of the HOKEY group, this framework proposes addressing security at different levels
through a self-delegation protocol. This concept of multi-level security can be utilised to
implement security in Y-Comm. However, as stated in (I.D06), deploying the self-delegation
protocol requires designated hardware and software which makes it a complicated process.
Moreover, in the case of handover, the framework does not consider if this will affect the
security at the service level and whether the service provider needs to know about the han-
dover and thus the terminal might need to re-authenticate itself again. Also, the framework
does not consider the QoS while providing security. Most importantly, the Mobile Ether-
net’s proposed protocols did not have clear goals and lacked formal verification to reveal any
vulnerabilities.
Additionally, the Mobile Ethernet work deals only with security without considering other
issues like QoS and vertical handover.
2.9 The Y-Comm Framework
The research aims to provide security for 4G systems and has adopted Y-Comm as a repre-
sentative of these systems. Therefore, it is very necessary to fully understand the Y-Comm
structure and its proposed approaches for handover and connectivity as well as its security
module.
2.9.1 An Overview of Y-Comm
As proposed in (GM07), (GM06), the Y-Comm framework is a communication architecture
to support vertical handover. Y-Comm uses two frameworks: the first is the Peripheral
framework which deals with operation on the mobile terminal. The second is the Core
framework and deals with functions in the core network to support different peripheral net-
works. These frameworks are brought together to represent a future telecommunications
environment which supports heterogeneous devices, disparate networking technologies, net-
work operators and service providers. The two frameworks, shown in Fig 2.8, share a
common base subsystem consisting of the hardware platform and network abstraction lay-
ers. Both frameworks diverge in terms of functionality, but the corresponding layers interact
to provide support for heterogeneous environments.
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Figure 2.8: The Y-Comm Framework
The Peripheral Framework
The Peripheral Framework is concerned with activities on mobile nodes and in the wireless
networks to which they are connected. The peripheral framework has seven layers:
• The Hardware Platform Layer (HPL): It is used to classify all relevant wireless tech-
nologies. Hence different wireless technologies which are characterised by the electro-
magnetic spectrum, MAC and modulation techniques make up this layer.
• The Network Abstraction Layer (NAL): It provides a common interface to manage and
control different wireless technologies. The first two layers for both frameworks are
similar in functionality. In the Peripheral Framework, they run on the mobile terminal
to support the various wireless network technologies while in the Core Framework these
two layers are used to control the functions of base stations of different networks.
• The Vertical Handover Layer (VHL): This layer executes vertical handover. Therefore,
this layer acquires the resources for handover, does the initial handover signalling,
context transfer and packet reception after vertical handover.
• The Policy Management Layer (PML): The PML decides whether, when and why han-
dover should occur. This is done by looking at various parameters related to handover
such as signal strength and using policy rules to decide both the time and place for
doing the handover.
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• The End Transport Layer(ETL): It allows the mobile node to make end-to-end connec-
tions across the core network. This layer provides the functionalities of the Network
and Transport layers of the TCP/IP module.
• The QoS Layer (QL): In the Peripheral Framework, it supports two mechanisms for
handling QoS. The first is defined as Downward QoS. This is when an application spec-
ifies its required quality-of-service to the system and the system attempts to maintain
this QoS over varying network channels. The other definition is Upward QoS, where
the application itself tries to adapt to the changing QoS. This layer also monitors the
QoS used by the wireless network as a whole to ensure stable operation.
• The Applications Environments Layer (AEL): It specifies a set of objects, functions
and routines to build applications which make use of the framework.
The Core Framework
This framework deals with functions in the core network. The first two layers of the Core
Framework are shared with the Peripheral framework. The remainders layers are:
1. The Reconfiguration Layer (REL): It is responsible for managing key infrastructure
such as routers, switches, and other mobile network infrastructure using programmable
networking techniques.
2. The Network Management Layer (NML): The NML is a management plane that is
used to control networking operations in the core. This layer divides the core into
a number of networks which are managed into an integrated fashion. It also gathers
information on peripheral networks such that it can inform the policy management
layer on mobile nodes about wireless networks at their various locations.
3. The Core Transport System (CTS): It is concerned with moving data through the core
network.
4. The Network QoS Layer (NQL): It is concerned with QoS issues within the core network
especially the interface between the core network and the peripheral networks.
5. The Service Platform Layer (SPL): This layer allows services to be installed on various
networks at the same time.
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2.9.2 Vertical Handover in Y-Comm
Y-Comm supports a number of different handover types (GMMAM09), the most complicated
of which is called proactive handover in which a mobile node decides on when and where
to handover. The parameter called the Time Before Vertical Handover denoted by TBVH,
is calculated (FS07). TBVH allows the higher layers of Y-Comm to take evasive action to
minimize the effect of performance degradation due to handover. The interaction is shown
in Fig 2.9
Figure 2.9: The Proactive Handover
Since proactive handover attempts to determine when and where handover should occur, it
is necessary to have a knowledge of networks in the local area where the mobile is located.
The mobile node therefore polls the NML to obtain information with regard to all local
wireless networks, their topologies and QoS characteristics. This information along with the
direction and speed of the mobile as well as the QoS of on-going connections are used by
the Policy Management Layer to determine where and when handover should occur. The
PML calculates TBVH - the period after which handover will occur. This information is
communicated to the Vertical Handover Layer which immediately requests resources to do a
handover. Even though the resources are acquired early, handover actually takes place when
TBVH expires. The message sequence is given in Fig 2.10
In addition, once the PML decides to handover, the new IP address, the new QoS as well as
TBVH, are communicated to the upper layers. Given TBVH, the upper layers are expected
to take the necessary steps to avoid any packet loss, latency or slow adaptation. For example,
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Figure 2.10: The Proactive Handover Transaction
it may be possible for the End-Transport Layer to signal an impending change in the QoS on
current transport connections and to begin to buffer packets ahead of the handover. After
handover, the previous channel used by the mobile node is released.
2.9.3 Y-Comm Security Framework
As shown in Fig 2.11, Y-Comm deploys a multi-layer security model which must be applied
to both the Peripheral and Core Framework simultaneously to provide security in different
situations. The security layers must work together across both frameworks in order to be
fully integrated with the new architecture. The important point to note is that the need to
support heterogeneous networking with open architectures means that security should not
only protect data using cryptographic techniques but network entities as well by monitoring
the utilization of these entities and making sure that they are not abused or overloaded by
even legitimate users. The highest layer of security is at layer seven and is called Service and
Application Security or SAS. In the Peripheral Framework, SAS defines the AAAC functions
at the end-device and is used to authenticate users and applications. SAS in the Core network
provides AAAC functions for services on the Service Platform in the core network.
The next security layer is called QoS-Based Security or QBS and is concerned with QoS
issues and the changing QoS demands of the mobile environment as users move around. In
addition, in order to meet their service-level agreements, servers may choose to replicate
services closer to the current position of the mobile. So it is necessary to ensure that core
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Figure 2.11: The Y-Comm Complete Structure
endpoints and peripheral networks are not overloaded. The QBS layer also attempts to block
QoS related attacks, such as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks on networks and servers.
The next security layer is at layer five, called Network Transport Security or NTS. In the
Peripheral network, NTS is concerned with access to and from end-devices and the visibility
of these devices and services on the Internet. In the core network, NTS is used to set up
secure connections through the core network. So NTS in the Core Framework involves setting
up secure tunnels between core endpoints using mechanisms such as IPsec to ensure that
moving data across the core network is done in a secure manner.
Finally, the fourth and last level of security is defined at layer four but can also encompass
layers three and two. It is called Network Architecture Security or NAS. In the Peripheral
Framework, it attempts to address security issues involved in using particular networking
technologies and the security threats that occur from using such a technology. So when a
mobile device wishes to use any given network, NAS is invoked to ensure that the user is
authorized to do so. NAS also ensures in the core network, NAS is used to secure access to
the programmable infrastructure. NAS in this context determines which switchlets, routelets
or base-station resources may be used by the network management system.
2.9.4 Analysis
The Y-Comm provides a platform to integrate different mechanisms for QoS and Security
as well to support vertical handover. In addition, because Y-Comm has proposed a detailed
model of proactive handover including the concept of TBVH, it facilitates an easier integra-
tion of the QoS and security mechanisms with the communication framework. Furthermore,
since the security framework is integrated with the Core and Peripheral frameworks within
Y-Comm, its security functions will be part of the communications architecture and thus,
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could be used to much greater effect than previous methods.
However, there is a need to define the layers’ underlying security protocols and some access
control mechanisms. Additionally, the interface between these protocols has to be specified
in order to provide an integrated security approach which addresses threats at different
levels. Furthermore, because Y-Comm is an open architecture, it is also necessary to protect
entities such as users, servers and network infrastructure as well as the data. This protection
has to be provided without restricting the openness of the 4G systems. Therefore, we need
define Targeted Security Models (TSMs) which are based around protecting a specific entity
from being abused or attacked by other entities such as users in an open architecture. This
is a new concept which the author believes is necessary to provide a secure environment.
Therefore, defining and formally verifying these models comprise a major part of this thesis.
2.10 A Summary and Overall Evaluation
Addressing security in Next Generation Networks (NGNs) have attracted many research
groups. Each attempted to tackle the problem from a different perspective and hence, many
issues have been addressed while many more are waiting to be resolved.
Our research to provide QoS and security for the Y-Comm framework benefited from the
work of these groups. For example, the vertical handover models of the IEEE 802.21 and
the Mobile Ethernet helped in defining models for reactive and proactive vertical handover
in Y-Comm (GMMAM09). Also, we benefited from the pre-authentication concept and the
key hierarchy of the ERP protocol to define our AKA protocol for a secure vertical handover.
The concept of a multi-level security framework of the Mobile Ethernet can co-exist with the
concept of the Integrated Security Module of Y-Comm. Additionally, our research benefited
from the self-delegation protocol to provide security for the SAS layer of the Y-Comm security
module.
However, our research differs from the previous works in many ways: Firstly, unlike all the
previous protocols, our research considered an integration between the security and QoS
through the functionality of the QBS layer of the Y-Comm security module. Secondly, all
the proposed mechanisms and protocols have been verified using formal methods approach
based on Casper/FDR tool (LBDH09), (PR10), (Sys93). Thirdly, in contrast to all the
aforementioned mechanisms which considered protecting the data being sent and received,
the approach taken aims to protect the data, as well as the network’s entities whether they
were servers or clients and thus, mitigates major threats such as SPAM and DOS attacks.
Most significantly, our security approach considers the dynamics and open nature of future
networks and thus aims at providing security without affecting these features. In order to
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achieve this, there is a need to deal with security and QoS in a dynamic way, rather than a
static one, in order to target security and QoS in different scenarios. Therefore, our approach
proposes Targeted Security Models (TSMs) as well as Targeted QoS Models. More details
about these models will be given in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
Approach and Constraints
3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the proposed approaches as well as the constraints needed to address
the research questions. The first section of this chapter recalls the research questions, while
the second section presents the environment and the methodology which will be followed
to answer the research question. The third section discusses our research to define network
architecture and propose a QoS framework. The fourth section discusses the security-related
part of the research, it will describe the proposed AKA protocols and validate our choice of
the verification method. Lastly, a chapter overview is given in the summary section
3.2 Proposed Work
We propose to investigate the QoS and security issues in heterogeneous systems and to
develop novel approaches to be applied in different scenarios without restricting the flexibility
of the systems. The solution adopts Y-Comm as a potential communication framework for
heterogeneous networks to align the proposed security and QoS mechanisms in this research.
3.2.1 The Concept of Targeted Models
Due to the dynamic and open nature of future networks, QoS and security have to be provided
very carefully so as not to limit network flexibility. Additionally, 4G is an open architecture
where the end user might be either a mobile or stationary client starting a connection or a
server receiving access requests. It is imperative that a dynamic approach to address the QoS
and security are considered in these situations. In addition, it is important to observe that
in this environment it is not just about delivering and protecting data, but also the entities
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in the system, i.e. users, servers and network infrastructure, need to be protected from each
other for example SPAM, DDOS and Impersonation attacks. Therefore, new methods need
to be developed to target QoS and security in specific scenarios.
In multi-technological and multi-operator environments such as 4G networks, there is a
need for defining signalling mechanisms that guarantee the provision of an End-to-End QoS.
Therefore, this research proposes a QoS signalling framework. The proposed framework
requires certain level of cooperation among network elements. Therefore, it proposes some
functional modules/ interfaces to be run on different network entities in order to signal QoS
in different scenarios, thus three Targeted QoS-Signalling Models: the initial registration,
the connection and the vertical handover models have been introduced.
In future heterogeneous environments, security has to be applied at different levels in an
integrated manner. Therefore, there is a need for a multi-pronged security architecture
where security protocols address the threats of each level. Additionally, these protocols have
to operate very closely together as well as with the communication procedure to provide full
integration of security and communication mechanisms.
In order to meet such requirements, the proposed approach in this research benefited from
the Y-Comm’s integrated security module to introduce the concept of the Targeted Security
Models (TSMs) which addressed security in different scenarios, thus it yielded three security
models: the connection security model which controls the connection between users and thus
prevents a user from arbitrarily sending an unsolicited message to another user. The Ring-
Based model helps in protecting the servers from unwanted traffic, e.g., Spam by giving the
server the ability to decide on the nodes they can communicate with. The Vertical handover
security model facilitates secure vertical handover and attempts to prevent network resources
from being abused and overloaded.
3.3 Research Methodology
This section describes our approach to define the three security models, the approach started
by investigating the security threats in 4G systems.
3.3.1 The Threat Model
As explained in (MA10), the key security threats in heterogeneous networks include access
control, communication security, data confidentiality,availability and privacy. These threats
are not seen in 3G networks because the network infrastructure is wholly owned by the
network operators and access is denied to other network entities. However, such assumptions
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are no longer valid in heterogeneous systems and therefore must be addressed in any proposed
security architecture. Moreover, since 4G is an IP-Based environment, it will suffer from most
of the IP-specific security vulnerabilities found in the Internet. Our experience of the Internet
as the best example of a successful open architecture has taught us that it is not sufficient
to only protect data but it is also necessary to protect entities from each other (DoS, Spam)
and also to protect the network infrastructure.
3.3.2 Solution Approach
The next step of the research was to introduce abstract security models to address security
threats in 4G systems. However, because our approach proposed integration between the
security and QoS, the next step of the approach was to define QoS architecture in heteroge-
neous environments.
After presenting the environment and defining the operational entities in the network struc-
ture, a set of Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocols along with access control
mechanisms were proposed and verified using formal methods approach. These protocols
were integrated in AKA frameworks which will cooperate with the QoS framework to define
the targeted security models
3.4 QoS-Related Work
4G networks will support global roaming across multiple wireless and mobile networks for
example, from a cellular network to a satellite-based network to a high-bandwidth wireless
LAN. This diversity of services and access technologies will be a universal characteristic in
future communications and poses major challenges such as secure cross-domains mobility
support, network resource management and QoS provision.
Initially, the client subscribes to a service with a range of desired QoS and security levels,
these are defined as the Service Level of Agreement (SLA). Maintaining the client’s SLA
is quite feasible as the client roams within single-operator environments. However, in a
multi-operator environment such as the 4G, the client might move outside its home network
to a new network with entirely different QoS and security measures. In such a case, the
client might not get the original SLA and a trade-off between the security and QoS has to
be achieved. This concept of compromising between the required QoS and recommended
security is referred to as the Quality of Security Service (QoSS) (TEL00).
As a representative of 4G systems, Y-Comm, by deploying the concept of QoSS, proposes
integration between the QoS and the security through the function of the QoS Based Security
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(QBS) layer. Additionally, since the security is also integrated with the communication
framework, we need to define the interface that enables this integration.
The author believes that network architectures will play a key role in implementing the
features required to address these issues. Therefore, part of our research considered defining
the network structure and proposing models for QoS signalling in different scenarios such
as the connection initiations and handover. These models will integrate with the proposed
AKA frameworks to define the security models.
3.5 Security-Related Work
This section describes our security-related research in some detail. We started by describing
the targeted security models then explain the approach followed to define these models.
3.5.1 The Targeted Security Models
The Targeted Security Models (TSM) are security models based around protecting a specific
entity from being abused or attacked by other entities such as users in an open architecture.
We have identified three security models that need to be developed, the first is called the
connection security model which controls the connection between users and thus prevents a
user from arbitrarily sending an unsolicited message to another user.
The second security model is concerned with restricting access to servers by introducing
the concept of a scope. This is an enhancement of the ’Off By Default’ (HB05) proposal.
Therefore, users can only access the server when they are in the same scope as the server.
The final security model is for facilitating secure vertical handover and attempts to prevent
network resources from being abused and overloaded. This can be achieved by monitoring
resource requests and ensuring access to vulnerable components that does not exceed the
available QoS.
The next step is to define the mechanisms and the protocols that will be used by the afore-
mentioned models. This novel approach is explained in the following subsection.
3.5.2 A multi-layer AKA Protocols
The Y-Comm’s security module comprises four layers, each of which addresses the security
at a specific level. When defining the underlying security protocols of these layers three types
of AKA protocols were proposed:
• The User-Level AKA (UL-AKA) Protocol : Operates between the Mobile device, the
SIM card and the user. After running this protocol, the mobile terminal will represent
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the user in the remainder stages. This protocol resides at the Service and Application
Security (SAS) layer of the Y-Comm’s security module.
• The Network-Level AKA (NL-AKA) Protocols : Achieves mutual authentication be-
tween the mobile terminal and the access network and thus, addresses some functions
of the Network Architecture Security (NAS) layer. For network level security, two pro-
tocols have been defined: the AKA protocol for the initial authentication process and
the Pre-AKA protocol for the authentication in case of handover.
• The Service-Level AKA (SL-AKA) Protocol : Provides authentication between the mo-
bile terminal, the service provider (SP) and it is related mainly to the Network Trans-
port Security (NTS) layer.
The next step was to verify the proposed protocols and check their vulnerability to security
threats.
3.5.3 Verifying Security Protocols
Protocol verification and validation can be achieved using different approaches. Discrete
event simulators such as NS2 (TI09) and OPNET (Abo07) provide good capabilities to anal-
yse the protocol performance. Other approaches based on the Unified Modelling Language
(UML) or the Specification and Description Language (SDL) provide validation methods to
check the protocol against its specification in order to prevent undesired states and behaviour.
This includes preventing deadlocks and livelocks. However, the verification of security pro-
tocols against their claimed properties requires special toolsets such as a mathematical logic
or model checks.
Generally speaking, verifying security protocols is based on theorem proofs and verification
logic such as the BAN logic (MB90), (SB04) which determines the trust relationship among
the protocols’ parties. However, the BAN logic considered the authentication properties
only so it could have not be used in confidentiality analysis. Also, the BAN logic assumed
all parties to be honest and trustworthy, thus, this assumption has to be considered when
interpreting the BAN results.
Another approach to simulate the security systems is by using formal specifications such as
the ”Z” notation (Spi92) or the Communicating Sequential Process (CSP) (Hoa85),(PR10)
which uses mathematical notations to describe the properties which an information system
must have. Verifying these properties is achieved using model checkers such as Failures-
Divergence Refinement (FDR) (Sys93).
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FDR is able to check whether a security model satisfies certain security properties by proving
that an implementation is a refinement of a specification. FDR does trace refinements, failure
refinements, and failure divergence refinements. However, for security analysis only the trace
refinement is used to check whether a security model does satisfy security properties such as
secrecy and authentication.
However, describing a system or a protocol using formal specifications is quite a difficult and
error-prone task. Therefore, Gavin Lowe (LBDH09) has developed CASPER/FDR tool to
model security protocols which accepts a simple and human-friendly input file that describes
the system and compiles it into CSP code which is then checked using the FDR model
checker. CASPER’s input file consists of eight headers as explained in Table 3.1
The Header Meaning
# Free Variables Defines all the variables, functions and agents
# Processes Where each agent in the system is repre-
sented by a process
# Protocol Description Describes system messages
# Specification Specifies the system’s security features to be
tested
# Actual Variables Defines the real variables, in the actual sys-
tem to be checked
# Functions Has all the functions used by the agents
# System Lists all the agents participating in the actual
system with their parameters instantiated
# Intruder Information Identifies the intruder and its initial knowl-
edge
Table 3.1: Casper input file headers
3.6 Summary
Due to the unique nature of 4G systems and the aim to support full integration within the
Y-Comm architecture, the research work attempted to define the Targeted Models in the
context of the Y-Comm required research to be carried out in both security and QoS sides.
Furthermore, the research needed to propose the underlying security protocols of the Y-
Comm’s security module, verify them using formal methods approach and then integrate
them via security frameworks. It also needed to propose potential QoS-signalling models
along with the network architecture which was used to define the interface that enabled
the integration between security, QoS and communication framework. This issue will be
investigated in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
A QoS Framework for 4G Systems
4.1 Introduction
In heterogeneous environments, mobile nodes move between different types of networks, some
of which will not meet the nodes’ requirements in terms of QoS or security. In such cases,
the nodes need to choose the best network that meets their desired requirement, this implies
that the nodes might need to trade-off between the desired requirements. For instance, nodes
might choose a highly secure connection which reduces the QoS or vice-versa.
This situation becomes more serious when considering multi-homed mobile devices; that is
due to the fact that, current network addresses (IPv4 and IPv6 (Alm92), (SD98)) identify
the network interface cards rather than the devices holding them. Therefore, multi-homed
devices could start multiple connections without any indication that these belong to the same
device. Such scenarios will impact QoS and security as it will aid denial of service (DoS)
attacks since a single multi-homed device can participate in multiple connections at the same
time over different networks. This situation highlights the fact that in future networks, QoS
and security are inter-connected and thus, should not be separately considered by any future
communication framework.
Also from a security perspective, in order to provide a practical security solution for 4G
systems, any proposed security mechanism has to consider the network structure and its
operational entities. This will define the interface that enables the integration between the
security mechanisms and the communication framework. Additionally, there is a need to
deal with effects of the multi-homing issue in an integrated manner, this could be achieved
by enhancing network services such as naming and locating services as will be described in
Chapter 9.
Since Y-Comm provides a framework to integrate security, the QoS and communication
mechanism, this chapter describes part of the conducted research that attempts to define
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Figure 4.1: The ITU Recommended Network Parties
the actual network architecture along with QoS models to provide QoS signalling in different
scenarios such as the connection initiation and handover. The first section describes a pro-
posed network architecture and explains its major entities in terms of structure and function.
The second section discusses potential QoS signalling models for different scenarios.
4.2 Network Architecture Overview
In 4G networks, multiple network operators have to cooperate in order to provide the user
with ubiquitous connectivity. Since each network operator uses a different network architec-
ture, interoperability might be one of the most challenging problems facing the deployment
of 4G technology. One proposed solution for this problem is having a central management
entity to control the resource of the all different technologies and coordinate the multi-
ple operators. As explained in (MA12a), the concept of a central management entity was
recommended by different architectures for NGNs such as Daidalos and Mobile Ethernet
(Agu06), (Kur05). The ITU-T recommendation for NGN as in (IT04), (ITU06) proposes
the concept of Regulatory Authority, shown in Fig 4.1 which controls different network op-
erators and service providers. The Regulatory Authorities are regulatory bodies with the
power to influence policies in telecommunication services, they are responsible for creating
national policies to encourage the development of telecommunications, also they provide es-
sential powers to regulate license agreements, interconnection arrangements, and monitoring
unlawful telecommunication activities.
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Figure 4.2: The Hierarchical Network Structure
Chapter 2 presented the Y-Comm’s view of the Internet structure. This section presents
a more detailed view of the network along with its components. As shown in Fig 4.2, we
proposed a hierarchical structure of the network composed of three levels. The top level is
the Core End-Point (CEP) which acts as a gateway to the Internet and is responsible for
managing multiple, mid-level domains. Each domain is technology-specific and is controlled
by a single operator. For instance the CEP might be connected to two domains, each is
controlled by different technology operator such as WiMAX and GSM. The bottom level
is the peripheral wireless networks, controlled by Access Routers or Base-stations through
which the mobile terminal has access to the wider network.
As shown in Fig 4.2, for scalable support of Security, QoS and handover in heterogeneous net-
works, different operating entities exist in the network such as Domain QoS Broker (DQoSB),
Core QoS Broker (CQoSB) and A3C servers (CA3C). These entities collaborate and function
on both network and service management to provide QoS and security-related tasks.
• Core A3C (CA3C): The top level A3C server resides in the Core End-Point and is
responsible for service level management. It holds users’ Service Level Agreements
(SLAs) that contain the subscribed services along with the associated QoS and networks
or the Operators, the user can access with the corresponding QoS. This information is
passed to the CQoSB for network level management.
• Core QoS Broker (CQoSB): plays a major role in managing inter-CEPs functions as
well as negotiating QoS parameters with other CQoSBs in the case of cross Core End-
Points connection. The CQoSB initially extracts users’ Level of Agreement from the
CA3C.
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• Domain A3C (DA3C): The DA3C is responsible for handling users’ service require-
ments. Initially, it extracts users’ profile information from the CA3C and uses this
information for authorizing the users’ requests to access services.
• Domain QoS Broker (DQoSB): gets user’s profile information from the CQoSB and
manages the resources of the attached peripheral networks with respect to the user
preferences and network availability, it also makes a per-flow admission control decision.
In order to support handover, DQoSB uses a Network Intelligent Interface Selection
(NIIS) module (IEE07), (S.S07) for load balancing and handover initiation between
peripheral networks.
• Access Router (AR): This is the link between the domain and peripheral networks; it
enforces the DQoSB’s admission control decision. The AR resides between the Mobile
Terminal and the A3C server in the domain. Therefore, using security terminology,
the AR acts as an Authenticator (Auth) with the DA3C server.
• Mobile Terminal (MT): The MT is the user’s device, used to access the network and to
request a service. To comply with the heterogeneity of 4G systems, the MT should be
able to get the subscribed service using the best available access network. Therefore,
for the integration of Handover and QoS, the MT contains a mobility decision module
called Intelligent Interface Selection (IIS) (S.S07) and a QoS module called QoS Client
(QoSC).
Optionally, some service providers, not shown in Fig 4.2, such as video on-demand providers
might reside in the Core end-point; these providers have agreements with the network
providers to guarantee the required QoS.
4.3 Network Entities
In order for the afore-mentioned network entities to cooperate and accomplish their security
and QoS tasks, a set of modules and interface should reside in each entity. This section
starts by explaining the network elements structure; it then defines possible protocols for the
connection between the elements.
4.3.1 Network Entities Structure
In our design, we separate the Service and Network management entities. However, for these
entities to interact using the above protocols, they should contain certain interfaces as shown
in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: The Structure and Relationship Between the Network Entities
• The Mobile Terminal (MT): the MT has four interfaces. The QoS Client (QoSC)
talks to the QoS Manager (QoSM) of the Access Router, A3C interface enables the
client to send A3C Registration/de-registration requests to the A3C server; the Intelli-
gent Interface Selection (IIS)is used to choose the best network for a handover based on
user preference and network availability, and Media Independent Handover Functions
(MIHF) which is used to control the network interfaces of the Mobile terminal and
perform handover based on the IIS module decision.
• The Access Router (AR): The AR comprises five modules: QoSM which has two in-
terfaces, one with the QoSC on the mobile terminal and the other with the QoSB engine
of the DQoSB, the A3C interface used to talk to the DA3C. The Access Admission
Enforcement (AAE) module enforces the decision of the Access Admission Decision
module (AAD) in the DQoSB; Network Monitoring Entity (NME) module monitors
the utilization of network resources and reports this to the Centralized NME (CNME)
module of the DQoSB, the MIHF module enables the (AR) to manage different types
of peripheral networks
• The Domain QoS Broker (DQoSB): the DQoSB has five modules: the QoSB
Engine which makes management decisions and has two interfaces: one with the QoSM
of the (AR) and the other with the CQoSB in the Core End-Point, the A3C interface
is used to talk to the DA3C server in the domain; the NWIIS module manages the
ARs and support load balancing, Access Admission Decision (AAD) module acts as a
proxy for the high level AAD (HAAD) in the Core endpoint, and provides the AAE
with policy- related decisions; the CNME module, as proposed in (Y.S08) comprises
two main sub-modules: a Merger sub-module which aggregates the traces from NMEs
and provides a coherent view of the traffic status. Analysis engine does a screening for
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network resource utilization and informs other modules of any abnormalities.
• The Core QoS Broker (CQoSB): the CQoSB comprises three modules: the QoS
Engine manages inter-domain connection and provides end-to-end QoS across core-end
points, the A3C interface is used for the interaction with the CA3C server.
4.3.2 Network Protocols
As stated with the proposed QoS framework in (MA11a), to convey QoS-related information,
network entities have to interact using a common language. Three different types of protocols
are needed for the network entities interactions.
For the connection between the AAE and AAD, there is a need for policy information and
configuration exchange protocol such Common Open Policy Service (COPS) (DD00). In
our architecture, the access router (AR) acts as (AAE), the DQoSB acts as AAD and the
CQoSB acts as a top level AAD. We used the concept of policy for a network level access
control. However, for authorizing the service level request, we propose using an A3C such
as DIAMETER (MA07), (PC03) or RADIUS (CR00) protocols.
The A3C protocol with its basic structure (PC03) has no QoS- related functions. Therefore,
an enhanced version of the protocol (DS10) introduces three QoS-context aware entities:
Resource Requesting Entity (RRE) which triggers the authorization process, Authorizing
Entity (AE), an A3C server processes the access request and generates an allow/ deny de-
cision to the Network Element (NE). The (NE) is an intermediate router between the AE
and the RRE and acts as a client to the AE. Additionally, the extension proposes four new
messages which are used to request QoS-related resource authorization for a given flow and
then to activate the reserved resources to accommodate the connection. In the proposed
architecture, the authorization process is triggered by the MT, acting as a (RRE) entity.
The access router (AR) corresponds to an (NE) and the DA3C acts as (AE). For the initial
request, DA3C contacts the CA3C and gets the required information for authorizing the re-
quest; this information might be cached for later requests. Since the Mobile terminal (MT)
deals with different types of access networks, it needs a common interface to hide these dif-
ferences. The IEEE 802.21 protocol introduces the Media Independent Handover Functions
(MIHF) module (KT09) to manage the resources in the peripheral networks regardless of
their technologies.
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Table 4.1: Mapping the Network Entities to the Y-Comm layers
The Module The Network Entity The Y-Comm layer
CQoS MT QoS layer
QoSM, QoSB engines the DQoSB and the
CQoSB
Network QoS Layer
AAE, AAD, HAAD AR, DQoSB, CQoSB The Security Module
IIS, NWIIS MT, DQoSB Policy Management
layer, the Network
Management Layer
NME, CNME AR, DQoSB QoS , Network
QoS,the security
module
MIHF MT the Network Abstrac-
tion Layers
4.3.3 The Network Architecture in the Context of Y-Comm
Since the presented research in this thesis is in the context of Y-Comm, there is a need to
show how the proposed entities could be represented in the Y-Comm architecture. In terms
of functionality, this section shows a possible mapping between the afore-explained modules
and the Y-Comm layers as in 8.1.
While the CQoS module of the MT corresponds to the QoS layer in the Peripheral Frame-
work, the QoSM, QoSB engines in the DQoSB and the CQoSB are mapped to the Network
QoS Layer (NQL) of the core framework. On the other hand, the Access Admission- related
modules: the AAE, AAD and the HAAD provide access control in two different scenarios:
controlling the access of the MT to a specific network based on the its SLA. Also, they might
be used by the end point servers to specify the server’s accessibility, since server’s NAL de-
fines its visibility i.e. locally, in the local network (LAN) or globally over the Internet. Such
access control mechanisms will be provided as a part of the Y-Comm security module.
The IIS and NWIIS modules correspond to the Policy Management layer (PML) on the
peripheral framework and the Network Management Layer (NML) of the core framework re-
spectively. The functionality of the monitoring modules (NME, CNME) is provided through
the QoS (QL) and Network QoS (NQL) layers as well as the security module. The MIHF
module is used in the Network Abstraction Layers (NAL) to deal with different access net-
works. The A3C interfaces mainly manage the interactions with the A3C severs and thus,
is considered as a part of the security module.
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4.4 Targeted QoS-Signalling models
The previous section defined the network’s main operational components along with their
structure. These entities cooperate to provide security and QoS-related tasks. However, since
there is a need for QoS provision in different situations such as when starting a connection
or in the case of handover, our research adopted a similar approach to the targeted security
models and proposed targeted models for signalling QoS in different scenarios.
This section explains how the network’s entities cooperate to provide QoS and thus define the
following three Targeted QoS-Signalling Models known as: the Registration Model describes
the procedure followed when the mobile terminal (MT) first attaches to the peripheral net-
work. The Connection Initiation Model deals with the case when the MT starts a connection
to a server (SP). Finally, The Handover Model explains the QoS provision in the case of Inter
and Intra Core End-Point handover. In order to provide QoS in each of these situations, the
network elements interact with each other using the COPS, DIAMETER and IEEE 802.21
protocols.
4.4.1 The Registration Model
Initially, the user subscribes to the Service-Level of Agreement (SLA) which define the pe-
ripheral networks and the services that could be used by the subscriber along with the
associated QoS and security parameters. For instance, based on the SLA, the user can only
use two types of technologies in the peripheral networks, GSM and 3G. In either network,
the SLA will define the associated security and QoS at the network level, while the SLA
will specify the services the user has subscribed to, the associated security and QoS at the
service level.
The SLA is shared between the mobile terminal (MT) and the CA3C server in the Core
End-Point, The QoSB engine of the CQoSB gets a copy of the SLA which is related to
the accessing the network. As shown in Fig 4.4, once the (MT) gets an IP address, it
should be authenticated by the A3C server in order to access the network. After a successful
authentication, the Access Admission Enforcement (AAE) of the AR asks the AAD of the
DQoSB for a user- specific Access Decision (AD Req). Since it is the first interaction with
this user, the DQoSB approaches the CQoSB- the HAAD module- for this information, the
HAAD extracts user’s profile from the QoSB Engine and passes the decision - via (AD Res)
message- all the way back to the (AR) which configures the access policy according to the
received profile and sends an acknowledgement message (Ack).
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Figure 4.4: The Registration Model
4.4.2 The Connection Initiation Model
This model enables a client and the server to negotiate the QoS specifications before setting
the connection. The model shown in Fig 4.5 discusses the case when the MT and the Server
(S) reside in the same Core End-Point but in different domains.
The MT initiates a connection request -with a required QoS denoted in the QoS Specification
(QoS-Spec) field - to the server (S). If the request complies with the network access policy
configured on the AR of the source domain, an Authorization Request (Auth-Req) to access
the service with the QoS stated in the QoS-Spec is initiated towards the DA3C server. If
the DA3C holds a copy of the user’s profile, it responds with Authorization Response (Auth-
Res) message; otherwise, it passes the request to the CA3C server which holds user’s contract
details. In the case of a successful authorization, the QoSM of the AR in the source domain
forwards the access request to the QoSM of the AR in the destination domain. This triggers
the same request authorization process as in the first domain. As shown in Fig 4.5, in the
case of a successful authorization, resources in the destination domain are activated using
Resource- Activation request/ response messages (Resc-Act. Req / Res). The L2 resources
are allocated by using IEEE 802.21 messages, and then an access response is sent back to
the AR in the source network. Upon the receipt of a positive access response, resources in
the source network are activated using (Resc-Act. Req/Res) messages, these activities in the
source network are not shown in Fig 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: The Connection Initiation Model
4.4.3 The Handover Model
This section explains the QoS provision in the case of intra and inter Core End-Point han-
dover. As shown in Figs 4.6 and 4.7, the MT gets QoS -related information about available
networks, the IIS module of the MT decides on the target network and a Handover request
containing the desired associated QoS is sent to the QoSM module of the AR which passes
it all the way to the DQoSB2 via the Core End-Point. The MT has to be authenticated;
also the security keys should be launched in the target network before the handover really
happens. In order to apply the right access control in the new network, the AAD module
of the DQoSB2 approaches the HAAD of the Core End-Point to get the Admission Deci-
sion related to the user. After configuring the access policy in the target Access Router, it
starts L2 resources reservation using IEEE802.21 messages. A successful handover response
message is sent back to MT to trigger the actual handover.
In the case of an Inter-Core-End Points handover, the old Core-End Point (CEP) provides
the target CEP with the user’s SLA; thus, the MT’s related information becomes available
in the target network. The remaining steps are very similar to the intra-Core-End Point
handover as shown in Fig 4.7. The communication between the CEPs takes place over
the backbone of the Internet. Architectures like the Intermon (MB04), which is a research
framework to facilitate Inter-domain QoS monitoring and analysis for validation, planning
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Figure 4.6: The Intra-Core End Point Handover Model
and optimisation of inter-domain QoS, could be used to manage the communication among
CEPs. However, the research in this thesis is not concerned with proposing inter-CEPs
communication framework
4.5 Summary
This chapter introduced a QoS framework for 4G systems, the framework proposed targeted
models for signalling QoS in different scenarios such as the initial registration and connection
as well as handover phases. In order to define these models, there was a need to specify the
operational entities in the network. Furthermore, these entities represented the actual parties
of the security protocols defined in the coming chapters and thus, facilitated the security-QoS
integration.
However, for the QoS framework to be effective, it needs to consider multi-homed mobile
devices which are supported with several network cards and could compromise the QoS by
initiating simultaneous connections over different networks. The multi-homing issue will
be investigated in Chapter 9, where further enhancements on current Internet servers such
as the naming and locating systems will be introduced. However, the next chapter will
describe the research, conducted to address the security issue in heterogeneous environment
by introducing the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) framework.
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Figure 4.7: The Inter-Core End Point Handover Model
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Chapter 5
The Authentication and Key
Agreement Framework
5.1 Introduction
Next Generation Networks (NGNs) represent an open architecture in which two different
domains need to cooperate in order to provide ubiquitous connectivity. The first is net-
work operators domain, where multiple network operators share the core network to provide
network accessibility over a wide variety of wireless technologies such as WiFi and mobile net-
work technologies. The other is the Service Providers (SPs) domain, which launches various
services ranging from the normal video-streaming to the most confidential E-Commerce ser-
vices. This highlights the fact that any efficient security solution for heterogeneous networks
has to consider the security in these different domains.
Therefore, as explained in chapter 2, the Y-Comm framework has proposed a four-layer
Integrated Security Module (ISM) which considers the security of different levels, namely
User, Network and Service levels. To define the underlying protocols of the security module,
this chapter introduces an Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)framework, which
comprises a number of AKA protocols to address the functionality of some of the layers of
the ISM. The framework introduces three types of AKA protocols: The Network-Level AKA
(NL-AKA) protocol which provides security at the network level. The Service-Level AKA
(SL-AKA) protocol sets up a secure connection between the mobile device and the service
provider. The User-Level AKA (UL-AKA) protocol achieves mutual authentication between
the user, the SIM/Personal ID card (PIC) and the mobile device.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the main parties of the AKA frame-
work. Section 3 introduces a proposed key hierarchy for the framework. Section 4 explains
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a set of desired security parameters for AKA protocols. Section 5 introduces the proposed
User-Level AKA protocol. The chapter is summarized in section 6.
5.2 An Overview of the AKA Framework
To address the security issue, we propose a security architecture to provide authentication
and key agreement at the User, Service and Network levels. The framework considers the
network structure in Chapter 4 and comprises four entities:
The Personal Identification Card (PIC):
Similarly to the SIM card in 2, 2.5 and 3G technologies (Cha05), the PIC holds user’s
credentials such as the subscribed services’ IDs and security keys.
The Mobile Terminal (MT):
It is the user’s device such as cellular phones, PDAs, and laptops, identified by a unique
manufacture ID (mID). Similar to the Equipment Identity Register (EIR) used in GSM
(Cha05), the mID is used to lock the MT to a specific PIC.
Application/Service Providers (SPs):
These are different types of services such as e-Commerce, on-line banking and electronic pub-
lic services in addition to access to vedio on-demand/news, Grid and Cloud resources/services.
which could be accessed by the subscribed clients using applications installed in the MTs.
Each SP is identified by a unique Service ID (SrvID).
Network Operators:
Multiple operators (telecommunication carriers) cooperate to enable the MT to access the
SPs. Referring to the network structure in Chapter 4, each domain is mapped to a single
network operator such as GSM or WiMAX.
Upon signing the initial contract, the user’s profile information including the Service Level
of Agreement (SLA) is shared between the Centralized A3C (CA3C) in the Core End-Point
and the subscriber. As shown in the Figure 5.1, the operation of the security framework
goes through three main stages:
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Figure 5.1: The AKA Framework Stages
• The User-Level AKA protocol comprises two sub-stages: the First achieves mutual
authentication between the PIC and the MT. In the Second, the user is authenticated,
based on his biometric information, to use the mobile terminal.
• In the Second stage, the MT is authenticated to access the peripheral network using
new proposed Network-Level AKA (NL-AKA) protocols. Two NL-AKA protocols are
needed; the first achieves mutual authentication between the network and the mobile
terminal when the MT joins the network for the first time, and thus is called Initial
AKA protocol, the latter considers the case of vertical handover and authenticates the
MT when it moves to a new network.
• The Third stage authenticates the MT to access the subscribed service over specific
access networks. Similar to the NL-AKA protocols, there is a need for new Service-
Level AKA (SL-AKA) protocols to achieve mutual authentication between the mobile
terminal and the service provider in the initial and in handover scenarios.
These protocols have been verified using formal methods approach based on Casper/FDR
tool
5.3 The Key Hierarchy
Upon signing the initial contract, the user’s profile information including the SLA is shared
between the Centralized A3C CA3C in the Core-End Point and the subscriber. The user’s
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PIC holds a Secret Key (SK) shared with the MT and a hashed value of the user’s biometric-
information as well as a Unique Secret Key (UK) shared with the CA3C.
As shown in Fig 5.2, for the Service-Level AKA, a service-specific secret key (Srvkey) are
derived using the UK, service ID (SrvID); the user’s subscription ID (SubID) and a lifetime
value as follows: Srvkey= F(UK, SrvID, SubID, lifetime). Using the Srvkey, an Association
Key (ASKey) is derived to protect the session between the client and the service provider.
For the Network-Level AKA, a Domain-Specific Master Key (DSMK) is derived for each ac-
cess domain as follows: DSMK= F( UK, Seq, AAA-domain) where Seq is a random number,
AAA-domain is the domain name of the corresponding DA3C server. From the DSMK key
one Authentication Key (AK) and one or more Secret Keys (SKs) is derived to encrypt the
connection between the authenticated entities.
Figure 5.2: Key Hierarchy
5.4 Analysing the Security Protocols
To verify the UL-NL and SL-AKA protocols, we use a form of formal methods approach
based on Casper/FDR tool (LBDH09). The Casper tool accepts an abstract, human-friendly
description of the system and compiles it into Communication Sequential Processes (CSP)
code, suitable for the Failures-Divergence Refinement (FDR) (Sys93) checker.
Furthermore, as stated in (AM96), it is desirable that AKA protocols meet certain security
properties. Therefore, a list of these properties will be used to analyse the security features
of all the proposed AKA protocols. The properties are as follows:
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1. Mutual Entity Authentication: This is achieved when each party is assured of the
identity of the other party.
2. Mutual Key Authentication: This is achieved when each party is assured that no other
party aside from a specifically identified second party gains access to a particular secret
key.
3. Mutual Key Confirmation: This requirement means that each party is assured that
the other has possession of a particular secret key.
4. Key Freshness : a key is considered fresh if it can be guaranteed to be new and not
reused through actions of either an adversary or authorized party.
5. Unknown-Key Share: In this attack the two parties compute the same session key but
have different views of their peers in the key exchange. In other words, in this attack
an entity A believes that it shares a key with another entity B while B mistakenly
believes the key is shared with an entity E 6= A instead.
6. Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience: This property implies that if the Intruder
compromised the long-term key of one party, he should not be able to masquerade to
the party as a different party.
5.5 The User-Level AKA Protocol
5.5.1 Introduction
For communication in Next Generation Networks, highly-developed mobile devices will en-
able users to store and manage a lot of credentials on their terminals. Furthermore,these
terminal devices will represent and act on behalf of users when accessing different networks
and connecting to a wide variety of services. This situation highlights the need for securing
transactions between the end users and their mobile devices as well as the need for maintain-
ing the integrity of the mobile devices. Creating such a secure environment will emphasise
on the trust worthiness of mobile devices and encourage end users to delegate their devices
the communication with sensitive services.
5.5.2 Related Work
Future mobile devices are expected to access different networks (such as 3rd generation
network, WLAN, Bluetooth, Internet, and etc). Hence sensitivity data are stored in them.
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Unfortunately, the password-based identification is not secure enough to control user’s access
to the mobile terminal and vulnerable to birthday and brute-force attack. This sections
describes some of research efforts to address the authentication between the MT, the PIC
and the User.
AKA and Authorization Scheme
In (YZ05), the authors propose an AKA and Authorization framework for 4G networks. At
the initial stage, the framework combines password, biometric-information as well as public
key infrastructure (PKI) to achieve mutual authentication between the user, the SIM card
and the device. Based on the result of the authentication in the initial stage, the framework
achieves authentication between the mobile device and the network.
Although it is stated in (YZ05) that the framework was proven to be scalable and provides
some desired security features such as multi-pronged mutual authentication, the framework
suffers from two major drawbacks: firstly, in order to provide a considerably robust platform
for user’s access to sensitive services and data and achieve the authentication process in the
initial stage, the framework associates the Trusted Computing (TC) with the PKI by imple-
menting Trusted Mobile Platform (TMP) (TMP04). These represent major modifications
to the architecture of mobile devices. Secondly, some of the required functions to deal with
the PKI-complexity and checking the integrity of the mobile terminal do not consider the
limitations of battery and processing power in small devices such as Mobile terminals and
Personal Digital Assistant (PDAs). These two reasons make the framework inapplicable with
current architecture and capabilities of mobile devices.
The Device Authentication Protocol of the Mobile Ethernet Security Framework
The Mobile Ethernet group has in (MK04) proposed an AKA framework that deals with
security at the network and service levels as well as achieving mutual authentication between
the user, SIM card and the mobile terminal. The Mobile Ethernet’s solution proposes two-
stage authentication protocol; the first stage is used in the initial authentication; when the
PIC is plugged into the MT for the first time. This stage is based on PKI and it aims at
achieving a mutual authentication between the MT and PIC and agreeing on a secret key (K)
which will be stored in the PIC and the MT. After the initial authentication, a simplified
protocol, based on the derived secret key (K), is used for any subsequent authentication
process.
Similar to the case of the previous AKA in subsection 5.5.2, due to the fact that setting-
up a PKI is a complex and costly process that consists of several steps: registration of
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Table 5.1: notation
Abbreviation Full name and description
PIC The Personal Identification (PIC),
initially shares the key K with the
MT. Key management protocols
such as HMAC-Authenticated Diffie-
Hellman (Euc06) are used to share the
key between the PIC and the MT.
MT Mobile Terminal
r1, r2 Random numbers
K A pre-shared secret key between the
MT and the PIC
Req An authentication request message
MAC{m}K Message authentication code of mes-
sage (m) using the key (K)
users, generation of keys, issuance and distribution of certificates. Additionally, PKI involves
other complex processes such as certificate retrieval and certification path construction and
validation. Because of these reasons, the author believes that PKI is not suitable for mobile
devices in general. Furthermore, as will be explained in the following subsection, the formal
verification results show attack against the authentication protocol in the second stage.
Analysing the Device Authentication Protocol of the Mobile Ethernet
After running the initial authentication protocol, the PIC and the MT will agree on a secret
key (K), which will facilitate the subsequent authentications. By considering the notation in
Table 5.1, the authentication protocol runs as follows:
The mobile terminal sends an authentication request (Req) to the PIC, which responds by
sending a random value (R1) as a challenge towards the MT. The MT returns the hash of the
R1 as well as a challenge (R2). The PIC responds to this challenge by sending the hashed
R2.
Msg1.MT → PIC : Req
Msg2.P IC →MT : R1
Msg3.MT → PIC : MAC{R1}{K}, R2
Msg4.P IC →MT : MAC{R2}{K}
The full Casper’s description of the protocol is mentioned in Appendix A. After modelling
this protocol, Casper/FDR discovered the following attack. The notation I PIC, I MT rep-
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resents the case where the Intruder impersonates the PIC, MT respectively. In this attack,
the intruder intercepts and passively relays the messages between the MT and the PIC and
thus, the mobile terminal will complete running the protocol believing that it was with the
PIC, while it was with the Intruder instead. Similarly, the PIC will believe it has been
running the protocol with the MT, while in reality it was with the Intruder.
1a. MT -> I_PIC : req
1b. I_PIC -> PIC : req
2a. PIC -> I_MT : R1
2b. I_PIC -> MT : R1
3a. MT -> I_PIC : MAC{R1}{K}, R2
3b. I_PIC -> PIC : MAC{R1}{K}, R2
4a. PIC -> I_MT : MAC{R2}{K}
4b. I_MT -> MT : MAC{R2}{K}
5.5.3 The Proposed User-Level AKA Protocol
As shown in Fig 5.1, the first stage of the proposed AKA framework comprises two sub-
stages: the first achieves mutual authentication between the PIC and the MT, while in
the second, the user is authenticated based on his biometric-information. As explained
in (MA12c), the proposed AKA protocol for the MT, PIC authentication is based in the
Challenge-Response paradigm.
By considering the notations in Table 5.2, the protocol runs as follows:
Msg1.P IC →MT : {r1, Pseq}{SK(MT )}
Upon plugging the Personal Identification Card PIC into the Mobile terminal MT, the AKA
process starts by sending a random number r1 in Msg1.
Msg2.MT → PIC : {MiD, r1, r2}{SK(MT )}
The MT constructs a challenge message Msg2 containing a Mobile ID, a fresh challenge
random r2 and the received random r1, this message is encrypted by the pre-shared key
SK(MT). Using the information included in Msg2, both ends generate a secret key K= F
(SK(MT), r1, r2, miD, PSeq) to secure the connection between the ends, the uniqueness of
the derived key is based on the freshness of nonce r1, r2 and the secrecy of the pre-shared
key SK.
Msg3.P IC →MT : {r3, r2}{K}
The PIC responds to the challenge in Msg2 by constructing Msg3 which contains the received
challenge random r2 and another challenge random number r3, this message is encrypted
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Table 5.2: Notation
Abbreviation Full name and description
PIC The Personal Identification (PIC), ini-
tially shares SK(MT) with the MT and
holds the (UK).
MT Mobile Terminal
r1, r2, r3 Random numbers
miD Mobile device unique ID
K A secret key, derived to secure the con-
nection between the MT and the PIC
SK(MT) A pre-shared key between the PIC and
the MT
PSeq PIC unique sequence number
F An irreversible key derivation function
Ackm An Authentication Token: Ackm= F(
MiD, PSeq, r1, r2)
MAC{m}K Message authentication code of mes-
sage (m) using the key (K)
Enc{m}K Encrypting the message (m) using the
key (K)
using the derived secret key K.
Msg4.MT → PIC : {r3, Ackm}{K}
The MT responds by sending the received challenge r3 along with the pre-shared acknowl-
edgement string Ackm via Msg4. As shown in Table 5.2, the Ackm is derived in a way to
include the identities of the two parties (the MT and the PIC), also it includes fresh random
values (r1, r2) to guarantee the freshness, this way possessing the Ackm will help in achieving
entity authentication as will be described in section 5.5.3.
Msg5.P IC →MT : {Ackm}{K}
The SP verifies the included Ackm in Msg4 and composes Msg5. In the case of a successful
authentication among the PIC, the MT and the user, the MT represents the PIC and the
user in the following stages of the AKA framework.
The proposed protocol is of the challenge-response type and is based on one secret key
SK(MT) which is pre-shared between the MT and PIC. However, this type of protocols is
vulnerable to replay attacks such as the one described in section 5.5.2. To avoid such attacks
the proposed protocol uses three random numbers r1,r2 and r3. Furthermore, in order to
meet some of the desired security requirements such as the mutual entity authentication, the
authentication token Ackm is used in the protocol as will be explained in section 5.5.3.
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Another possible way to stop replay attacks is by using different keys to encrypt the messages
in the two directions. Based on this, we presume that PIC has two keys: the SK(MT) which
is shared with the MT and the secret key (K) and the protocol goes as follows
Msg1.P IC →MT : {r1, K}{SK(MT )}
Msg2.MT → PIC : {r1, r2}{K}
Msg3.P IC →MT : {r2}{K}
However, this solution requires one of the parties to hold two keys, one is pre-shared with
the other party and will be used to encrypt the first message. The second key is sent in the
first message to the second party and will be used it to encrypt the rest of the messages.
Furthermore, some security requirements such as key freshness, mutual entity authentication
and the resilience to key compromise impersonation attack are not achieved.
Formal Verification
We modelled our protocol by preparing a Casper input file describing the UL-AKA protocol.
For conciseness, we only show here the #Specification and #Intruder headings, while the
#Free Variables, #Protocol Descriptions and #System headings are included in Appendix
B.
The #Free variables heading defines the participating parties, the variables and the used
functions. It is worth noting that Casper does not specify a built-in method to simulate key
derivation functions; therefore, we specifically defined therein the function F which is used
to derive the session key (K) specific. The Protocol Description heading specifies how the
intended parties will use the functions to generate the corresponding keys.
The security requirements of the system are defined under the #Specification heading. The
lines starting with the keyword Secret is used to define the secrecy properties of the proto-
col. For example, the first line specifies SK(MT) as a secret between the PIC and MT. The
lines starting with Agreement define the protocol’s authenticity properties; thus, the first
authenticity of the figure above specifies that the MT is correctly authenticated to the PIC
and agreed on the nonce value (r3). The WeakAgreement(X,Y) specification means that if
Y thinks he has successfully completed a run of the protocol with X, then X has previously
been running the protocol with Y.
# Specification
Secret(PIC,SK(MT),[MT])
Secret(MT,SK(MT),[PIC])
Secret(PIC,miD,[MT])
Secret(PIC,K,[MT])
Secret(MT,K,[PIC])
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Agreement(MT,PIC,[r3])
Agreement(PIC,MT,[r2])
WeakAgreement(MT, PIC)
WeakAgreement(PIC, MT)
The #Intruder Information heading shows that the intruder identity is Mallory, the identities
of all agents, the nonce R1 and the function F are included in the intruder initial knowledge.
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = PICard, Mobile, R1, F
Running Casper/FDR tool verifies that none of the checked assertions defined in the #Spec-
ification heading was vulnerable to an attack. This is mainly due to the assumption that
the SK(MT) key is secret between the PIC and the MT. Exposing this key, will lead to the
entire protocol being compromised.
Protocol Analysis and Security Considerations
Although Casper/FDR has shown no attack against the proposed protocol, we need to
carefully consider the result, Casper/FDR proves the protocol in the system specified in the
System heading Appendix B; however, the protocol might be vulnerable in another system.
Further analysis of the protocol based on the security requirement list is given in this section.
1. Mutual Entity Authentication:
There is no direct specification within Casper to check this property, yet in order to
show how our protocol could meet this requirement, we explicitly considered the Ackm
value is generated as follows Ackm = F (MiD,PSeq, random). This value is pre-stored
in the PIC and Mobile terminal. In Msg 4, 5 each entity ensures the other party to have
the right Ackm, which includes the parties’ identities as parameters, thus, enforcing
entity authentication. If the MiD and Pseq were exposed, it is not feasible for the
Intruder to generate the Ackm, because it does not know the right random value.
Even if the Intruder recorded Msg5, it could not be used in next sessions because a
fresh key K is used for each session.
2. Mutual Key Authentication:
The mutual authentication between the MT and the PIC is based on the secrecy of
the derived session key (K). We got Casper to check this using the Secret (PIC, K,
[MT])assertion check.
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3. Mutual Key Confirmation:
This requirement is achieved by performing the checks after Msg3 and 4 in the Protocol
Description heading Appendix B. By using the Decryptable function each party makes
sure that the valid secret key K is possessed by the other part. If the any of the check
failed, the protocol aborts.
4. Key Freshness:
Casper does not have any function to check this requirement, so we included freshly gen-
erated values r1, r2 in the derivation function of the the session key K: K= F(SK(MT),r1,r2,miD,
PSeq) ; thus the fact that Casper does not detect any attack on the secrecy of the ses-
sion key (K) implies that key freshness is not violated.
5. Unknown-Key Share:
The Aliveness assertion is used to check this attack. Additionally, making a binding
between the Keys and the parties’ identity deals with this attack. This has been
achieved in this protocol by including the identities of the MT and the PIC in the
KDF of the K.
6. Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience: This property is not be achieved with the
proposed protocol as the compromise of the long-term key Sk(MT) will lead to the
session key (K) being compromised.
5.5.4 Biometric-Information Based Authentication
For this stage, we assume that the Mobile terminal is equipped with a trusted biometric-
information reader such as fingerprint reader. When the user makes the initial contract,
a brief hashed value- of the user’s biometric-information is stored in the PIC. This hashed
value could be generated using algorithms like (CV02) and (YS05) which have been designed
to provide similarity preserving and eliminate any noise in the biometric sample.
After running the previous AKA protocol and setting up a secure channel between the MT
and the PIC, the user is prompted to enter his biometric-information, the MT processes the
data and generates a hashed value of the submitted info. This hashed value is passed to
the PIC which compares it with the previously stored value. In case of match, the user is
authenticated as the PIC owner and consequently to use the MT. From this point onwards,
MT will represent the user in both network and service Aˆ– level connections.
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5.6 Summary
To define the underlying security protocol of the Integrated Security Module of the Y-Comm
framework, this chapter introduces an AKA framework that comprises three types of AKA
protocol to provide security at the network, service and user levels. The chapter explains
the proposed AKA for the User-Level AKA (UL-AKA). The protocol was verified using
Casper/FDR and proven to meet all the desired security requirements. The underlying
protocols for the Network and Service Levels will be explained in the following two chapters.
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Chapter 6
The AKA Framework, The
Network-Level AKA Protocol
6.1 Introduction
As explained in chapter 5, the AKA framework comprises three stages; User-Level AKA
(UL-AKA), the Network-Level AKA (NL-AKA) and the Service-Level AKA (SL-AKA).
The first phase of the AKA framework achieves mutual authentication between the Personal
Identification Card (PIC), the mobile terminal and the user. In the case of a successful au-
thentication, the mobile terminal (MT) will represent the user in the following authentication
stages, namely the NL-AKA and the SL-AKA.
This chapter introduces NL-AKA protocols for authenticating the MT and the network in
case of initial connection; when the MT joins the network for the first time as well as in the
case of handover; when the MT switches between different access networks. The NL-AKA
protocols consider the open architecture introduced in Chapter 4.
6.2 Problem Definition
Due to the fact that the connectivity in the peripheral networks will be based on a wide
variety of wireless technologies, provided by different operators, various network operators
need to cooperate and coexist in the core network. Furthermore, new providers might choose
to join the network and share the spectrum. Unlike current communication systems such as
2G and 3G, which introduce closed environments where the core network is controlled and
owned by sole network operators and thus its security is mainly based on the assumption
that, the core network is physically secure.
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The above discussion highlights the fact that we are moving towards an open, heterogeneous
environment where the core network is not controlled by a single operator, so multiple op-
erators will have to cooperate. This tendency will bring about radical changes to handover
mechanisms. Current mechanisms mainly support the network-controlled handover in which
the decision to implement handover is taken by the network(s) to which the mobile device
is currently attached. While this type of handover works fine in current homogeneous sys-
tems, where the core network is controlled by a sole operator and thus information about the
topology of different networks is available, this type of handover is not suitable for hetero-
geneous environments, since multiple operators coexist in the core network. This highlights
the need for the client-based handover in which the client is the deciding entity rather than
the network. In this type of handover, the mobile device will be responsible for initiating
the handover, acquiring and releasing the resources in the new and old network respectively.
However, this situation brings about new security threats in term of authenticating the mobile
device to the new access network in case of handover and maintaining data confidentiality
as well as controlling the allocation of network resources and making sure that this process
is accomplished by authorized parties. While the latter issue was addressed by the QoS
framework in chapter 4, the first will be investigated in this chapter by analysing different
research efforts such as (HOK07), (rGPPG), (KT09), (MK04), (3GP06), (Ali10), which have
been trying to deal with the security issue, a detailed analysis of these approaches could be
found in (MA11b) and (MA12b) .
Due to the fact that the Mobile Ethernet group (MK04), (I.D06) assumes a generic network
structure, which is very close to the one described in Chapter 4, this research will consider
the Mobile Ethernet’s vertical handover AKA protocol as a model to investigate the security
threats in the open architecture. The protocol will be analysed and verified using formal
methods approach. The results discovered some security breaches in the deployment of the
Mobile Ethernet’s AKA protocol, which highlight the need for a new protocol.
6.3 Initial NL-AKA Protocol
The Initial NL-AKA is needed to identify and authorize mobile nodes when initially join the
access network.
6.3.1 Related Work
This section describes some of the related work towards introducing AKA protocols for the
initial registration in heterogeneous environments.
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AKA and Authorization Scheme Based on Trusted Mobile Platform
The work in (YZ05) has introduced an AKA and authorization scheme to achieve mutual
authentication between the user, the Mobile Terminal and the SIM card. This scheme
deploys passwords in combination with biometric information and Public key Infrastructure,
the scheme also benefits from the Trusted Mobile Platform (TMP) (TMP04) to guarantee
the internal integrity of the mobile device.
As explained in (YZ05), the proposed scheme achieves many security features such as mutual
authentication, protection on wired links as well as resistant to replay and man-in-middle
attacks. However, the main drawbacks of the scheme are as follows:
1. The scheme proposes using the PKI approach. However, this comes at the cost of a
higher overhead especially in terms of key management and cryptographic operations
(MJS02).
2. Many security features of the scheme are based mainly on the hardware architecture of
the trusted mobile platform, this implies that the proposed scheme is not generic and
might not be compatible with none TMP-supported devices.
Handover Key Working Group (HOKEY WG)
This group is concerned with providing a set of protocols and mechanisms to secure han-
dover. It introduced an abstract mechanism for delivering root keys from an Extensible
Authentication Protocol EAP (BA04) server to another network server that requires the
keys for offering security protected services, such as re- authenticating the EAP-supporting
peer using the EAP Re- authentication Protocol (ERP) (VN08). The ERP protocol mainly
considers the case of handover, and recommends full EAP for initial authentication. How-
ever, in either case, the solution is based on the assumption that all access networks support
the EAP framework, this assumption might not be feasible in heterogeneous networks since
the EAP severs might belong to different operators.
The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
The 3GPP group (rGPPG) has proposed the integration of 3GPP-WLAN and 3GPP-WiMAX
as examples of heterogeneous networks. In both cases, the 3GPP recommends invoking EAP-
AKA (JA06) for the initial authentication. By integrating the 3GPP-AKA (MZ05) protocol
and the EAP platform, the EAP-AKA achieves many desired security features such as mutual
authentication between the device and the network.
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One issue with this approach is that it is fully dependent on a specific core wireless technology,
in this case, the 3GPP core network. Whoever wants to add a new wireless access to an
existing network will always need to develop a method that integrates wireless access with
the 3GPP core infrastructure. Additionally, the solution is based on implementing the EAP
platform globally which requires all AAAC severs to support the EAP.
Security in the Mobile Ethernet Architecture
Mobile Ethernet Architecture is a Beyond 3G network system for the all IP integrated
network using MAC layer technologies (I.D06). The architecture is based on the Wide Area
Ethernet (WAE) which is a virtual private network aimed at providing connectivity based on
the Ethernet (MAC) addressing and thus achieves interoperability among different IP-based
operators. More details about the Mobile Ethernet framework could be found in Chapter 2.
For the Network-Level security, Mobile Ethernet has proposed AKA protocols for the initial
and handover cases. The proposed protocols consider a generic structure for heterogeneous
networks similar to the one in Chapter 4, and since it operates at Layer 2 (L2), it does
not require underlying platforms such as EAP and thus, could be used with any operator.
Furthermore, as stated in (MK04), the initial AKA protocol achieves mutual authentication
between the mobile terminal and the network and meets many desired security features.
Due to these factors, this initial AKA protocol in (MK04) is very relevant work and we will
consider this as a model to investigate the security threats in the environment. This protocol
will be analysed in Section 6.4 using the formal methods approach.
6.4 The Initial AKA protocol for the Mobile Ethernet
This section presents a formal analysis of the Initial AKA protocol for Mobile Ethernet
proposed by Masahiro et al (MK04). For this protocol, the security architecture consists of
the following network components:
• The Authentication Information Server (AIS): manages the subscriber’s infor-
mation, the AIS corresponds to the Core A3C (CA3C) server in the Core End-Point.
• The Authentication Server (AS): authenticates the subscribers based on informa-
tion retrieved from the AIS. The AS corresponds to the Domain A3C (DA3C) server.
• The Entry Points (EPs): represent one end point for wireless communication and
represent Access Points (APs) or Access Routers (ARs).
• The Mobile Device (M): is the mobile terminal accessing the network.
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Table 6.1: Notation
The Notation Description
M The Mobile Node
AIS The Authentication Information Server
AS The Authentication Server
R1, R2 Random values
E(K, Msg) Encrypted Msg by key K
D(K, Msg) Decrypted Msg by key K
PRF, PRF2 Pseudo-random function
MS Master Secret key MS = PRF (UUK,R1|R2)
AK Authentication Key AK = PRF (MS,R1|R2)
SK Secret Key used for encryption SK = PRF2(MS,R1|R2)
6.4.1 The Protocol Description
The initial AKA protocol of (MK04) is based on the challenge-response paradigm. By
considering the notation in Table 6.1, the protocol goes as follows: initially the mobile
device (M) and the AIS pre-share User ID (UID) and user unique key (UUK). When the
MD attaches to the access network, it sends its UID and a random number (R1) as a challenge
all the way to the AS. The AS appends a freshly created random (R2) to the message and
passes it to the AIS. Using the received UID, the AIS looks up in its database and finds the
corresponding UUK, then it derives the Master Key (MS) and passes it along with the UID
to the AS. The received MS is used by the AS to derive the Authentication Key (AK) and
the Secret key (SK), then the AS returns the challenge (R1) encrypted using the AK and
a challenge R2 to the mobile device. If the Mobile device managed to derive the required
keys, it should be able to verify the received message and compose the response. The AS
checks whether the Mobile device possessed the right keys and indicates the end of the
authentication process by sending an acknowledgement message.
As demonstrated in Fig 6.1, this version of the protocol might be vulnerable to security
threats, which are mainly due to the fact that the derived keys are insecurely distributed to
the participating entities. Therefore, the authors in (MK04), have assumed that the devices
of the architecture are securely installed using mutual authentication and data integrity
is maintained in the core network, i.e. between the AIS and the AS. By keeping these
assumptions in mind, Casper/FDR tool was used to verify the protocol and find out whether
it is still vulnerable to any attacks. A detailed analysis of the protocol is in the following
sections.
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Figure 6.1: The Mobile Ethernet Protocol
6.4.2 The Formal Verification of the Mobile Ethernet Protocol
As shown in Fig 6.1, it is not clear how the Mobile device knows about the Entry Point.
This knowledge could not be pre-configured as there is no way to predict which EP the
mobile device will use. Similarly, there is a need to justify why the mobile device starts the
protocol by sending the UID, R1 as the mobile device’s first message. In order to simulate
this interaction in Casper, we introduce the following preliminary messages: the Entry Points
advertisement messages (Adv), The Access Request (AccReq) message, which is used by the
Mobile device to indicate its intention to access the network. The Authentication Request
(AuthReq) message is sent by the Entry point to trigger the authentication process. None
of these messages play a security role; they are only used at the pre-authentication stage,
where the entry points advertise their presence.
To formally verify the protocol, a Casper/FDR’s input file was prepared. The full input file
is given in the Appendix C. After compiling the Casper model and feeding the CSP output
to FDR, no attacks against the secrecy of the AK and SK keys were found, this is due to
the assumption that the Intruder does not know the key derivation functions of these keys
despite the fact that the Master Secret Key (MS) is sent unprotected. However, attacks were
found against the Agreement( M, AS, [R2]) and Aliveness (EP, M). We could find the
traces for those attacks, which could be translated to the following attack sequence, where
the notation I M for instance represents the intruder taking the Mobile device’s identity,
either to fake a message (as in the second message 1) or to intercept a message intended for
M (as in message 2).
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0. -> M : EP, AIS, AS
1a. M -> I_EP : accReq
1b. I_M -> EP : accReq
2a. EP -> I_M : authReq
2b. I_EP -> M : authReq
3. M -> I_EP : M, R1
4. I_EP -> AS : M, R1, h(M, R1)
5a. AS -> I_AIS : M, R1, R2, h(M, R1, R2)
5b. I_AS -> AIS : M, R1, R2, h(M, R1, R2)
6a. AIS -> I_AS : MS, M, h(MS, M)
6b. I_AIS-> AS : MS, M, h(MS, M)
7. AS -> I_EP : R2, {R1}{AK}, h(R2, {R1}{AK})
8. I_EP -> M : {R1}{AK}, R2
9. M -> I_EP : {R2}{AK}
10. I_EP -> AS : {R2}{AK}, h({R2}{AK})
11. AS -> I_AIS : hoackm, h(hoackm)
12. I_EP -> M : hoackm
In other words, this attack could be interpreted as follows: The Mobile device (M) thinks
it has successfully completed a run of the protocol apparently with EP, while in reality it is
with the Intruder, and EP has not previously been running the protocol. The steps of the
attack are shown in 6.2.
Figure 6.2: The Attack Against the Initial AKA Protocol of the Mobile Ethernet
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6.4.3 Protocol Analysis and Security Consideration
In this section, we discuss how our formal modelling with Casper allows checking the security
requirements described in 5.4.
• Mutual Entity Authentication: As stated in (AM96), entity authentication in-
volves corroboration of a claimant’s identity through actual communications with an
associated verifier during execution of the protocol itself. Since the protocol does not
consider verifying the identity of the participants and based on the discovered attack,
we could claim that this protocol could not meet this feature.
• Mutual Key Authentication: the mutual authentication between the M and the
AS is based on the secrecy of the AK. We got Casper to check this using the Secret
(M, AK, [AS]) and Secret (AS, AK, [M]) assertion checks. Since no attack was found
against the key secrecy, this property is met.
• Mutual Key Confirmation: Casper verifies this requirement by using the DE-
CRYPTABLE (m, K) which checks if the message (m) is decryptable by the key (K).
We performed a similar check after messages 8 and 10 as shown in the Protocol De-
scription heading to verify that the valid Authentication key (AK) is possessed by the
other party. If any of the checks fails the protocol aborts.
• Key Freshness: This property is guaranteed by including a fresh random value R1,
R2 in the key derivation functions of the keys MS, AK and SK.
• Unknown Key Share: The afore-explained attack implies that the UKS requirement
was not met. Despite of the fact that, the mobile device (M) and the AS share the
Authentication Key (AK), the M mistakenly believes that the intruder holds this key as
well. Casper/FDR indicates this fact by highlighting an attack against the Agreement
and Aliveness assertions in the # Specifications header.
• Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience: This property could be modelled
by specifying the long-term keys as crackable and then checking the Authenticity as-
sertions. Casper verifies no breach against the authenticity feature
It is clear from the discussion above that, the initial AKA protocol failed to meet some
security requirements, which are mainly related to the discovered authentication attack.
Although the protocol presumed the core network entities to be securely installed and the
integrity of the exchanged messages to remain intact between the AIS and the AS, the fact
that an attack could still be discovered could be due to the Intruder managing to intercept
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the connections in the core network. This raises the issue of the need for providing a better
security in the core network. Initially, the core network has been assumed to be physically
secure, this assumption was valid in the closed, homogeneous environments, where the core
network was controlled by a sole operator. However, this assumption does not hold in the case
of future networks, where the core network represents an open, multi-operators environment.
Additionally, there is a need to deal with identification-related attacks to meet the Mutual
Entity Authentication property.
Furthermore, the process of deriving the keying materials in the Initial AKA protocol of
(MK04) does not define the keys’ usability scope. Therefore, there is a need to propose a
more stable key hierarchy that specifies the scope of each derived keys.
6.5 The Proposed Solution
In order to address the previous security threats and to provide a better security in the
core network, a novel initial AKA protocol is introduced in this section. However, instead
of making assumptions of a secure core network, we need to define the part of the core
network to be protected and the type of security mechanism. Therefore, as explained in
(MA11b), in order to design the proposed protocol, a progressive design approach has been
followed; in the initial version of the protocol, no security was considered in the core network,
modelling the proposal found secrecy and authenticity attacks, analysing the discovered
attacks will highlight the main source of threats. The second version simulated the case of a
secure channel only between the CA3C and the DA3Cs, the discovered attacks in this draft
highlight the need to secure different parts of the core network. In the third version, secure
channels have been presumed between the DA3C and the Auth. After simulating this case
using CSP, Casper failed to find any attacks. This could be ascribed due to the assumption
that the Intruder does not know the KDFs to generate the Secret the Authentication keys
(SK, AK). However, by adding this knowledge to the intruder capabilities, two attacks were
discovered. These attacks highlight the need to secure all the communication between the
entities (Auth, DA3C, CA3C) in the core network. Therefore, the last version of the protocol
considers pre-established secure channels among these entities and simulates the situation.
6.5.1 Defining the Security System
For the proposed protocol to be practical, we consider the open network structure in Fig 6.3
which has been presented in Chapter 4.
It is crucial to show the actual parties participating in the protocol and thus, how the
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Figure 6.3: The Hierarchical Network Structure
proposed protocol could be mapped to actual entities in the network. The system comprises
four entities: the Mobile Terminal (MT), the Authenticator (Auth) which runs on the Access
Router (AR); the Domain A3C server (DA3C) which is responsible for authenticating and
authorizing the MT to use the network and the Core-End Point which hosts the central A3C
server (CA3C).
6.5.2 The Key Hierarchy
As shown in Fig 6.4, the security materials comprise a top level Unique Key uk(MT),
which is pre-shared between the MT and the CA3C server. Similar to the Ki key in GSM
(Sch03) , the uk(MT) is stored into the MT’s SIM card and is never used for encryption
purposes, rather it is only used for deriving further security keys. The second level key is the
Domain Specific Master Key (DSMK), as the name implies, this key is unique at the domain
level and is derived using an irreversible function F1 as follows: DSMK= F1(uk(MT), seq1,
Auth Domain Name), where seq1 is a fresh sequence number, the Auth Domain Name is the
corresponding domain name. Since each domain might have more than one Authenticator,
the MT could join the domain via any of its Auths, thus, a different Secret Key (SK)
has to be used for each Authenticator. One Authentication Key (AK) is used for mutual
authentication between the MT and the network. Similar to F1, two irreversible function F2
and F3 are used to derive AK and SK as follows: AK = F2 (seq1, DSMK), SK = F3(seq1,
AuthID, DSMK), where AuthID is the ID of the Auth and is broadcasted by the Auth in
the form of AuthID@DomainName.
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Figure 6.4: The Key Hierarchy
6.5.3 The Initial Version Of the Protocol
In the initial version, the protocol is proposed without considering security in the core net-
work, this will help to highlight the potential threats.
The protocol Description
By considering the notation in Table 6.2, the AKA protocol is explained as follows:
After starting the mobile device, the MT picks the access routers’ advertisements (Adv)
which contain information about the access network such as the AuthID and the domain
name. The MT uses this information to generate a Domain-Specific Master Key (DSMK).
Phase 1
Msg1 : Auth→MT : Adv
Generate the DSMK= F1(uk(MT), seq1, AuthID)
The protocol starts when the MT sends a joining message Msg 2 to the Auth. The Auth
responds by sending authentication request AuthReq as Msg 3.
Phase 2
Msg2.MT → Auth : AccReq
Msg3.Auth→MT : AuthReq
By using the DSMK, the MT derives the Authentication Key (AK) and composes Msg
4, this message consists of a fresh sequence number seq1 used as a challenge, Authentication
ID (AuthID), the Mobile Terminal identity (MT) , and a set Initauth flag (InitAuth=1).
The Auth passes this message to the DA3C and from there to the CA3C as Msg 5 and Msg
6. Using the included mobile ID, the CA3C looks up the corresponding uk(MT) and uses it
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to generate a fresh Domain Specific Master key DSMK.
Phase 3
Generate the AK = F2(seq1, DSMK)
Msg4.MT → Auth : MT, seq1, AuthID, Initauth
Msg5.Auth→ DA3C : MT, seq1, AuthID, Initauth
Msg6.DA3C → CA3C : MT, seq1, AuthID,
Initauth
Generate the DSMK= F1(uk(MT), seq1, AuthID)
The DSMK key is included in Msg 7. Using the information in this message, the DA3C
generates the Authentication Key (AK) and returns the previously sent sequence Seq1 and
a new sequence Seq2 all the way to the MT as Msg 8 and Msg 9. These messages are en-
crypted using the derived AK. Since the MT has the required information to derive all the
keys (DSMK, SK, AK), the MT verifies the contents of Msg 9 and derives the Secret Key SK.
Phase 4
Msg7.CA3C → DA3C : DSMK, seq1, AuthID,MT,
Initauth
Generate the AK = F2(seq1, DSMK)
Msg8.DA3C → Auth : {seq1, seq2}AK
Msg9.Auth→MT : {seq1, seq2}AK
Verify the message contents, then derive the
SK:= F3(seq1, DSMK, AuthID)
The MT returns Seq2 all the way to the DA3C as Msg 10 and Msg 11. The DA3C ver-
ifies the contents of Msg 11 and derives the Secret Key SK.
Phase 5
Msg10.MT → Auth : {seq2}AK
Msg11.Auth→ DA3C : {seq2}AK
Verify the message contents, then derive the SK:= F3(seq1, DSMK, AuthID)
Upon verifying the Msg 11, the DA3C authenticates the MT and acknowledges this to
the CA3C, and then generates the Secret Key (SK) and passes it to the Auth in Msgs12,
13. Using the SK, the Auth sends an encrypted access response message to the MT as Msg 14.
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Table 6.2: Notation
Notation The Description
MT The Mobile Terminal
Auth Is the Access Router in the peripheral network
AuthID The Authenticator unique ID has the format Au-
thID@domainname
CA3C Core-endpoint entity, which has QoS and Security related re-
sponsibilities
se1(DA3C) Pre-shared secret key between the CA3C and the DA3C
se2(Auth) Pre-shared secret key between the DA3C and the Authenti-
cator (Auth)
uk(MT) Unique secret key shared between the CA3C and the MT
DSMK Domain specific- Master Key DSMK= F1 (uk(MT), seq1,
Auth-domain name)
AK Authentication key AK= F2 (seq1, DSMK)
SK Secret Key SK = F3 (Seq1, AuthID, DSMK), used to encrypt
all the messages between the MT and the network
F1, F2, F3 Irreversible Key Derivation Functions
InitAuth
flag
A flag set only in the initial authentication. In case of han-
dover, this flag will not be set
HoAckm Joining/Handover Acknowledgement message used by the
DA3C server to inform the CA3C in the CEP about a suc-
cessful authentication
seq1, seq2 Sequence numbers
{m}K Encrypting the message (m) using the key (K)
Phase 6
Msg12.DA3C → CA3C : HoAckm
Msg13.DA3C → Auth : SK
Msg14.Auth→MT : {AccRes}SK
Formal Verification
A Casper description of the protocol was prepared. However, since this is an initial version
of the protocol, only the #Specfications heading is mentioned here. A complete description
of the final and completely refined version of the protocol are included in Appendix D.
# Specification
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Secret(MT,AK,[DA3C])
Secret(DA3C,AK,[MT])
Secret(MT,SK,[DA3C, Auth])
Agreement( MT, DA3C, [seq2])
Agreement(DA3C, MT, [AK])
WeakAgreement(MT, Auth)
WeakAgreement(Auth,MT)
WeakAgreement(Auth, DA3C)
WeakAgreement(DA3C, Auth)
Aliveness (Auth, MT)
Aliveness (MT, Auth)
After modelling the protocol using Casper and checking the corresponding CSP code using
FDR checker, the following attacks were discovered. The first attack is against the Se-
cret(MT, SK, [Auth, DA3C] assertion, where the Intruder launches a replay attack and
eventually manages to get the secret key (SK). The second attack is against authenticity
specification Agreement(DA3C, MT, [AK]), in which the intruder replays messages between
the different parties and manages to impersonates the DA3C to the MT, thus, the MT mis-
takenly believes it has completed a run of the protocol, with the DA3C, using data items
AK. The third attack is against the WeakAgreement(Auth, DA3C) assertion. In this attack,
the DA3C mistakenly believes it has successfully completed a run of the protocol with the
Auth. However, in reality it was running the protocol with Intruder. These attacks were
described in (MA11b).
The first attack is against the Secret(MT, SK, [Auth, DA3C] assertion, where the
Intruder launches a replay attack and eventually manages to get the secret key
(SK). The message sequence involved in the attack is given below.
0. -> mt : auth, ca3c
1a. auth -> I_mt : adv, da3c
1b. I_auth -> mt : adv, da3c
2a. mt -> I_auth : accReq
2b. I_mt -> auth : accReq
3a. auth -> I_mt : authReq
3b. I_auth -> mt : authReq
4a. mt -> I_auth : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
5a. I_auth -> da3c : SEQ1, Authid,Mallory, InitAuth
4b. I_mt -> auth : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
6a. I_da3c -> ca3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
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7a. ca3c -> I_da3c : DSMK,SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
5b. auth -> I_da3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
6b. da3c -> I_ca3c : SEQ1, Authid, Mallory, InitAuth
7b. I_ca3c -> da3c : DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, Mallory, InitAuth
8a. da3c -> I_auth : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
9a. I_auth -> mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
10a. mt -> I_auth : {SEQ2}{AK}
11a. I_auth -> da3c : {SEQ2}{AK}
12. da3c -> I_ca3c : hoackm
8b. I_da3c -> auth : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
9b. auth -> I_mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
10b. I_mt -> auth : Garbage
13a. da3c -> I_auth : SK
11b. auth -> I_da3c : Garbage
13b. I_da3c -> auth : SK
14a. auth -> I_mt : {accRes}{SK}
14b. I_auth -> mt : {accRes}{SK}
The intruder knows SK
As shown in Fig 6.5, the attack could be explained as follows:
1. Initially the intruder intercepts and passively replays the messages between the MT
and the Auth as in messages 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b. Once the intruder intercepts
message 4a from the MT, it starts three sessions as follows:
(a) The Intruder acts as the Auth and actively composes message 5a, which is a replay
of a fake message 4a by replacing the MT with the intruder’s identity (Mallory).
The Intruder will then intercept and block the response from the DA3C towards
the CA3C as in message 6b. Thus, the CA3C will not be able to discover the fake
message.
(b) The Intruder pretends to be the MT and passively replays message 4a towards
the Auth as message 4b. Since the Auth is expecting a response to message 3a,
the goal of message 4b is to make the Auth believe that he is still running the
protocol.
(c) Acting as the DA3C, the intruder replays message 4a towards the CA3C. As a
result of this message, the intruder will get the DSMK from the CA3C as in
message 7a
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2. The intruder uses the information from messages 7a and 6b to compose a fake message
7b towards the DA3C. Since this message holds the intruder identity and the DSMK,
the DA3C will believe the included identity was verified by the CA3C, and thus will
generate the other keys; (AK),(SK).
3. After intercepting message 8a, the intruder starts two sessions:
(a) The intruder pretends to be the Auth and intercepts messages 9a, 10a, 11a. By
verifying message 11a, the DA3C will authenticate the intruder believing it is the
MT. The intruder knows of the successful attack by intercepting the Acknowl-
edgement message from the DA3C as in message 12.
(b) Since the Auth is expecting a response to message 5a, the intruder replays message
8a (it was originally intended to the Auth) towards the Auth, so the Auth believes
he is still running the protocol as in messages 9b, 10b and 11b.
4. Once the intruder intercepts the SK in message 13a, this means the secrecy attack was
successfully completed and it is time to finish the protocol. Therefore, the intruder
passes the SK to the Auth, so the Auth could send the AccRes as in messages 14a and
15a.
Figure 6.5: The Attack Against the Secret(MT, SK, [Auth, DA3C]
The second attack is against authenticity specification Agreement(DA3C, MT, [AK]). In
which, the intruder replays messages between the different parties and manages to imper-
sonates the DA3C to the MT, thus, the MT mistakenly believes it has completed a run of
the protocol, with the DA3C, using data items AK. The message sequence involved in the
74
attack is shown below.
0. -> mt : auth, ca3c
1a. auth -> I_mt : adv, da3c
1b. I_auth -> mt : adv, da3c
2a. mt -> I_auth : accReq
2b. I_mt -> auth : accReq
3a. auth -> I_mt : authReq
3b. I_auth -> mt : authReq
4a. mt -> I_auth : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
5a. I_auth -> da3c : SEQ1, Authid, Mallory, InitAuth
4b. I_mt -> auth : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
6a. I_da3c -> ca3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
7a. ca3c -> I_da3c : DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
5b. auth -> I_da3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
6b. da3c -> I_ca3c : SEQ1, Authid, Mallory, InitAuth
8a. I_da3c -> auth : Garbage
7b. I_ca3c -> da3c : DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, Mallory, InitAuth
8b. da3c -> I_auth : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
9a. I_auth -> mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
10a. mt -> I_auth : {SEQ2}{AK}
9b. auth -> I_mt : Garbage
10b. I_mt -> auth : {SEQ2}{AK}
11a. I_auth -> da3c : {SEQ2}{AK}
11b. auth -> I_da3c : {SEQ2}{AK}
12. da3c -> I_ca3c : hoackm
da3c believes (s)he is running the protocol,
taking role DomainSERVER, with Mallory, using
data items AK
13. I_da3c -> auth : SK
14. auth -> I_mt : {accRes}{SK}
mt believes (s)he has completed a run of the
protocol, taking role INITIATOR, with da3c,
using data items AK
The first four steps of the attack are same as the previous one, the remainder steps go as
follows:
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1. The Intruder acts as DA3C and send a ’Garbage’ message to the Auth as message 8a,
the Auth considers this as a response to 5b and thus he thinks that, he is still running
the protocol. Pretending to be the CA3C, the intruder uses the information in messages
7a and 6b to replace the MT identity in message 7a with it’s identity (Mallory) and
sends message 7b to the DA3C. Upon receiving this message, the DA3C generates the
AK, SK and sends message 8a toward the Auth. This message will be intercepted by
the intruder, which will pretend to be Auth and exchange messages 8a,9a,10a with the
DA3C and the MT.
2. The Auth passes the ’Garbage’ message towards the MT. However, the intruder blocks
this message and responds by replaying 10a towards the the Auth so the Auth believes
that he is still part of the protocol. The intruder pretends to be the Auth and replays
message 10a towards the DA3C as in message 11a. In order not to receive a duplicated
message, the intruder blocks the message sent by the Auth towards the DA3C as
message 11b.
3. Upon verifying message 11a and mistakenly believing it is running the protocol with
the MT, the DA3C acknowledges the successful authentication to the CA3C by sending
message 12, which will be blocked by the intruder. Similarly, to the previous attack,
when the intruder has managed to get the SK, the intruder prompts the Auth to send
the AccRes message by sending the SK in message 13 towards the Auth. Thus, the
MT mistakenly believes it has been running the protocol with DA3C, while in reality
it has been running it with the intruder (Mallory)
Figure 6.6: The Attack Against the Agreement(DA3C, MT, [AK])
76
The third attack, described below, is against the WeakAgreement(Auth, DA3C) assertion.
In this attack, The DA3C mistakenly believes it has successfully completed a run of the
protocol with the Auth. However, in reality it was running the protocol with Intruder. For
completeness, the message sequence involved in the attack is given below.
0. -> mt : auth, ca3c
1a. auth -> I_mt : adv, da3c
1b. I_auth -> mt : adv, da3c
2a. mt -> I_auth : accReq
2b. I_mt -> auth : accReq
3a. auth -> I_mt : authReq
3b. I_auth -> mt : authReq
4. mt -> I_auth : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
5. I_auth -> da3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
6a. I_da3c -> ca3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
6b. da3c -> I_ca3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
7a. ca3c -> I_da3c : DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
7b. I_ca3c -> da3c : DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
8. da3c -> I_auth : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
9. I_auth -> mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
10. mt -> I_auth : {SEQ2}{AK}
11. I_auth -> da3c : {SEQ2}{AK}
12. da3c -> I_ca3c : hoackm
13. da3c -> I_auth : SK
Once again, these attacks could be ascribed to the fact that the Intruder man-
aged to intercept and replay the connections between the parties in the core
network.
6.5.4 The Second Version of the Protocol
As an attempt to secure the core network, we propose the presence of a certain trust relation-
ship between the network’s entities and thus secure channels have already been established
between the CA3C and the DA3Cs. Such secure channels could be guaranteed by using dif-
ferent mechanisms such as IP security (IPSec) (SK98) or any other Virtual Private Network
(VPN) protocols. Alternatively, this could be achieved using out-of-band approach such as
agreeing on security materials among the multiple operators.
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Formal Verification
In order to simulate this secure connection between the CA3C and the DA3C using Casper/FDR,
a secret key se1(DA3C) is presumed to be pre-shared between these entities. Casper/FDR
found attacks against the secrecy of the SK defined by the Secret(MT, SK, [Auth, DA3C]
assertion, as the intruder replays the messages between the parties and impersonates the
Auth to the DA3C to intercept the (Auth-DA3C) connection in Msg 13. Also, an authenti-
cation attack against the WeakAgreement(Auth, DA3C) assertion was discovered. It explains
how the intruder intercepts and replays the messages between different participants and once
it gets message 8, it impersonates the Auth so the DA3C mistakenly believes that, he has
been running the protocol with the Auth while in reality it was with the intruder. These
attacks were analysed in (MA11b).
The first attack below is against the secrecy of the SK defined by the Secret(MT, SK,
[Auth, DA3C] Assertion, as the intruder replays the messages between the parties and im-
personate the Auth to the DA3C to intercept the (Auth-DA3C) connection in Msg 13.
1a. auth -> I_mt : adv, da3c
1b. I_auth -> mt : adv, da3c
2a. mt -> I_auth : accReq
2b. I_mt -> auth : accReq
3a. auth -> I_mt : authReq
3b. I_auth -> mt : authReq
4a. mt -> I_auth : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
5a. I_auth -> da3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
6a. da3c -> I_ca3c : {SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth}{se1(da3c)}
6b. I_da3c -> ca3c : {SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth}{se1(da3c)}
7a. ca3c -> I_da3c : {DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth}{se1(da3c)}
7b. I_ca3c -> da3c : {DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth}{se1(da3c)}
4b. I_mt -> auth : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
5b. auth -> I_da3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
8a. da3c -> I_auth : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
9a. I_auth -> mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
8b. I_da3c -> auth : Garbage
10a. mt -> I_auth : {SEQ2}{AK}
9b. auth -> I_mt : Garbage
11a. I_auth -> da3c : {SEQ2}{AK}
10b. I_mt -> auth : {SEQ2}{AK}
12. da3c -> I_ca3c : {hoackm}{se1(da3c)}
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13a. da3c -> I_auth : SK
11b. auth -> I_da3c : {SEQ2}{AK}
13b. I_da3c -> auth : SK
14a. auth -> I_mt : {accRes}{SK}
14b. I_auth -> mt : {accRes}{SK}
The intruder knows SK
The discovered attack highlights that, there is a need to protect other parts of the core
network.
The second attack, below is an authentication attack against the WeakAgreement(Auth,
DA3C) assertion. It explains how the intruder intercepts and replay the messages between
different participants and once it gets message 8, it impersonates the Auth so the DA3C
mistakenly believes that, he has been running the protocol with the Auth while in reality it
was with the intruder. These attacks are similar to the previous three attacks against the
initial version of the protocol in Section 6.5.3.
1a. auth -> I_mt : adv, da3c
1b. I_auth -> mt : adv, da3c
2a. mt -> I_auth : accReq
2b. I_mt -> auth : accReq
3a. auth -> I_mt : authReq
3b. I_auth -> mt : authReq
4. mt -> I_auth : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
5. I_auth -> da3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
6a. da3c -> I_ca3c : {SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth}{se1(da3c)}
6b. I_da3c -> ca3c : {SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth}{se1(da3c)}
7a. ca3c -> I_da3c : {DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth}{se1(da3c)}
7b. I_ca3c -> da3c : {DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth}{se1(da3c)}
8. da3c -> I_auth : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
9. I_auth -> mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
10. mt -> I_auth : {SEQ2}{AK}
11. I_auth -> da3c : {SEQ2}{AK}
12. da3c -> I_ca3c :{hoackm}{se1(da3c)}
13. da3c -> I_auth : SK
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6.5.5 The Third Version of the Protocol
In the final scenario, secure channels exist only between the DA3C and the Auth. To simulate
these channels a secret key se2(Auth) is pre-shared between the Auth and the DA3C. After
preparing the Casper’s input file and asking Casper/FDR to verify the protocol, Casper
found no attacks against the assertions in the # Specifications heading.
This result could be mainly ascribed to the fact that disclosing the connection between the
CA3C and the DA3Cs will lead to exposing the DSMK key. However, this key does not have
any security rule rather than acting as a primitive information, used to derive the AK and
the SKs. In that sense, even if the attacker managed to get the DSMK, he will not be able
to derive further keys, and thus could not launch secrecy or authentication attacks.
6.5.6 AKA Protocol Formal Verification and Security Analysis
Similar to the assumption of the AKA protocol of Mobile Ethernet in Section 6.4 that the
Key Derivation Function (KDFs) are not known to the Intruder, the three versions of the
proposed protocol adopted this assumption. Therefore, the key derivation functions of the
AK and SK keys, F2 and F3 respectively were not included in the Intruder initial knowledge.
By adding the (F2, F3) to the attacker knowledge, as stated in the #Interuder Information
heading below, new attacks against the secrecy of the SK, AK are discovered.
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {mt, da3c, Mallory, ca3c,
Authid, auth, uk(Mallory), F2, F3 }
Crackable = PresharedKeys
Crackable = Domainspecifickey
The first discovered attack is due to the exposure of the SK key and it goes as follows:
1a. auth -> I_mt : adv, da3c
1b. I_auth -> mt : adv, da3c
2a. mt -> I_auth : accReq
2b. I_mt -> auth : accReq
3a. auth -> I_mt : authReq
3b. I_auth -> mt : authReq
4a. mt -> I_auth : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
4b. I_mt -> auth : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
5a. auth -> I_da3c : {SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth}{se2(auth)}
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5b. I_auth -> da3c : {SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth}{se2(auth)}
6a. da3c -> I_ca3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
6b. I_da3c -> ca3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt, InitAuth
7a. ca3c -> I_da3c : DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, mt,
InitAuth
7b. I_ca3c -> da3c : DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, mt,
InitAuth
8a. da3c -> I_auth : {{SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}}
{se2(auth)}
8b. I_da3c -> auth : {{SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}}
{se2(auth)}
9a. auth -> I_mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
9b. I_auth -> mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
10a. mt -> I_auth : {SEQ2}{AK}
10b. I_mt -> auth : {SEQ2}{AK}
11a. auth -> I_da3c : {{SEQ2}{AK}
11b. I_auth -> da3c : {{SEQ2}{AK}
12. da3c -> I_ca3c : hoackm
13a. da3c -> I_auth : {SK}{se2(auth)}
13b. I_da3c -> auth : {SK}{se2(auth)}
14a. auth -> I_mt : {accRes}{SK, Authid)}
14b. I_auth -> mt : {accRes}{SK, Authid)}
The intruder knows SK
The second discovered attack is due to the disclosure of the Authentication Key (AK) and
it goes as follows:
0. -> mt : auth, ca3c
1a. auth -> I_mt : adv, da3c
1b. I_auth -> mt : adv, da3c
2a. mt -> I_auth : accReq
2b. I_mt -> auth : accReq
3a. auth -> I_mt : authReq
3b. I_auth -> mt : authReq
4a. mt -> I_auth : SEQ1, Authid, mt,
InitAuth
4b. I_mt -> auth : SEQ1, Authid, mt,
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InitAuth
5a. auth -> I_da3c : {SEQ1, Authid, mt,
InitAuth}{se2(auth)}
5b. I_auth -> da3c : {SEQ1, Authid, mt,
InitAuth}{se2(auth)}
6a. da3c -> I_ca3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt,
InitAuth
6b. I_da3c -> ca3c : SEQ1, Authid, mt,
InitAuth
7a. ca3c -> I_da3c : DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, mt,
InitAuth
7b. I_ca3c -> da3c : DSMK, SEQ1, Authid, mt,
InitAuth
8a. da3c -> I_auth : {{SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}}
{se2(auth)}
8b. I_da3c -> auth : {{SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}}
{se2(auth)}
9. auth -> I_mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{AK}
10. I_mt -> auth : {SEQ2}{AK}
11a. auth -> I_da3c : {{SEQ2}{AK}}{se2(auth)}
11. I_auth -> da3c : {{SEQ2}{AK}}{se2(auth)}
12. da3c -> I_ca3c : hoackm
13. da3c -> I_auth : {SK}{se2(auth)}
The intruder knows AK
The discovered attacks are ascribed to the fact that the main parameters to derive the Au-
thentication and Secret keys, such as the DSMK, seq1 and AuthID, were sent unprotected
between the CA3C and the DA3Cs and thus the intruder manages to derive the keys. These
attacks highlight the need to have secure connections between the CA3C and DA3Cs. To
simulate these connections a secret key se1(DA3C) is presumed to be shared between the
CA3C and the DA3C, and thus the final version of the protocol is as follows:
Phase 1
Msg1.DesAuth→MT : Adv
Generate the DSMK= F1(uk(MT), seq1, AuthID)
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Phase 2
Msg2.MT → Auth : AccReq
Msg3.Auth→MT : AuthReq
Generate the AK = F2(seq1, DSMK)
Phase 3
Msg4.MT → Auth : MT, seq1, AuthID, Initauth
Msg5.Auth→ DA3C : {MT, seq1, AuthID,
Initauth}se2(Auth)
Msg6.DA3C → CA3C : {MT, seq1, AuthID,
Initauth}se1(DA3C)
Generate the DSMK= F1(uk(MT), seq1, AuthID)
Phase 4
Msg7.CA3C → DA3C : {DSMK, seq1, AuthID,MT,
Initauth}se1(DA3C)
Generate the AK = F2(seq1, DSMK)
Msg8.DA3C → Auth : {{seq1, seq2}AK}se2(Auth)
Msg9.Auth→MT : {seq1, seq2}AK
Verify the message contents, then derive the
SK:= F3(seq1, DSMK, AuthID)
Phase 5
Msg10.MT → Auth : {seq2}AK
Msg11.Auth→ DA3C : {{seq2}AK}se2(Auth)
Verify the message contents, then derive the
SK:= F3(seq1, DSMK, AuthID)
Phase 6
Msg12.DA3C → CA3C : {HoAckm}se1(DA3C)
Msg13.DA3C → Auth : {SK}se2(Auth)
Msg14.Auth→MT : {AccRes}SK
The complete Casper description of the final version of the protocol is included in Appendix
D.
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6.5.7 AKA Protocol Formal Verification
The main goal of the proposed protocol is to achieve mutual authentication between the MT
and the core network, thus authenticating the MT to use the peripheral network. To model
the AKA protocol using Casper/FDR tool, we prepared a Casper input file that represents
the system. The complete description of the protocol is found in Appendix D.
In this section, we discuss how our formal modelling with Casper allows the checking of the
typical security requirements for AKA security protocols.
• Mutual Entity Authentication: Casper provides no direct specification to model
this property. In order to show how our protocol could meet this requirement, we ex-
plicitly, and by considering the protocol transactions, could argue that this requirement
could be met to a certain extent in our protocol. When making the initial contract,
the MT and the CA3C share a unique key uk(MT), which acts as the root in the key
hierarchy and is never used for encryption. We assume this key has been derived by
running a key derivation function over identity-related information of the MT and the
CA3C, and since it is never exposed and is stored in the MT’s SIM card, it is unlikely
for an intruder to get that key; thus, possessing this key verifies the identity of the
party.
• Mutual Key Authentication: the mutual authentication between the MT and the
DA3C is based on the secrecy of the AK. We got Casper to check this using the Secret
(MT, AK, [DA3C]) and Secret (DA3C, AK, [MT]) assertion checks.
• Mutual Key Confirmation: Casper verifies this requirement by using the DE-
CRYPTABLE (m, K) which checks if the message (m) is decryptable by the key (K).
We performed a similar check after messages 9 and 11 as shown in the Protocol De-
scription heading to verify that the valid Authentication key (AK) is possessed by the
other party. If any of the checks fail, the protocol aborts.
• Key Freshness: since there is no direct function with Casper to simulate this feature,
we included a freshly generated sequence seq1 in the key derivation function as ex-
plained in the key derivation subsection; thus the fact that Casper does not detect any
attack on the secrecy of the secret and authentication keys (SK) and (AK) respectively
implies that key freshness is not violated.
• Unknown-Key Share: we check this property using the Aliveness assertions. Addi-
tionally, we could address this attack by making a binding between the keys and the
identity of the parties. The proposed AKA protocol has achieved this by the identity
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Table 6.3: Comparison
The Security Property The AKA of
Mobile Ether-
net
Initial Pro-
posal
Refined Pro-
posal
Mutual Entity Authentication No No Yes
Mutual Key Authentication/
Keys’ Secrecy
Yes No Yes
Mutual Key Confirmation Yes No Yes
Key Freshness Yes Yes Yes
Unknown-Key Share No No Yes
Key Compromise Impersonation
Resilience
Yes Yes Yes
Defining Key Scope No Yes Yes
of the MT and the CA3C in the derivation of the uk(MT). Also, the authenticator’s
ID and the domain name are included in the key derivation functions of the SK and
AK keys.
• Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience: this property could be modelled by
specifying the long-term keys as crackable and then checking the Authenticity asser-
tions. Casper verifies no breach against the authenticity feature.
The parameters, used as an input to derive the keys help in determining the scope of the key.
For instance, the DSMK = F1(uk(MT), seq1, Auth-domain name) is unique at the domain
level (since it includes the domain name) and fresh per user (it has uk(MT) and a fresh seq1).
A similar discussion goes for the Authentication Key AK= F2(seq1, DSMK), which is unique
and fresh per-domain. The SK= F3(seq1, AuthID, DSMK) is slightly different; as the key
derivation function includes the Authenticator’ ID as an input, therefore, this key is unique
and fresh per authenticator. This implies that, in case of inter-domain or Vertical Handover
new AK and SKs are derived while, only new SKs are derived in case of intra-domain or
Horizontal Handover.
6.5.8 Protocol Analysis and Security Consideration
Table 6.3 shows a summary of the results, it compares the results between the Mobile
Ethernet’s AKA protocol, the first proposed solution (no security in the core network) and
the final proposal ( with the security in the core network).
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6.6 Secure Vertical Handover in Heterogeneous Envi-
ronment
The open architecture of Next Generation Networks (NGNs) implies that, to maintain ubiq-
uity, future mobile devices need to roam between different networks using vertical handover
techniques. When a mobile user moves into a new foreign network, data confidentiality and
mutual authentication between the user and the network are vital issues in this heterogeneous
environment.
6.6.1 Related Work
This section discusses some related work, that have been trying to provide AKA protocols
to secure vertical handover mechanisms in heterogeneous networks.
The Handover Key Working Group (HOKEY WG)
In an attempt to secure vertical handover, the HOKEY WG proposed the EAP Re-authentication
Protocol (ERP) (VN08). However, the ERP protocol has many drawbacks; firstly, ERP is
based on the EAP platform, this implies that, all the network entities such as the Access
Routers have to be updated or replaced to support this platform. Secondly, the poor confi-
dentiality of the discovery messages at the beginning of the protocol, and thirdly, the lack
of formal verification of the protocol. More detailed analysis of the ERP protocol could be
found in chapter 2.
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
The 3GPP project has introduced two scenarios; the 3GPP-WLAN interworking, which is
introduced in Release 6 of 3GPP specifications (3GP06) and 3GPP-WiMAX interworking
architectures as examples of heterogeneous environments. Both scenarios presume the pres-
ence of 3GPP technology in the core network, while WLAN or WiMax technologies are in
the peripheral networks.
In the case of WiMAX to WLAN Vertical Handover, the mobile terminal (MT) invokes
EAP-AKA if the WLAN domain is visited for the first time. Otherwise, fast EAP-AKA
re-authentication is executed. In the case of WLAN to WiMAX handover, the MT performs
the Initial Network Entry Authentication protocol (INEA) which is performed as a part
of the Privacy and Key Management protocol version 2 (PKMv2) (AA09), when visiting
the domain for the first time. Otherwise, WiMAX Re-authentication protocol is executed
(WiM10).
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One issue with this approach is that it is fully dependent on a specific wireless technology;
in this case, the 3GPP core network . Whoever wants to add a new wireless access to an
existing network will always need to develop a method that integrates wireless access with
the 3GPP core infrastructure.
The Handover AKA protocol of the Mobile Ethernet
The Mobile Ethernet has proposed two AKA protocols: the first, which has been discussed in
section 6.4 is used for the initial authentication; when the Mobile device joins the network for
the fist time. The second AKA protocol is responsible for AKA functions in case of handover.
The AKA protocols of the Mobile Ethernet are not technology-specific and do not require
platforms such as the EAP and thus could be deployed by any operator. Also, the network
architecture, proposed by the Mobile Ethernet is very similar to the open architecture in
chapter 4. Due to these factors, the handover AKA protocol of the Mobile Ethernet will be
act as model to investigate the potential security threats, it will be analysed in section 6.7.1
using formal methods approach.
6.7 Secure Vertical Handover in Mobile Ethernet
This section describes and formally analyses the Vertical Handover AKA protocol proposed
by Masahiro et al (I.D06). By considering the notations in Table 6.1, the protocol runs as
follows:
After running the initial AKA protocol in the source network, the mobile device and the
Authentication Server (AS) would have shared the security context that consists of the UID,
MS, AK, and SK. In case of a handover, the security context is transferred, over a presumably
secure channel from the old AS to the new AS in the destination network. This means that
the security context is always shared between the mobile device and the network. It also
implies that only the SK is re-established on handover, while the re-establishment of the
AK and the authentication process happen after the handover. As stated in (I.D06), the SK
transferred during the context transfer continues to be used until the new SK is established.
As shown in Fig 6.7, since both the mobile device and the Authentication server retain the
security context, in the case of handover, mobile device’s authentication is based on the the
previous mutual authentication between the device and the old AS.
At the end of the authentication phase, the M and the AS derive a new Handover Authenti-
cation ID (HOAID), which is used to speed up the handover response. So instead of sending
the UID, the mobile device will initiate the authentication protocol by sending the HOIAD
and the R1 as the first message in Fig 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: The Mobile Ethernet Protocol
6.7.1 The Formal Verification of the Mobile Ethernet Protocol
This section will formally verify the Mobile Ethernet’s AKA protocol for Vertical Handover
using the Casper /FDR tool, then a detailed analysis of the security properties will be
introduced. As stated in (I.D06), it is assumed that, the network can trace the movement
of the device and determine when handover occurs. However, in order to simulate this using
Casper, we introduce the following preliminary messages: the Entry Points’s advertisement
messages (Adv), The Access Request (AccReq) message, which is used by the mobile device to
indicate its intention to access the network. The Authentication Request (AuthReq) message,
sent by the Entry point to trigger the authentication process. None of these messages play
a security role; they are only used at the pre-authentication stage, where the entry points
advertise their presence.
A Casper input file describing the system in Fig 6.7 was prepared. The full description is
mentioned in Appendix E.
After generating the CSP description of the systems using Casper and asking FDR to check
the security assertions, two attacks were found. The first discovered attack below is against
the WeakAgreement(M, EP) and Aliveness (M, EP) assertions.
0. -> m : ep, as
1a. m -> I_ep : accReq
1b. I_m -> ep : accReq
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Figure 6.8: The First Attack on the Mobile Ethernet
2. ep -> I_m : authReq
3. I_m -> ep : Garbage
4. ep -> I_as : Garbage, h(Garbage)
5. I_as -> ep : Garbage
6. ep -> I_m : Garbage
Fig 6.8 shows the first discovered attack, which could be described as follows: Initially, the
intruder intercepts the connection and replays the messages between the EP and the M as in
messages 1a, 1b and 2. Pretending to be the mobile device, the intruder composes and fake
message with a ’Garbage’ contents as in message 3. Using this fake message, the protocol
continues following the normal sequence and thus, the EP completes the run believing it has
completed the run with the M, while it was with the intruder instead.
The second attack, shown in Fig 6.9 is against the WeakAgreement(EP, M) and Aliveness
(EP, M) assertions. In this attack, the intruder intercepts and replays the messages between
the M and the EP as in messages 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3. Once the intruder intercepts message
3, it impersonates the EP and completes running the protocol as in messages 4, 5 and 6.
Thus, the mobile device will complete running the protocol believing that, it was with the
EP, while it was with the intruder instead.
0. -> m : ep, as
1a. m -> I_ep : accReq
1b. I_m -> ep : accReq
2a. ep -> I_m : authReq
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Figure 6.9: The Second Attack of the Mobile Ethernet
2b. I_ep -> m : authReq
3. m -> I_ep : {m, r1, hoaid1}{sk}
4. I_ep -> as : {m, r1, hoaid1}{sk},
h({m, r1, hoaid1}{sk})
5. as -> I_ep : {r2, {r1}{ak}}{sk}
6. I_ep -> m : {r2, {r1}{ak}}{sk}
6.7.2 Protocol Analysis and Security Considerations
In this section, we discuss how our formal modelling with Casper allows checking the security
requirements described in 5.4.
• Mutual Entity Authentication: In the first discovered attack, the intruder manages
to impersonate the M to run the protocol with the EP. Also, in the second attack, the
intruder impersonates the EP to run the protocol with the mobile device. These attacks
imply that the protocol does not fulfil this security requirement. These attacks could
be ascribed due to the fact that the protocol does not consider verifying the identity
of the participants.
• Mutual Key Authentication: The AS is authenticated to the M by proving the
possession of the random value R1 and the Authentication Key AK. We got Casper to
check this using the Secret (M, AK, [AS]) and Secret (AS, AK, [M]) assertion checks.
Since no attack was found against the key secrecy, this property is met.
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• Mutual Key Confirmation: Casper verifies one direction of this requirement by
using the DECRYPTABLE (m, K) which checks if the message (m) is decryptable by
the key (K). We performed a similar check after message 6 as shown in the Protocol
Description heading to verify that the valid Authentication Key (AK) is possessed by
the AS. If the check fails, the protocol aborts. For the mutual authentication, it was
presumed in (I.D06) that the AK along with the security context were transferred from
the old AS before the protocol starts, thus there is no need to check this by Casper.
• Key Freshness: Since the keying materials are transferred from the old AS, this
property could be verified by considering the key derivation functions for the MS =
PRF (UUK,R1|R2), AK = PRF (MS,R1|R2) and SK = PRF2(MS,R1|R2) in the
initial AKA protocol. We could claim that this property is guaranteed since fresh
random values R1, R2 are included in the key derivation functions of the MS, AK and
SK keys.
• Unknown Key Share: The second, discovered attack implies that the UKS was
not met. Despite of the fact that the mobile device (M) and the AS share the Au-
thentication Key (AK), the M mistakenly believes that the intruder holds this key as
well. Casper/FDR indicates this fact by highlighting an attack against the WeakA-
greement(EP,M) and Aliveness(EP,M) assertions in the # Specifications header.
• Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience: this property could be modelled
by specifying the long-term keys as crackable and then checking the Authenticity as-
sertions. By specifying the MS key to crackable and checking the Agreement(AS, M,
[AK, R1]) assertion, Casper verifies no breach against this authenticity feature.
It is obvious that, the Mobile Ethernet’s AKA protocol for vertical handover fulfilled the Mu-
tual Key Authentication, Key Freshness and the Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience
requirements. While it failed in meeting the Mutual Entity Authentication and the Unknown
Key Share, other requirements such as Mutual Key Confirmation could only be achieved if
we consider the protocol pre-assumptions of a secure transfer of the security context from
the previous AS. This analysis accords with the verification results of Casper/FDR, where
two authenticity attacks were discovered.
6.8 The Proposed Solution
In order to address the previous security threats, this section introduces a new AKA protocol
for Vertical Handover in open, heterogeneous environments. The new protocol considers the
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security in the core network at the design stage. However, instead of making assumptions
of a secure core network, we need to define the part of the core network to be protected
and the type of security mechanism. Therefore, in order to design the proposed protocol, a
progressive design approach has been followed; in the initial draft, security was considered in
the core network between the CA3C and the DA3Cs, modelling the proposal found secrecy
and authenticity attacks, which highlight the main source of threats. The second version
simulated the case of a secure channel only between the DA3C and the Auth, the discovered
attacks highlight the need to secure different part of the core network. In the final version,
secure channels have been presumed between the DA3C and the Auth as well as between
the DA3C and the CA3C. After simulating this case using CSP, Casper failed to find any
attacks. This implies that to address the afore-discovered security threats, the connections
between all the entities in the core network have to be protected.
6.8.1 The Initial Version Of the Protocol
The initial version of the protocol considers the presence of a certain trust relationship be-
tween the network’s entities and thus secure channels have already been established between
the CA3C and the DA3Cs.
To simulate this secure connection between the CA3C and the DA3C using Casper/FDR,
a secret key se1(DA3C) is presumed to be pre-shared between these entities. Thus, the
connections between the CA3C and the DA3C in the source network (SrcDA3C) and the
DA3C in the destination network (DesDA3C) are protected using the Srcse1(SrcDA3C) and
Desse1(DesDA3C) respectively.
The Mobile Terminal (MT), residing in the source network, picks the access routers’ adver-
tisements (Adv) which contain information about the destination access network such the
AuthID and the domain name. The MT uses this information to generate a Domain-Specific
Master Key (DSMK).
Phase 1
Msg1 : DesAuth→MT : Adv
Generate the DSMK= F1(uk(MT), seq1, AuthID)
The protocol starts when the MT sends a joining message Msg 2 to the Authenticator in the
destination network (DesAuth). The DesAuth responds by sending authentication request
AuthReq as Msg 3.
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Phase 2
Msg2.MT → DesAuth : AccReq
Msg3.DesAuth→MT : AuthReq
By using the DSMK, the MT derives a new Authentication Key in the destination net-
work (DesAK) and composes Msg 4, which consists of a fresh sequence number seq1 used as
a challenge, Authentication ID (AuthID); the Mobile terminal identity (MT) , and an unset
Initauth flag (InitAuth=0). Since the MT has already been authenticated in the source
network, the connection with the SrcAuth will be encrypted using the Source Secret Key
(SrcSK). The SrcAuth passes this message to the SrcDA3C and from there to the CA3C
as Msg 5 and Msg 6. Using the included mobile ID, the CA3C looks up the corresponding
uk(MT) and uses it to generate a fresh Domain Specific Master key DSMK.
Phase 3
Generate the DesAK = F2(seq1, DSMK)
Msg4.MT → SrcAuth : {MT, seq1, AuthID, Initauth}SrcSK
Msg5.SrcAuth→ SrcDA3C : MT, seq1, AuthID, Initauth
Msg6.SrcDA3C → CA3C : {MT, seq1, AuthID, Initauth}Srcse1(SrcDA3C)
Generate the DSMK= F1(uk(MT), seq1, AuthID)
The DSMK key is included in Msg 7, which is sent over the secure channel using the
pre-shared Desse1(DesDA3C) key. Using the information in this message, the DesDA3C
generates the Authentication Key (DesAK) and returns the previously sent sequence Seq1
and a new sequence Seq2 all the way to the MT as Msg 8 and Msg 9. These messages are
encrypted using the derived DesAK. Since the MT has the required information to derive
all the keys (DSMK, DesSK, DesAK), the MT verifies the contents of Msg 9 and derives the
Secret Key DesSK.
Phase 4
Msg7.CA3C → DesDA3C : {DSMK, seq1, AuthID,MT, Initauth}Desse1(DesDA3C)
Generate the DesAK = F2(seq1, DSMK)
Msg8.DesDA3C → DesAuth : {seq1, seq2}DesAK
Msg9.DesAuth→MT : {seq1, seq2}DesAK
Verify the message contents, then derive the
DesSK:= F3(seq1, DSMK, AuthID)
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The MT returns Seq2 all the way to the DesDA3C as Msg 10 and Msg 11. The DesDA3C
verifies the contents of Msg 11 and derives the Secret Key DesSK.
Phase 5
Msg10.MT → DesAuth : {seq2}DesAK
Msg11.DesAuth→ DesDA3C : {seq2}DesAK
Verify the message contents, then derive the DesSK:= F3(seq1, DSMK, AuthID)
Upon verifying the Msg 11, the DesDA3C authenticates the MT and acknowledges this
to the CA3C, and then generates the Secret Key (DesSK) and passes it to the DesAuth in
Msgs 12, 13. Using the DesSK, the DesAuth sends an encrypted access response message to
the MT as Msg 14.
Phase 6
Msg12.DesDA3C → CA3C : {HoAckm}Desse1(DesDA3C)
Msg13.DesDA3C → DesAuth : DesSK
Msg14.DesAuth→MT : {AccRes}DesSK
Formal Verification
A Casper description of the protocol was prepared, a complete description of the final and
completely refined version of the protocol is included in the Appendix F. After modelling
the protocol using Casper and checking the corresponding CSP code using FDR checker, the
following attacks were discovered:
The first attack is against the Secret(DesAuth, DesSK,[MT, DesDA3C]) assertion, where
the Intruder launches a replay attack and eventually manages to get the secret key (SK).
The second attack is against the WeakAgreement(DesAuth, DesDA3C) assertion, where the
Intruder launches a replay attack and successfully impersonates the DesAuth. Detailed
analysis of the attack is in (MA12b).
6.8.2 The Second Version Protocol
In this version of the protocol, secure channels exist only between the DA3Cs and the Auths.
To simulate these channels, secret keys Srcse2(SrcAuth) and Desse2(DesAuth) are pre-shared
between the Auth and the DA3C in the source and destination domains respectively. After
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preparing the Casper’s input file and asking Casper/FDR to verify the protocol, Casper
found attack against the Agreement(DesDA3C, MT, [seq1, DesAK]) assertion as described
in (MA12b).
6.8.3 The Final Protocol
The first and second versions of the protocol in the 6.8.1 and 6.8.2 sections, highlight the fact
that, there is a need to protect all the parts and connections in the core network. Therefore, in
the final version of the proposed protocol, secure channels between the Auths and the DA3Cs,
as well as the between the DA3Cs and the CA3C, have been considered. We simulated these
security considerations with Casper and asked FDR to check for attacks. Despite the fact
that we included the key derivation functions F2, F3 in the Intruder knowledge as stated
in Appendix F, Casper/FDR failed to find attacks against any of the assertions in the
#Specifications heading.
This result implies that the assumption in current systems such as 3G and 2G of a physically
secure core network could not be valid any more. Therefore, in order to provide security in
future heterogeneous environments, there is a need to protect each part and connection in
the core network.
6.8.4 AKA Protocol Formal Verification
The main goal of the proposed protocol is to achieve mutual authentication between the MT
and the core network in case of handover, thus authenticating the MT to use the destination
peripheral network. To model the AKA protocol using Casper/FDR tool, we prepared a
Casper input file that represents the system. The complete Casper description is detailed in
Appendix F.
Furthermore, the AKA protocol for handover is related to the initial AKA protocol and
uses the same keying materials. Therefore, similar to the initial AKA, the handover AKA
protocol meets the desired security requirements as explained in (MA12b).
6.9 Summary
For Network-Level security, this chapter introduces two AKA protocols to provide mutual
authentication between the mobile terminal and the access network in the initial connection
as well as in the case of a handover. These protocols consider the open architecture of
the heterogeneous networks as presented in Chapter 4, and therefore, they are considered
amongst the key underlying security protocols of the AKA framework described in Chapter 5.
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The protocols were verified using Casper/FDR tool and proven to meet the desired security
requirements. As pointed out in our discussion on Y-Comm in Chapter 2, this work shows
that as the core of the network is opened, more attacks will be possible on network entities
that previously were protected in closed environments.
The next chapter will introduce the underlying protocols for the Service-Level security of
the AKA framework.
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Chapter 7
The AKA Framework- The
Service-Level AKA Protocol
7.1 Introduction
After authenticating the Mobile Terminal (MT) in the access network using the NL-AKA
protocols for the Initial and handover authentication, the MT will attempt to access the
services, to which it has already subscribed. In order to provide an authoritative and secure
access to these services, there is a need for a Service-Level AKA (SL-AKA) protocol that
secures the session between the client and the Service Provider (SP).
This chapter introduces two SL-AKA protocols, which are responsible for achieving mutual
authentication and securing the session between the MT and SP in two scenarios; the initial
authentication and in case of a handover.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the security challenge in terms of
achieving mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the service provider in
heterogeneous environments. Section 3 describes related research to address the security
issue at the service-level. Two proposed SL-AKA protocols, for the initial AKA and the
handover, are described in Section 4. The Chapter is summarized in Section 5.
7.2 Problem Definition
The aim of ubiquitous computing in heterogeneous environments similar to the one described
in Chapter 4 is to provide mobile users anytime, anywhere and any platform access to a
wide variety of computing servers. While much research has been performed to provide the
infrastructure and mechanisms to support this goal at the network level such as Mobile IPv6,
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Fast Mobile IPv6 and IEEE802.21 (DJ04), (McC05), (IEE07), few research efforts such as
(Ste07) have considered the need for application support for connectivity.
Furthermore, the issue of Application/Service-Level security has, in general, been difficult
to address in future networks. This is due to many reasons. Firstly, any proposed security
protocol has to consider the structure of current mobile devices as well as their limitations in
terms of battery and processing power. These conditions put extra restrictions when deciding
on security measurements such as encryption algorithms (Symmetric or Asymmetric) as well
as keys management.
Secondly, as described in Chapters 2 and 6, current security mechanisms consider the closed
nature of current communication systems. However, these differences highlight the need for
enhancing current security mechanism if not introducing new ones that consider the open
architecture of the future networks.
Thirdly, when a client subscribes to a service, parameters such as the desired QoS and security
parameters will be defined as part of the Service Level of Agreement (SLA). However, since
the service provider might have different preferences in terms of the security and QoS, the
two end-points might need to provide a range of preferences where they could negotiate
and trade off between security and QoS. This highlights the need for a negotiation stage to
specify the connection parameters before setting up the connection.
Fourthly, in heterogeneous networks, future mobile devices are expected to switch between
various access networks whilst remaining connected to the service provider. Based on their
security and QoS characteristics, a server provider might choose to trust some networks more
than others and hence apply different security measurements. This highlights the need for
the server provider to know about the access network of the mobile terminal in order to
re-assess the connection security and to decide on the required security parameters.
However, in case of handover when the mobile terminal moves into a new network with
different characteristics, the mobile terminal and the service provider will need to re-negotiate
the connection parameters to comply with the characteristics of the new access network. This
highlights the need for a lightweight Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol for
handover so the functionality of the this protocol will not disrupt the connection with the
server.
7.3 Related Work
This section describes some potential mechanisms to address the Service-Level security in
future networks.
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7.3.1 Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL)
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), are cryp-
tographic protocols that provide secure communication between two end points over the
Internet. SSL is divided into two layers, with each layer using services provided by a lower
layer and providing functionality to higher layers. The SSL record layer provides confidential-
ity, authenticity, and re-play protection over a connection-oriented reliable transport protocol
such as TCP. Layered above the record layer is the SSL handshake protocol, a key-exchange
protocol which initializes and synchronizes cryptographic state at the two endpoints. Af-
ter the key-exchange protocol completes, sensitive application data can be sent via the SSL
record layer (TD99). In this sense, SSL/TLS enables the end-points to negotiate and agree
on security parameters such as the encryption and hashing algorithms.
Using public-key encryption techniques, SSL-enabled client and server will authenticate each
other and establish an encrypted connection. Although SSL/TLS achieve many desired
security properties, and as a result, have been widely implemented, there are many drawbacks
when it comes to implementing them in future networks; firstly, they are PKI-based protocols,
which involves undesired complexity as explained in 5.5.2. Secondly, the SSL/TLS run above
the Transport layer which make them unaware of the characteristics of the underlying access
networks, and thus cannot reflect these characteristics in the negotiation stage of the protocol.
Thirdly, these protocols do not introduce a lightweight extension for re-authentication in case
of handover.
7.3.2 The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) (Ste07) is a connection-oriented trans-
port protocol that operates on the top of the IP protocol. The SCTP has several advan-
tages over the traditional transport protocol such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
(VC74) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) (Pos80), examples of these advantages are multi-
streaming and multi-homing support. Additionally, the Secure SCTP (SSCTP) (CH12),
(MT07) was designed with security features to set a secure association between the two
end-points and thus addresses attacks such replay and SYN flooding. The SSCTP protocol
enables the two end-points to negotiate the security parameters and thus agree on the desired
algorithms.
However, the security approach proposed of the Secure SCTP is highly dependent on the
SCTP protocol as the underlying transport protocol and consequently, it cannot be used with
other transport protocols such as the widely implemented TCP and the UDP. Although the
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SCTP protocol supports client mobility (MR05), there is neither a clear impact of this
mobility on the security mechanisms or a lightweight re-authentication protocol in case of
handover.
7.3.3 The Service-Level AKA of the Mobile Ethernet framework
The Mobile Ethernet framework (MK04), (I.D06), (Kur05) is an architecture for IP-based,
future networks. In order to address the security between the mobile terminal and the service
provider,an SL-AKA protocol was introduced in (MK04).
Although the Mobile Ethernet framework, and thus its security protocols, adopts a network
structure that is very similar to our view of future networks in Chapter 4, and despite the
fact that, the SL-AKA protocol achieves a set of desired security features such as mutual
authentication and connection confidentiality, it suffers from some major drawbacks. These
are as follows: firstly, the SL-AKA protocol does not have a negotiation stage; thus, it neither
considers variations of QoS and security requirements of the access networks and the service
provider nor the preference of clients. Secondly, it does not consider the case of handover
and thus no SL-AKA protocol for handover has been proposed.
7.4 The Proposed Service-Level AKA Protocol
The SL-AKA protocol is needed to achieve mutual authentication between the Mobile Ter-
minal (MT) and the Service Provider (SP). The proposed protocol is invoked when the MT
sends a request to use a specific service running on the service provider (SP) side to achieve
a mutual authentication and key agreement between the two ends. However, before pro-
ceeding with explaining the protocol, it might be beneficial to recall the structure of future
heterogeneous networks as described in Chapter 4.
7.4.1 Overview of Future Networks
We adopt a hierarchical network structure composed of three levels. At the top level, the Core
End-Point (CEP) acts as a gateway to the Internet and is responsible for managing multiple,
mid-level domains. Each domain is technology-specific and is controlled by a single operator.
For instance, two domains might be connected to the same CEP, each controlled by a differ-
ent technology operator such as WiMAX and GSM. The bottom level comprises individual
peripheral wireless networks, controlled by Access Routers or Base Stations through which
the mobile terminal has access to the wider network. Additionally, some Service Providers
(SPs) such as video on-demand or E-Commerce providers might reside in the core network
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and could be accessed over the peripheral network. Each service provided is identified by
its service ID (SrvID), also, these providers have agreements with the network operators to
guarantee the required QoS
7.4.2 The Initial SL-AKA Protocol
This protocol runs when the Mobile Terminal (MT) initially expresses its intention to contact
the Service Provider (SP) to achieve mutual authentication and to set up a secure channel
between the MT and the SP.
Considering the network structure in Chapter 4, the information about the subscribed ser-
vices and the client’s security preferences along with the characteristics of its access network
such as the network domain name are kept by the Central A3C (CA3C) in the Core-End
Point (CEP). Also, as described in the key hierarchy section of Chapter 5, for each sub-
scribed service, the CA3C will derive a service key Srvkey= F(UK, SrvID, SubID, lifetime)
and passes it to the MT and the SP. However, sharing the SrvKey between the MT and the
SP is not part of the SL-AKA protocol and could be achieved as part of the QoS models in
Chapter 4. Therefore, the SL-AKA protocol considers the SrvKey to be pre-shared between
the SP and the MT. This key will be used to derive the Association Key (ASKey) to secure
the connection between the SP and the MT.
By considering the notations in Table 7.1, the SL-AKA runs as follows:
The SL-AKA is initiated when the Mobile Terminal (MT) indicates to the CA3C its intention
to access the service provider (SP). The CA3C server knows the services’ subscription IDs as
well as the corresponding MT’s preferences in terms of security and QoS which are part of the
Service Level of Agreement (SLA) stored in the CA3C server. The CA3C server passes the
MT’s preference as a vector of information (Vector1), which contains lists of MT’s preferred
encryption and hashing algorithms (Enclist) and (HMACList) respectively. Additionally, it
contains a fresh random value (r1) to maintain the vector freshness.
This vector along with the domain name of the MT’s access network and the MT’s SubID are
passed to the Service Provider (SP) as messages 1,2 and 3. Once, the SP receives message
3, it derives the Association Key ASKey = F (Srvkey(SP), Vector1, Vector2).
Msg1 : CA3C → DesDA3C : V ector1, SubID,ADname
Msg2 : DesDA3C → DesAuth : V ector1, SubID,ADname
Msg3 : DesAuth→ SP : V ector1, SubID,ADname
Generate the ASKey= F (Srvkey(SP), Vector1, Vector2)
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Table 7.1: Notation
Abbreviation Full name and description
MT Mobile Terminal
SP Service providers residing in the core end point
DesDA3C The Domain AAAC server of the destination do-
main of the Application/service provider
CA3C Central AAAC server stores the MT’s SLA, which
contains the MT’s preferred QoS and Security pa-
rameters as well as the a list of all the SPs.
Srvkey(SP) Service key: a pre-shared key between the MT and
the SP: Srvkey= F(UK, SrvID, SubID, lifetime).
r1,r2 Random nonce
HMACList1,
HMACList2
Lists of supported hashing algorithms.
EncList1, En-
cList2
Lists of encryption algorithms.
SrvID Service ID, which uniquely identifies the service.
SubID User subscription ID, uniquely identify the sub-
scriber to the SP.
ADname Access Domain name, defining the domain name
of the access network.
SrvCookies The Cookies, sent by the sever to the MT, these
cookies limit replay and DoS attacks.
Vector1 r1,HMACList1,EncList1.
Vector2 r2,HMACList2,EncList2.
ASKey Association key ASKey = F (Srvkey, Vector1, Vec-
tor2).
Ackm Authentication Token Ackm=F(SubID, SrvID,
timestamp) used as an acknowledgement messages
to indicate the completion of the AKA process.
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Based on the MT’s preference in Vector1, the SP constructs Vector2 which represents the SP
preferences in terms of encryption and hashing algorithms (EncList2), (HMACList2) -this
negotiation stage will be discussed later in section 7.4.2. In message 4, the SP sends Vector2
and server cookies (SrvCookies) to the MT. These cookies will be used as a challenge and to
stop re-play attacks.
Msg4 : SP →MT : {V ector2, SrvCookies}Srvkey(SP )
Generate the ASKey= F (Srvkey(SP), Vector1, Vector2)
Message 4 is encrypted using the pre-shared service key SrvKey(SP) between the MT and
the SP. Therefore, the MT will decrypt the message to get Vector2 and derive the ASKey.
The MT retrieves the nonce number (r2) from the received Vector2, uses the derived ASKey
to encrypt message 5, which includes the server’s cookies and r2. Upon receiving message
5, the SP verifies the message’s contents to ensure that it contains the valid values for the
SrvCookies and r2. In case of a successful verification, the SP acknowledges the successful
authentication by composing the acknowledgement message (Msg6)
Msg5 : MT → SP : {r2, SrvCookies}ASKey
Verify the message contents
Msg6 : SP →MT : {Ackm}ASKey
The Negotiation Process
At this stage, we presume that each time the user subscribes to a new service, an identity-
based authentication token is generated and securely stored in the MT and the SP. This
token is used in the protocol as an acknowledgement Ackm=F(SubID, SrvID, timestamp)
to indicate authentication completion and for achieving identity authentication as explained
in the SL-AKA Analysis section 7.4.2. For the initial subscription, an out-of-band token
distribution is achieved prior to the SL-AKA. In later stages, if the MT wants to subscribe to
a new service, the new token is sent via secure control and management channels. However,
setting these channels up is beyond the scope of the SL-AKA protocol.
In Msg1, the CA3C provides the SP with a list of the supported hashing and encryption
algorithms by the MT; it also contains the domain name of the MT’s access network. The
reason for including the network domain name is to allow the SP to specify its security level
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with regards to the credibility of the MT’s access network.
Two major factors define network’s credibility: the network security level in terms of the
efficiency of the authentication and encryption mechanisms; geographical location of the
MT’s access network, some services might choose not to accept access requests from certain
countries or domains, which are considered as insecure. Taking these factors into account,
the SP specifies three modes of access networks: low, normal and high secure networks and
as a result the SP re-orders its own hashing and encryption lists (HMACList2, EncList2)
and sends them to the MT as part of the Vector2.
This way, in addition to its own lists, each end has the other end’s lists. In the case of HMAC
lists for instance, each end takes the first suggested algorithms in the SP’s list (HMACList2)
and looks it up in the MT’s list (HMACList1), if no match is found, it takes the second
suggested algorithm in list2 and looks it up in list1, then the third and so on. The first
match is considered as the adopted hashing algorithm. The same procedure is followed for
choosing the session encryption algorithm.
The SL-AKA Formal Verification and Security Considerations
Similar to the proposed UL-AKA and NL-AKA protocols, Casper/FDR tool is used to verify
the SL-AKA protocol. We prepared an input file describing the protocol and its system.
Refining the CSP file using Casper/FDR shows no attacks against the proposed protocol.
The full Casper file, representing the protocol is in the Appendix G.
The MT and the SP could use the same SrvKey as long as it is still valid; LifeTime is less
than a pre-defined threshold. This threshold is defined by the CA3C and is proportional to
the MT truthfulness.
By considering the contents of Vector 1 and Vector 2, we guarantee the freshness of the
Association Key (ASKey), by including two fresh nonces (r1, r2) in the derivation function:
ASKey = F (Srvkey, Vector1, Vector2). Furthermore, as will be explained later in the
lightweight SL-AKA protocol for a handover, a new ASKey is derived whenever the MT
changes the domain of the access network, thus, in the case of multi-homed devices (GM11),
different associations keys are used to protect the sessions with the SP. The side effects of
this situation is the possibility that, a legitimate user might start many sessions and transfer
a large volume of information; therefore, the SP needs to set a policy on the number of
the simultaneous sessions for each mobile terminal identified by the subscription ID SubID.
Another potential solution is by enforcing admission control at the SP’s access network, such
mechanisms are not parts of the SL-AKA protocol.
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Security Analysis Based on the Security Requirements List
1. Mutual Entity Authentication: Similar to the UL-AKA protocol, this security property
is achieved, using the Authentication Token Ackm=F(SubID, SrvID, timestamp) which
has been generated based on the parties’ IDs.
2. Mutual Key Authentication: The mutual authentication between the MT and the SP
is based on the secrecy of the derived session key Srvkey(SP). We got Casper to check
this using the Secret (SP, Srvkey(SP),[MT]) assertion check.
3. Mutual Key Confirmation: This property is met by performing the check, using the
Decryptable function after Msg4 and Msg5 in the Protocol Description heading as
detailed in Appendix G. By using the Decryptable function each party makes sure that
the valid key is possessed by the other part. If any of the check failed the protocol
aborts.
4. Key Freshness: Since Casper does not have any function to check this property, the
freshness of the Association key ASKey is guaranteed by including Vector 1 & 2 in
its Key Generation Function (KGF) ASKey= F(Srvkey(SP), Vector1, Vector2). These
vectors comprise two fresh random values r1 & r2; thus, a new ASKey is derived for
each session. Since Casper does not detect any attack on the secrecy of the ASKey,
this implies that key freshness is not violated.
5. Unknown-Key Share: This requirement could be met by making a bind between the
derived key and the parties’ identities. This is considered by including the SrvKey
in the deriving function of the ASKey; the SrvKey involves the SubID and SrvID in
its derivation function: Srvkey= F(UK, SrvID, SubID, lifetime). Casper verifies this
property by using the WeakAgreement assertion in the Specification heading Appendix
G.
6. Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience: This check has been done by specifying
the long-term key Srvkey(SP) as crackable and using the Agreement assertion to check
any breach of the authenticity feature.
7.4.3 Light Weight SL-AKA Protocol for Handover
When the MT performs handover and changes its point of attachment, the new access
network might offer different QoS and be of a different credibility level. There is a need
to consider these changes by re-negotiating the security parameters and deriving a new
Association Key (NewASKey) to secure the connection between the MT and the SP.
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However, there is also a requirement not to interrupt the ongoing service; therefore, the re-
negotiation process in the proposed SL-AKA protocol starts before the MT actually moves
to the new network, and hence, the NewASKy is derived by the MT and SP prior to the
handover. Furthermore, since the MT and SP have already authenticated each other, the
new fast re-authentication will be based on the previous authentication.
The light weight SL-AKA protocol goes as follows: When the MT sends a handover request
to a new domain, the CA3C will send the domain name of the new network towards the SP
as in messages 1,2 and 3. When the SP receives this information, it re-orders the HMACList2
and the EncList2 to suit the new characteristics of the network, and thus the SP will have
a different value of the Vector2. The SP will also use the old Association Key (OldASKey)
to derive the new one: NewASKey= F(OldASKey, Vector1, Vector2).
Msg1 : CA3C → DesDA3C : ADname
Msg2 : DesDA3C → DesAuth : ADname
Msg3 : DesAuth→ SP : ADname
Generate the NewASKey= F (OldASKey , Vector1, Vector2)
The SP sends the new vector (Vector2) to the MT as message 4, which is encrypted us-
ing the OldASKy. Only the MT can decrypt this message to retrieve Vector2, which will be
used by the MT to generate the NewASKey. The MT acknowledges the successful derivation
by sending an encrypted acknowledgement using the NewASKey.
Msg4 : SP →MT : {V ector2}OldASKey
Generate the NewASKey= F (OldASKey , Vector1, Vector2)
Msg5 : MT → SP : {Ackm}NewASKey
Formal Verification
Similar to the initial SL-AKA protocol, Casper/FDR proves no attacks against the light
weight SL-AKA. The full Casper/FDR description of the protocol is in Appendix H.
7.5 Summary
As a part of the AKA framework described in chapter 5 and in order to achieve mutual
authentication and set a secure connection between the Mobile terminal (MT) and the Service
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Provider (SP), this chapter introduces a novel SL-AKA protocol that considers the network
structure proposed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, to deal with the handover issue at the
service level, a lightweight SL-AKA protocol is introduced. Both protocols are verified using
Casper/FDR tool and proven to meet many desired security requirements.
This chapter along with Chapters 5 and 6 have defined the underlying security protocols
of the AKA framework. The next chapter will show how to integrate the AKA framework
with the QoS framework described in Chapter 4 to define the Ring-based, Connection and
Vertical handover security models.
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Chapter 8
The Targeted Security Models
8.1 Introduction
As highlighted in Chapter 2, one of the key concepts of the proposed security approach in
this research is the notion of the Targeted Security Models (TSMs), which aim at protecting
data as well as network entities in different situations. In this research, three security models
have been proposed: the Connection, vertical handover and the Ring Based security models.
This chapter will introduce the security models and describe how they could be defined by
integrating the QoS models introduced in Chapter 4 and the AKA framework described in
Chapter 5.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls the layers of the Y-Comm’s Integrated
Security Module (ISM). Section 3 describes the Ring-Based Security model. Section 4 defines
the Connection security model. It starts by introducing an abstract model then explains how
the model could be defined by integrating the AKA framework and the Registration and
connection- QoS signalling models. Section 5 proposes an abstract Secure Vertical Handover
Model, then shows how the model is defined by integrating the AKA framework and the
handover-QoS signalling model. The chapter is summarized in Section 6.
8.2 Recalling the Y-Comm Integrated Security Mod-
ule
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the Y-Comm framework proposes a four-layer Inte-
grated Security Module (ISM) to address security at different levels of the communication
framework. The security module comprises the following layers:
1. Service And Application Security (SAS): In the Peripheral Framework, SAS defines the
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Table 8.1: Mapping the AKA mechanisms to the Security module
The Security Layer The AKA Protocol
Service and Application Security (SAS) UL-AKA
Network Transport Security (NTS) SL-AKA
Network Architecture Security (NAS) NL-AKA
AAAC functions at the end-device and is used to authenticate users and applications.
SAS in the Core network provides AAAC functions for services on the Service Platform
in the core network.
2. QoS-Based Security (QBS): is concerned with QoS issues and the changing QoS de-
mands of the mobile environment as users move around.
3. Network Transport Security (NTS): is used to set up secure connections through the
core network.
4. Network Architecture Security (NAS): is invoked to ensure that the user is authorized
to use any given network.
As explained in the Table 8.1, the underlying security protocols of the AKA frameworks
namely UL-AKA, NL-AKA and SL-AKA address the functionalities of certain layers of the
ISM. In order to address the functionality of the QoS-Based Security (QBS) layer as well as
to define the Targeted Security Models, we need to integrate the AKA framework and the
QoS-Signalling models, this will be explained in the following sections.
8.3 The Ring-Based Security Model
This section describes the Ring-Based Security Model which uses the scope concept to protect
servers by limiting their accessibility based on their functionality. The model will also protect
network and servers resources from being abused, thus will greatly reduce Denial of Service
attacks on offered services without limiting access to key parts of the infrastructure.
8.3.1 The Motivation
The open and multi-homed nature of the Next Generation Networks (NGNs) makes them
vulnerable to security threats which manifest themselves mainly in form of Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks. Due to many factors, these attacks will become more common in future
heterogeneous networks: firstly, the concept of global reachability, which has been adopted
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in the design of most communication protocols, allows any host to communicate with any
other host over the globe. Secondly, due to the absence of QoS-provision over the different
networks, an attacker can send a huge volume of traffic towards the victim without any
indication of a QoS breach.
It is obvious that the compromise and resource exhaustion attacks lead to a breach of the
agreed SLA. This highlights the need for an integrated solution that considers the security
and QoS sides of these attacks. Moreover, in order to deal with the above situation, there is
a need for a novel approach that addresses each of the afore-mentioned factors. Therefore,
to deal with the first factor, this Chapter introduces the Ring-Based security model which
enhances the concept of the ”Off By Default” (HB05) which enables the end-hosts or servers
to define the nodes to communicate with and thus, limits servers’ accessibility based on their
functionality.
8.3.2 The Model Outline
The Ring-Based concept does not allow servers to be directly accessible over a Wide Area
Network such as the Internet without initially interacting with the network infrastructure.
This is done by using the concept of scope where a server acts only within a given scope.
Therefore, by considering the network structure introduced in Chapter 4, four scopes are
presented as shown in Fig 8.1:
• Local: indicates that the server could only be accessed locally via mechanism such as
the loopback interface.
• Local Area Network: defines a LAN scope which means that the server could be
accessed by the nodes in the same peripheral network.
• Core End-Point/Site: denotes that only devices residing within the same Core End-
Point could access the server; these devices might be in the same or different domains.
• Global: means that the server is globally accessible over the Internet; thus, it accepts
connections from other Core-End Points.
Details on how to enforce these scopes are given in Chapter 9.
8.4 The Connection Security Model
This section will describe the Connection security model. It starts with introducing the model
outline which defines the transactions between different network entities. Then it shows how
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Figure 8.1: The Ring-Based Security Model
this model could be achieved by integrating the QoS-Registration and Connection Initiation
models, described in Chapter 4 and the AKA framework, introduced in Chapter 5.
8.4.1 The Connection Model Outline
As stated in (MA10), (GM10), this model aims at establishing a secure connection between
a mobile terminal and a service being hosted at another site, it defines the required steps to
set up such secure session as shown in Fig 8.2.
• Step 1: The server is started. The NAS module in the server talks to the NAS module
on the Local LAN to get access to its wireless infrastructure.
• Step 2: The QBS security module on the server informs the QBS module in the core
network about its overall Service Level of Agreement which contains the QoS associated
with a connection to this service.
• Step 3: The mobile node is started. The NAS module in the mobile node contacts the
NAS module in the peripheral networks to gain access to the wireless infrastructure.
• Step 4: When the mobile node wants to use the service, the QBS Module in the mobile
node contacts the QBS module in the core network and asks for a connection with a
given quality of service to be made to the Server. The QBS module returns two core
endpoints which must be used to set up the connection.
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• Step 5: The NTS module on the mobile node contacts the NTS module in the core
network and says that it would like a connection to the server, using the core endpoints,
the QoS and security parameters.
• Step 6: The NTS module in the core network contacts the NTS module on the server
to signal an incoming call. At this point, the server can also check the security of the
client as well as the security of the connection.
• Step 7: If the server accepts the request, then the NTS module in the core network
joins the two core endpoints.
• Step 8: It then signals to both the client and server that a connection has been estab-
lished.
Figure 8.2: The Connection Security Model
8.4.2 Defining the Connection Security Model Mechanisms
Once the mobile terminal (MT) starts, the User-Level AKA protocol (Chapter 5) is invoked
to achieve mutual authentication between the terminal, the SIM/PIC and the user. Starting
from this stage, the MT will deal with all subsequent security and connectivity procedures
on behalf of the user.
The second step deals with registering the MT in its network, which mainly involves:
• Authenticating and authorizing the MT to join the network, this could be achieved by
the Initial Network-Level AKA protocol described in Chapter 6.
• Checking the MT’s Service Level of Agreement (SLA) with the server and applying
the corresponding access control policy on the network Access Router (AR), this will
be achieved by the QoS-Registration model.
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The third step deals with connection initiation, when the MT wants to start a connection
with a remote service provider (SP). This step involves the following:
• Authorizing the connection request in both the source -the MT- and the destination
-the service Provider- networks.
• Making sure that the connection specifications comply with the available QoS. The
first two steps are part of the QoS-Connection model.
• Achieving mutual authentication and setting up a secure session between the MT and
the SP, this will be achieved using the initial Service-Level AKA protocol described in
Chapter 7.
• The final steps will be allocating the network resource to accommodate the connection,
this is part of the QoS-Connection model.
Fig 8.3 shows the steps of the Connection security model.
Figure 8.3: The Steps of Connection Security Model
8.5 The Secure Vertical Handover Model
This section starts with proposing a model for the secure vertical handover and then defines
how this model could be achieved by integrating the AKA framework and the QoS-Handover
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signalling model, described in Chapter 4.
8.5.1 The Model Outline
As stated in (MA10), (GM10), the vertical handover security model is for facilitating se-
cure vertical handover and attempts to prevent network resources from being abused and
overloaded. This is done by monitoring resource requests and ensuring access to vulnerable
components does not exceed the available QoS. As shown in Fig 8.4, the model involves the
following steps:
• Step 1: The QBS layer of the Mobile Terminal asks the QBS of the Core Network
about potential target networks for handover with required QoS and security level. If
this information has not been already in the Core-End point, all the available networks
are probed by the core endpoint. At the end of this stage, the MT has a clear idea
of the QoS and security available at all potential networks in the vicinity and could
decide on the target network for future handover.
• Step 2: The Mobile terminal sends a handover request to the target network.
• Step 3: After authenticating and authorizing the MT in the target network, network
resources are allocated to accommodate the handover and a Handover Response is sent
towards the MT.
Figure 8.4: The Secure Vertical Handover Model
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8.5.2 Defining the Secure Vertical Handover Model Mechanisms
After deciding on the target network for handover, the MT sends a Handover Request towards
the new network. Security should be provided with minimum disturbance to the handover;
therefore, before the actual handover happens, the MT should be pre-authenticated and
the security materials should be launched in the target network in advance. This could be
achieved using the handover Network-Level AKA, introduced in Chapter 6.
Once mutual authentication is achieved, the new target network will derive the Admission
policy related to the MT from the Core network, it then passes this policy all the way to the
peripheral network’s Access Router. This task will be achieved as a part of the QoS-Handover
Signalling model.
If the MT has a connection with a remote service provider, the handover Service-Level AKA
protocol will be invoked to provide a fast re-authentication and set a secure session.
Network resources have to be allocated in the target network, then a Handover response is
sent back to the MT. The old/source network will release the resources which have been
reserved for the MT. This is part of the QoS-Handover Signalling model. Fig 8.5 details the
steps of the Secure Vertical Handover Model.
Figure 8.5: The Steps for the Secure Vertical Handover Model
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8.6 Summary
After defining models for QoS-signalling in Chapter 4 and an AKA framework in Chapter 5,
this chapter described how these could cooperate to define the Connection and the Vertical
handover security models. The chapter also defines the Ring-Based model to protect servers
in heterogeneous environment by limiting the accessibility based on their scope of func-
tionality. The next Chapter will explore possible options to implement the proposed AKA
protocols in this research as well as introduce new enhancements to the network structure
to help in implementing the Ring-Based model.
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Chapter 9
Potential Implementation Approaches
for the Proposed Security Mechanisms
9.1 Introduction
After defining the Targeted Security Models (TSMs) as well as their underlying security
mechanisms, this Chapter investigates possible procedures towards implementing the pro-
posed NL-AKA, SL-AKA and UL-AKA protocols. Furthermore, it investigates possible
approaches to support integration between the security, QoS and communication procedures
using an ontology (Gru93), (Lac05). The chapter also proposes changes to the addressing,
naming and location systems in the network, which could aid at implementing the Ring-
Based Model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 deals with the multi-homing issue
and introduces major enhancements on some network services to implement the Ring-Based
Model. Section 3 defines the problem of security attacks against the implementation of the
security protocols and the need for integrating the proposed QoS and security mechanism
with the communication framework. Section 4 describes the Compiler Of Security Proto-
cols into Java (COSP-J) compiler to generate a Java code of the security protocol and the
Automatic Code Generator into C# code (ACG-C#) compiler which generates a C# code
of the protocol. Section 5 describes how an ontology could support the integration between
security, QoS and communication framework. The chapter is summarized in Section 6.
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9.2 Enhancing Network Services to implement the Ring-
Based Model
As stated in Chapter 8, the Ring-Based Model aims at dealing with compromise and resource
exhaustion attacks as forms of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by using the scope concept to
restrict access to servers so users can only access the server when they are in the same scope
as the server. Additionally, there is a QoS-side of the DoS attacks since they are mainly
availability attacks and result in exhausting the network and server resources.
The author believes that the multi-homing issue in future networks will increase the sever-
ity of these attacks, as malicious, multi-homed devices use several interfaces, identified by
different network addresses to launch the attack, without having anything to indicate that
these addresses are collocated on the same node. In this sense, the multi-homing issue will
enable attackers to start simultaneous connections with end-servers over different networks
which might result in exceeding the agreed QoS and overloading the resources.
Therefore, any proposed solution should consider the multi-homed nature of future devices
and limit servers accessibility to only authorized clients. Also, it has to continuously monitor
the resource utilization over different networks and make sure that there is no breach of the
agreed QoS.
9.2.1 Investigating the Multi-Homing issue in Future Networks
In recent work of the Y-Comm group (GM11) and (MA11c), the impact of multi-homed
devices on current network addresses and structure has been investigated. The outcome
highlighted the need for a new approach to map multiple network interfaces to the hosting
device, thus a novel addressing scheme has been introduced in (GM11). Additionally, major
changes to location and naming systems such as the Home Location Register (HLR) and
the Domain Name System (DNS) (Sch03), (Moc87) have been introduced in (MA11c). It is
worth pointing out that the idea of using different scopes fits very nicely with the addressing
scheme that was formally associated with IPv6, in that IPv6 specified various address types
closely associated with the scope concept for example, link and site addresses. Y-Comm,
however, takes the view that location or network address and scope should be treated in a
more orthogonal or independent fashion. This is because a scope of server is usually defined
in an administrative context by a security administrator. Hence we need to decouple the
concept of scope from network addresses.
Fig 9.1 shows the novel addressing scheme, the 128-bit long address has three portions: the
Location ID defines the domain of the mobile node (MN), the Node ID is a 64-bit used to
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Figure 9.1: The Address Format
identify the node and is assigned by the the manufacturer. Among the fields of the NetAdmin
part is the 2-bit Scope Field (SF) which is responsible for defining the node accessibility as
follows:
• SF=00: indicates that the node could only be accessed by processes on the same
machine.
• SF=01: defines a LAN scope which means that the node could be accessed from only
the devices belonging to its LAN network.
• SF=10: denotes that only devices residing in the same site as the node could get
access.
• SF=11: means that the device is globally accessible.
To support the new addresses and deals with the multi-homing issue, there is a need for
major changes to the DNS and the location systems. Therefore, in (MA11c) the group has
proposed the concept of the Enhanced DNS (eDNS) and the Master Locator (ML), respec-
tively. Similarly to the current DNS, the eDNS is still responsible for resolving Addresses
to names and visa-versa. However, as shown in Table 9.1, to support the new addressing
scheme, there is a need to have more information about the node launched in the naming
system. Examples of this information is the scope field (SF), the M and S fields, which are
taken from the NetField portion of the address and indicate whether the destination is static
and represent a multicast address. The ML is an evolved version of the Home Location
Register HLR and is responsible for tracking the mobile terminal over different networks,
Table 9.2 shows the structure of the ML.
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Internet
Name
Node ID S M SF Location ID ML’s Ad-
dress
Name1 Node ID1 1 0 01 Location ID1 ML- Add
Name2 Node ID2 1 0 10 Location ID2.1
Location ID2.2
ML- Add
Name3 Node ID3 0 0 11 Location ID3 ML- Add
Name4 Node ID4 0 0 10 Location ID4.1
Location ID4.2
Location ID4.3
Location ID4.4
ML- Add
Table 9.1: The eDNS Record
Node ID Location ID INF Mobility
Vector
QoS
Specifica-
tions
Node ID1 Location ID1.1
Location ID1.2
INF1.1
INF1.2
Value1
Value2
QoS-Spec1
QoS-Spec2
Node ID2 Location ID2.1
Location ID2.2
INF2.1
INF2.2
Value3
Value4
QoS-Spec3
QoS-Spec4
Table 9.2: The ML Record
9.2.2 Specifying the Ring-Based Model
The Ring-Based Model presented in Chapter 8 used the scope concept, derived from the
(HB05), to limit servers’ visibility over the network based on their functionality. This section
describes how the scope concept and hence the Ring-Based Model could be implemented
using the new addressing scheme and the SF field to define the server scope.
However, for the proposed security model to work in future, heterogeneous environment such
as the one in Chapter 4, the SF field in the new address must be redefined and mapped to the
network structure. In this structure of the network, a server could be local, accessed by clients
in the same peripheral network or by clients residing within the Core-End Point (CEP)or
located at the same site. The server might also be global and thus, accessible globally over
the Internet. By considering the value of the (SF) field in the addressing scheme, the four
scopes could be redefined as follows:
• SF=00: indicates that the server could only access locally and thus it’s in a Local
scope.
• SF=01: defines a LAN scope which means that the server could be accessed by the
nodes in the same peripheral network. So the Location ID should be the local LAN.
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Figure 9.2: Enforcing the Reachability Based on the Scope
• SF=10: denotes that the server could only be accessed by devices residing within the
same Core End-Point. So Location ID must be a site Address.
• SF=11: means that the server is globally accessible over the Internet.
The following sections explain how the servers’ accessibility could be implemented and en-
forced using the new addressing scheme and the hierarchical network structure. More details
could be found in (MA11d).
The host registration and devising the Access Policy
As shown Fig 9.2, in this stage, the hosts register themselves in a global naming system
such as the proposed eDNS along with the corresponding Scope Field’s value that reflects
their scope, this information is passed to the High-level Access Admission (HAAD) module
in the Central QoS Broker (CQoSB). The HAAD uses the defined scope along with the
Service Level of Agreement (SLA) information, retrieved from the QoS Engine to devise an
Access Control Policy (ACP). The ACP is passed from the HAAD all the way to the Access
Admission Enforcement (AAE) module in the Access Router (AR) using policy-conveying
protocols such as the COPS protocol.
Enforcing the Access Policy
At the end of the previous stage, the end-hosts should have been registered with the eDNS
along with their desired accessibility. Additionally, based on the accessible scope and other
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Figure 9.3: Enforcing the Scope Concept in The Ring-Based Model
QoS-related information, an access policy will be devised by the HAAD and transferred to
the enforcement module in the AR which will, based on the policy, accept or drop access
requests.
Fig 9.3 shows the transaction in the case of the Corresponding Node (CN) trying to connect
to a mobile node (MN). For this scenario, we presume that, MN’s scope might be any of the
LAN, Domain or Global.
• Msg1: The CN asks the eDNS server for MN’s address.
• Msg2: The eDNS uses the MN’s name to look up its database and since the MN
is a multi-homed device, its name will be resolved to different addresses with the
same Node ID, this implies that the MN is accessible over different routes/ networks.
However, the eDNS cannot define the best route for the connection. Therefore, the
eDNS returns the MN’s Node ID and the address of the Master Locator( ML) that
manages the mobility of MN.
• Msg3: The CN polls the ML to find out the different networks to which the MN is
currently attached. The ML approaches the CQoSB to get QoS-related information
about the MN’s different networks. Upon receiving this information, the ML sets the
INF bits and thus maps the Location ID to the interface address.
• Msg4: A list of MN’s Location IDs along with their QoS specifications is passed
to the CN, which chooses the route to the MN and thus defines the corresponding
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Location ID.
• Msg5: Since the CN has the MN’s full address, the CN can start the connection by
sending Access Request to the MN. This request will be intercepted by the AR in
the source network which checks the Scope Field in the destination address. Based
on the SF value, if MN was accessible for CN the access request packet is forwarded,
otherwise, it is dropped.
• Msg6 When the access request gets to the destination network, the AR will check
whether the request complies with the access policy or not. If the request passes the
check, the AR passes it to the MN.
However, before the CN could use the service on MN, there is a need to achieve mutual
authentication and set a secure session between the CN and the MN. This could be achieved
using Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocols similar to the one in (MA11b).
Model Analysis and Attacks Modelling
This section will describe different attack scenarios and show how our security model reacts
to them.
• The first scenario is the case of a Denial Of Service (DOS) Attack where a single Cor-
responding Node (CN) is trying to access a server with a LAN/Site scope. Obviously,
if the CN was not in the server’s scope, its connection request will be dropped by the
Access Routers. Otherwise, it could communicate with the server. However, if the
CN initially claims more QoS than it is allowed to, this will be detected by the Access
Admission Enforcement (AAE) as violation to the access policy. Furthermore, after
making the connection, if the CN tries to abuse the network and exceeds the reserved
QoS, this will be detected by the Network Monitoring Entity (NME) module in the
Access Router, consequently, the CN will be blacklisted.
• A similar discussion applies if the server was global.
• The third scenario considers the case of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack
where multiple corresponding nodes attempt to access a server with LAN or Site scope.
Only corresponding nodes in the scope of the server could communicate with the server.
However, in the case where a large number of legitimate nodes managed to access the
server, they could overload the server and launch a DDOS attack despite the fact that
none of the nodes has individually exceeded the agreed QoS.
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Table 9.3: Analysis Summary
Scope DOS DDOS
LAN/ Site Fully Miti-
gated
Still Possible
Global Fully Miti-
gated
Partially Mit-
igated
• In case of a server with a global scope, the previous DDOS attack could still be achiev-
able.
Although the proposed model is based on the ’Off By Default’ concept, it has
avoided most of its drawbacks as explained in (MA11d) by being fully integrated
with the network infrastructure and considering the multi-homing nature of
future mobile devices. Furthermore, by deploying the new address scheme, which uses
the Node ID to identify the device, if a multi-homed CN attempts to start multiple sessions
with the server using different network interfaces, the network and thus the server will be
able to co-locate these sessions to the same CN and thus monitor the resources utilization
over the different sessions. Table 9.3 summarizes the analysis result.
9.3 The Problems of Implementing Security Protocols
With the increasing popularity of wireless network technologies such as 3G, Wimax and LTE,
mobile devices are expected to use these technologies to maintain connectivity to various
types of services. From the viewpoint of the user, ease of use, service flexibility and secure
communication are the main desired features. To deal with the security issue, there is a need
to make sure that any implemented security protocols will achieve desired security goals
such as confidentiality, authentication and integrity. Therefore, various formal methods such
as BAN, CSP and FDR (MB90), (Hoa85), (Sys93) have been developed to verify security
protocols.
In spite of the successful verification of the protocol design, there can be some errors in
its implementation that can be exploited by intruders. This could be due to the mistakes
made by the programmers or bugs in the programming language itself. For instance, in
2002, a Linux worm known as Linux.Slapper.Worm exploited a flaw in the secure sockets
layer (SSL), which is commonly used by e-commerce sites to secure transactions between the
customer’s computer and the company’s server. The worm does not exploit an attack against
the SSL protocol itself, but is a buffer overflow attack that works only against this specific
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implementation (Did09), this vulnerability did not concern the security protocol itself, but
its imperfect implementation. Another example was stated in (CJ05), a flaw pertaining
to a buffer overflow attack was found in the OpenSSH code of the SSH protocol. Once
again, it is not an attack against the protocol itself, but against some of its implementations.
Furthermore, implementing security protocols is an exhaustive and error-prone process which
requires a hard-core programming experience.
Accordingly, it would be interesting to have a tool that could generate the implementation
automatically to remove the risk of error in this step, and also to make implementation
faster and easier. Therefore, the CPSP-J and the ACG-C# compilers have been proposed
in the literature to generate a program code automatically from a high-level specification of
security protocols that has been verified using Casper/FDR tool.
9.4 Potential Compilers for Security Protocols
9.4.1 COSP-J Compiler
As proposed in (Did09), the COSP-J is meant to to be used in addition to Casper in order
to first analyse a protocol and then compile it. Nevertheless, COSP-J and Casper provide
two levels of abstractions; Casper considers a set of agents that communicate with each
other, without actually considering what these agents physically are (i.e. devices or users);
furthermore, Casper does not consider how the agents communicate and the nature of the
communication protocols between the agents. COSP-J provides a more concrete level of
abstraction, as it considers the nature of the agents, the communication protocols. For
instance, with COSP-J there is a clear distinct between the user and the device (a user
might log on from different machines), this difference could be shown in Fig 9.4
COSP-J Input File
As shown in Fig 9.5, the COSP-J is very related to Casper; its input file is adapted from the
general structure of the input files of Casper. The input file of the COSP-J tool comprises
the following headings:
• The # Protocol Description heading: This heading lists the messages to be exchanged
between the participating agents. It differs from the # Protocol Description heading
of Casper in the two points:
1. We do not use the environmental message 0 anymore in COSP-J, this is due to the
fact that the difference between an environmental message and an initial starting
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Figure 9.4: COSP-J and Casper Abstraction (Did09)
Figure 9.5: The use of Casper and COSP-J together (Did09)
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assumptions is important for the analysis of a protocol with Casper, but does not
change anything for an implementation (Did09).
2. To indicate the completion of a protocol, COSP-J proposed a way to express
what the results are of the protocol run once it is finished. The method in the
implementation returns these values to the calling code. These values may be
useful after the end of the protocol, for example if this implementation of the
protocol is just a part of a big network application (Did09).
• The # Free Variables heading: This section describes the types of the variables and
functions that are used in the protocol definition. For COSP-J, we need to be more
specific about the types of functions and variables being used, such as defining the type
of the encryption and hashing functions.
• The # Processes Heading: This heading gives some information about the agents
running the protocol and their initial starting assumptions. For COSP-J, there is a
need to define which values are fed initially to the agents and which are generated
during the run of the protocol.
• The # Functions heading: This heading defines the functions used in the protocol.
• The # External heading: This is a new heading; does not exist in Casper, and it
describes the variables that are used in the input file and that will be provided at
runtime.
COSP-J Output Code
The output code of COSP-J will be a script written in Java, the output defines a list of
actions each agent should perform for each message in the protocol. Based on this, an agent
could be of any of the following cases:
• Case 1: If the agent is not sending nor receiving, no action is assigned to the agent.
• Case 2: If the agent is sending, two actions are required; the agent needs to build the
message out of its fields and then compose it. The message might contain an atomic
(i.e. a nonce value, an agent identity) or an encrypted value. In the latter type, the
agent has to build the sub-message first and then encrypt it.
• Case 3: If the agent is receiving a message, it decomposes and decrypts it, stores the
values that were unknown and checks if the values that were already known are correct.
(Did09).
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Figure 9.6: Security Protocol Design and Implementation (CJ05)
9.4.2 The ACG-C#
The ACG-C# is a tool, used to automatically generate the C# implementation code for
security protocols from the high-level specification written in a variation of Casper nota-
tion. This ACG-C# tool compiles the specification to produce C# code that is a concrete
implementation of the protocol.
As shown in Fig 9.6, the overall process used to verify the safety of the security protocol
and to implement it. The entire process is composed of two sub processes, which are referred
to as protocol design and protocol implementation. To guarantee the safety of the security
protocol in the design phase, we first make an abstract model of the protocol with Casper
and then generate CSP code with the compilation function of Casper. Next, we can run
the FDR model checking tool to verify whether the security protocol satisfies the security
properties or not. If the security properties are satisfied, then the designer inputs the slightly
modified Casper script into the ACG-C# tool. In the implementation phase, the ACG-C#
tool automatically generates the C# implementation code for the security protocol.
9.4.3 Comparing COSP-J and ACG-C#
These tools are automated compilers, related to Casper/FDR tool; they accept a CSP-
like description of the security protocol and generate a code program for implementing the
protocol, While COSP-J produces a Java code, ACG generates a C# file. In this sense, the
differences between these tools will be based on the features of the corresponding language.
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Furthermore, both compilers claim to offer many desired advantages such as No error-prone,
Secure code and High confidence (CJ05). In this sense, deciding on the suitable compiler
would be a matter of personal preference.
9.5 Using Ontology to Support the Integration
9.5.1 An Overview of Ontologies
An ontology is an explicit specification of a conceptualization (Gru93), it communicates a
common understanding of a domain; declare explicit semantics, makes expressive statements,
and supports sharing/reusing of knowledge (Lac05)
9.5.2 How Would an Ontology Help!
The research in this thesis dealt with three different domains; the architectural design of the
communication framework, the QoS signalling as well as security provision. This implied that
research efforts at different domains have to cooperate together. The efficient cooperation in
this situation requires the presence of a common definition of concepts across the different
domains, this in turn will aid the integration of the various research efforts.
Ontology helps in such situations because it provides the following:
• It provides common understanding of the structured information among
researchers of different domains: An ontology deals with the issue of misunder-
standing by formally describing terminological concepts and their relationships that
characterise a domain. It formally corroborates one common understanding of a do-
main and defines semantics independent of the reader (human or computer) and context
(Cho07).
• Explicit Semantics: By explicitly defining the main concepts in a domain and the
relationships between those concepts, it can make expressive statements about the do-
main model. This way of documenting concepts with modelling primitives and semantic
relationships assists in interpretation during information sharing in heterogeneous IT
systems.
• Sharing/reusing of knowledge: The development of an ontology by a certain group
will give the chance to other groups to reuse the ontology in their domain,and thus
save time and effort.
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9.5.3 An Ontology for Y-Comm
In order to use Y-Comm framework, as with any new model, novices will have to spend time
understanding the approach being taken including the diversity of concepts and relationships.
In addition, the use of ontologies to formalize Y-Comm and to specify semantic meanings
should reduce the study time and the misunderstanding of definitions.
Therefore, work has already started on developing a new ontology for Y-Comm to facilitate
the interoperability among different areas of service provision (access, content, and broker-
age), ease the tasks for vertical handover management and mitigate misunderstanding of the
shareable information from different providers.
The author believes that by using Y-Comm’s ontology, new ontologies could easily be in-
troduced to define the security and QoS mechanisms. This in turn will aid the integration
between the different domains, as it will clearly show the potential semantic relation between
objects across the domains.
9.6 Summary
This chapter describes the COSP-J and ACG-C#, two automated code-generating tools
which are related to Casper/FDR; they accept a script description of the verified protocol and
generate the corresponding code program in Java and C#, respectively. Since, the proposed
AKA protocols in this research were verified using Casper/FDR, the author believes that
any of these tools could be used to generate the code program of the protocols and thus have
a chance to verify their implementations. The chapter also describes how a full integrated
solution for security and QoS could be defined using ontologies. In order to implement
the Ring-Based Model, the chapter describes potential enhancements on network addressing
scheme, location and naming systems to implement and enforce the accessibility scopes. The
analysis section shows that the proposed model succeeds in stopping DoS attacks while is
also partially effective in addressing Distributed DOS attacks.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions and Future Work
10.1 Introduction
This final chapter provides a succinct summary of the main ideas proposed in this thesis, the
results, noteworthy achievements and the future applications of the proposed novel concepts.
It captures the main theme of this research study and shows how it succeeded in answering
the research questions.
10.2 How were the key research questions addressed?
The research study identified crucial gaps in addressing the issue of providing security and
QoS in future heterogeneous networks. It revealed how integrating security and QoS is
crucial to provide secure connectivity in heterogeneous environments. Furthermore, due to
the open dynamic nature of heterogeneous networks, the research highlighted the need for
addressing the issue of security and QoS provision in different scenarios. These issues were
then embedded into the three important research questions
• What is the architecture of future, heterogeneous networks and how to guar-
antee an end-to-end QoS provision for mobile terminals in these networks
?
The answer to these questions is a new QoS framework proposed in Chapter 4. Furthermore,
a new hierarchical architecture of the future networks has been introduced, the architecture
defined the structure of the main networks entities, required for security and QoS functions.
To provide an End-to-End QoS in this environment, three Targeted QoS-Signalling models
have been proposed. The models will deal with QoS provision in three situations; the Initial
Registration, the Connection Initiation and the case of Handover.
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• What are the underlying protocols of the Y-Comm’s Integrated Security
Module (ISM) and how these protocols are integrated together ?
As stated in Chapters 5, 6, 7, to answer these questions, research has been done to define
the security module’s underlying protocols, part of which is represented by an Authentica-
tion and Key Agreement framework that provides AKA functions at network and application
levels and in different situations such as handover and connection initiation. All the pro-
posed security mechanisms have been verified by using formal methods approach based on
the Casper/FDR. Furthermore, the integration between these protocols was defined by an
Authentication and Key Agreement Framework.
• Considering the open nature of future network, how to provide security
and support the integration between security and QoS without limiting the
flexibility and dynamics of these networks ?
The answer to this question was to propose three Targeted Security Models, namely the
Connection, the Secure Vertical Handover and the Ring-Based models (Chapters 8). As
the names imply, the first two models address the security and QoS provision in the case
of connection initiation and in the case of handover, respectively. They were defined by
integrating the AKA framework with the QoS-Signalling models. The Ring-Based model
aims at protecting the end-servers from unsolicited traffic such as SPAM.
10.3 Main Contributions
As stated in Chapter 1, the main contributions of this research study include:
• A critical review of existing solutions in the areas of security and QoS provision for
heterogeneous networks. This review uncovered important deficiencies that hampered
the successful realisation of the significance of QoS and security integration in future
communication systems.
• A proposed hierarchical architecture for heterogeneous networks, the architecture de-
fined the main operational network entities and their structure.
• Based on the proposed network architecture, a QoS framework was introduced. The
framework defined three Targeted-QoS signalling models which provided QoS in dif-
ferent scenarios such as the initial registration, connection initiation and in the case of
handover.
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• A new addressing scheme for multi-homed device, which identified the device regardless
of its network interfaces.
• Similar to the Targeted QoS-Signalling Models, three Targeted Security Models, namely
the Connection security model, the handover model and the Ring-Based model were
proposed. While the first two provided security in the case of connection initiation and
handover, respectively, the latter protected the servers as well as network entities from
being overloaded or abused. The underlying security protocols in these models were
verified and analysed using Casper/FDR compiler as a well established model checker.
• Describing how QoS and security could be integrated as part of the proposed Targeted
Security Models.
10.4 Elaboration on the main contributions
10.4.1 Identification of crucial gaps in knowledge in the field of
providing QoS and Security in heterogeneous environments
The study conducted an exhaustive literature survey of related work in the areas of QoS,
security and vertical handover support in heterogeneous environments. The study highlighted
the following crucial drawbacks in the investigated approaches:
• Lack of cooperation; various research efforts addressed the QoS, security and vertical
handover separately without actually considering integrating their effort in one unified
solution.
• Uncertainty about the architecture of heterogeneous environments, which led to many
abstract solutions that did not reflect into a clear network architecture or to scenario-
specific solutions.
• Poor realization of the open and flexible nature of heterogeneous networks; these unique
features should be considered in the design of the QoS and security mechanisms so no
conflict might result of implementing them.
10.4.2 Defining a generic structure of heterogeneous networks
In order to propose practical mechanisms for addressing the security and QoS provision,
our research defined a generic architecture for heterogeneous networks in Chapter 4. The
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proposed hierarchical architecture defined the operational network entities, their structures
as well as the required interfaces between them.
10.4.3 Introducing a QoS framework
Having defined the network architecture, a novel QoS framework was proposed in Chap-
ter 4, which realized the dynamic nature of future networks and thus introduced a dynamic
approach for providing QoS. The approach introduced the concept of the Targeted QoS-
Signalling models which will provide QoS in different scenarios; therefore, three models have
been introduced: the Initial Registration Model, the Connection Initiation Model and the
Handover Model.
10.4.4 Investigating the Multi-homing issue of Future Mobile De-
vices
This study proposed a new addressing scheme that identifies mobile devices regardless of
their network interfaces. Furthermore, it defined the required naming and locating services
to support the new address. These enhancements will aid in implementing some of the
security mechanisms introduced in this thesis.
10.4.5 Providing Security in Heterogeneous network
In order to provide security in future network based on the proposed network structure, an
Authentication and Key Agreement Framework was introduced in Chapter 5. The framework
provided security at three levels:
• The User-Level: An Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol was intro-
duced to achieve mutual authentication between the user, mobile terminal and the
Personal ID Card (PIC).
• The Service-Level: Two AKA protocols were introduced in Chapter 7 to secure the
transaction between the mobile terminal and the end-server (called Service Provider).
While the first AKA protocol addressed the initial authentication when the mobile
terminal contacts the service provider for the first time from its access network, the
second is a lightweight pre-authentication protocol, which considers the mobility of the
mobile terminal and re-authenticates the mobile terminal to the service provider when
it changes its access network.
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• The Network-Level: The proposed protocols for network-level security in Chapter 6 are
responsible for achieving mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the
network in two cases: the initial access, when the mobile terminal joins the network
for the first time and in the case of handover when the mobile terminal joins the access
network coming from another network.
All the protocols of the AKA framework have been formally verified using Casper/FDR com-
piler. The choice of using Casper/FDR was based on the fact that this tool has been widely
acknowledged and hence, used to verify many security protocols as stated in (LBDH09). Fur-
thermore, due to the multi-homed feature of future mobile devices, the Ring-Based Security
Model adopted the new addressing scheme in Chapter 9.
10.4.6 Defining the Target Security Models
The Connection and the Vertical handover security models were defined by integrating the
AKA framework and the QoS-Signalling models as described in Chapter 8.
10.5 Future improvements to solutions from which the
study can benefit
This section lists a set of improvements to the proposed solutions and related work upon
which this study is based, which will result in a further improvement in performance:
• Analysing the performance of QoS-Signalling models. This could be achieved using
analytical modelling or simulation tools such as OPNET or NS-2 (Abo07), (TI09).
• Defining the cryptographic algorithms as well as the mathematical algorithms in the
key derivation functions. This involves comparing different algorithms and analysing
how these might affect the performance of the whole protocol.
• Enhancing the current naming and locating services to cope with the mutli-homed
nature of the mobile devices. Examples of such enhancements are represented by the
enhanced DNS (eDNS) and the Master Locator (ML) in Chapter 9.
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10.6 What are the future works that can be pursued
based on this study?
The solutions proposed in this study have led to the discovery of a new set of key mechanisms
which enhance user experience and provide a secure environment for communication in future
heterogeneous networks. The successful derivation of these new mechanisms has created new
opportunities for improved research activity in different areas of QoS, security management
and handover optimisation. This section looks at how the proposed research ideas can
develop further.
10.6.1 Implementing the new addressing scheme and the Ring-
Based Model
In order to explore this further, the author considers building a testbed composed of mobile
devices and Linux routers capable of supporting 3G using OpenBTs (DB08) as well as Wi-Fi
networks. This would be used to implement the new addressing scheme along with concept
of scope in the Ring-Based model.
10.6.2 Implementing the Connection and the Vertical handover
security model
As explained in Chapter 9, two code-generating compilers namely, the COSP-J and ACG-C#
have been introduced to generate Java and C# code of the protocols verified by Casper/FDR.
The author considers using COSP-J to have the Java executable programs of the proposed
AKA protocols, and then run these protocol on smart phones with Java platform.
10.7 Concluding remarks
This thesis has addressed the key issues of providing security and QoS in heterogeneous
environment. I hope that this contribution will play a significant role in the development of
future mobile heterogeneous networks.
APPENDIX A
The UL-AKA For the Mobile Ethernet
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# Free Variables
PIC, MT : Agents
r1, r2, r3 : Nonce
miD : DeviceID
K : SessionKeys
h : HashFunction
Req: message
InverseKeys = (K, K)
# Processes
INITIATOR(PIC,r1, K )
RESPONDER(MT,PIC, r2, miD, K, Req)
# Protocol Description
0. -> PIC : MT
1. MT -> PIC : Req
2. PIC -> MT : r1
3. MT -> PIC : {r1}{K}%v, h(r1), r2
[decryptable(v,K)andnth(decrypt(v,K), 1) == r1]
4. PIC -> MT : {r2}{K}%w
[decryptable(w,K)andnth(decrypt(w,K), 1) == r2]
# Specification
Secret(PIC,K,[MT])
Secret(PIC,r2,[MT])
Secret(PIC,r1,[MT])
Agreement(MT,PIC,[r1, K])
Agreement(PIC,MT,[r2, K])
WeakAgreement(MT,PIC)
WeakAgreement(PIC,MT)
# Actual Variables
PICard, Mobile, Eve : Agents
R1,R2, R3 : Nonce
MID : DeviceID
k : SessionKeys
InverseKeys = (k, k)
req: message
# System
INITIATOR(PICard,R1, k)
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RESPONDER(Mobile,PICard, R2, MID, k, req)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {PICard, Mobile}
APPENDIX B
The Proposed UL-AKA Protocol
# Free Variables
PIC, MT : Agents
r1, r2 : Nonces
r3 : challNonce
SK : Agents -> presharedKeys
F : presharedKeys x Nonces x Nonces x DeviceID -> SessionKeys
miD : DeviceID
K : SessionKeys
h : HashFunction
Ackm: Acknolwedgment
InverseKeys = (K, K), (SK, SK),(F, F)
# Processes
INITIATOR(PIC,r1,r3,Ackm) knows SK(MT)
RESPONDER(MT,PIC, r2, miD, Ackm) knows SK(MT)
# Protocol Description
0. -> PIC : MT
1. PIC -> MT : {r1}{SK(MT)}
< K := F (SK(MT ), r1, r2,miD) > 2. MT -> PIC : {miD,r2,r1}{SK(MT)}
< K := F (SK(MT ), r1, r2,miD) > 3. PIC -> MT : {r2,r3}{K}%v
[decryptable(v,K)andnth(decrypt(v,K), 1) == r2]
< r3 := nth(decrypt(v,K), 2) >
4. MT -> PIC : ({Ackm, r3}{K})%w
[decryptable(w,K)andnth(decrypt(w,K), 1) == r3andnth(decrypt(w,K), 2) == Ackm]
5. PIC -> MT: {Ackm}{K}%w1
[decryptable(w1, K)andnth(decrypt(w1, K), 1) == Ackm]
# Specification
Secret(PIC,SK(MT),[MT])
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Secret(PIC,miD,[MT])
Secret(PIC,K,[MT])
Agreement(MT,PIC,[r3])
Agreement(PIC,MT,[r2])
WeakAgreement(MT, PIC)
WeakAgreement(PIC, MT)
Aliveness (PIC, MT)
Aliveness (MT, PIC)
# Actual Variables
PICard, Mobile, Mallory : Agents
R1,R2: Nonces
R3, R4 : challNonce
MID : DeviceID
k : SessionKeys
InverseKeys = (k, k)
ACKM: Acknolwedgment
# Functions
symbolic SK, F
# System
INITIATOR(PICard,R1,R3, ACKM)
RESPONDER(Mobile,PICard, R2, MID, ACKM)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = PICard, Mobile,R1, F
APPENDIX C
The Mobile Etherent’s Initial NL-AKA Protocol
# Free Variables
M: MobileTerminal
EP : AccessRouterAuthenticator
AS : DomainA3CServer
AIS : CentralA3CServer
AuthID : Identity
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Initauth : Flags
R1 : initialSeq
R2 : Sequence
UUK : MobileTerminal-> PresharedKeys
AK : AuthenticationKeys
SK : SecretKeys
MS: Domainspecifickey
RPF: PresharedKeys x initialSeq -> Domainspecifickey
rpf: initialSeq x Domainspecifickey ->
AuthenticationKeys
F3: initialSeq x Domainspecifickey -> SecretKeys
h : HashFunction
AccReq, AccRes,AuthReq, Adv: Messages
HoAckm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (AK, AK), (UUK, UUK) , (SK, SK),
(MS, MS), (RPF,RPF), (rpf,rpf),(F3,F3)
# Processes
INITIATOR(M, EP, R1,AuthID,Initauth, AccReq, AuthReq) knows UUK(M)
Authenticator(EP,M,AS, AuthReq, Adv,AccRes)
DomainSERVER(AS,AIS, R2, HoAckm)
CentralSERVER(AIS) knows UUK(M)
# Protocol Description
0. -> M : EP, AIS, AS
1. M -> EP: AccReq
2. EP -> M : AuthReq
< MS := RPF(UUK(M), R1);
AK:= rpf(R1, MS)>
3. M -> EP : M,R1
4. EP -> AS : M,R1, h(M,R1)
5. AS -> AIS : M,R1, R2, h(M,R1,R2)
< MS := RPF(UUK(M), R1)>
6. AIS -> AS : MS,M, h(MS, M)
< AK:= rpf(R1, MS)>
7. AS -> EP: R2,({R1}{AK}%z)%x, h(R2,({R1}{AK}%z)%x)
8. EP -> M : x%(R1AK%z), R2
[decryptable(z, AK)andnth(decrypt(z, AK), 1) == R1]
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< SK := F3(R1,MS) >
9. M -> EP : ({R2}{AK}%y)%q
10. EP -> AS: (q%{R2}{AK})%y, h((q%{R2}{AK})%y)
[decryptable(y, AK)andnth(decrypt(y, AK), 1) == R2]
< SK := F3(R1,MS) >
11. AS -> EP :HoAckm, h(HoAckm)
12. EP -> M : HoAckm
# Specification
Secret(M,AK,[AS])
Secret(AS,AK,[M])
Secret(M,SK,[AS, EP])
Agreement( M, AS, [R2])
Agreement(AS, M, [AK, R1])
WeakAgreement (EP, M)
WeakAgreement (M, EP)
Aliveness (EP, M)
Aliveness (M, EP)
# Actual Variables
m, Eve: MobileTerminal
ep : AccessRouterAuthenticator
as : DomainA3CServer
ais : CentralA3CServer
Authid : Identity
InitAuth : Flags
r1 : initialSeq
r2 : Sequence
ak : AuthenticationKeys
sk : SecretKeys
ms: Domainspecifickey
accReq, accRes,authReq, adv: Messages
hoackm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (ms, ms), (ak, ak), (sk, sk)
# Functions
symbolic UUK, RPF, rpf, F3
# System
INITIATOR(m,ep, r1,Authid,InitAuth, accReq,
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authReq)
Authenticator(ep,m,as, authReq,adv, accRes)
DomainSERVER(as,ais, r2,hoackm)
CentralSERVER(ais)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Eve
IntruderKnowledge = m, as, Eve, ais, Authid,ep,
UUK(Eve)
Crackable = PresharedKeys
Crackable = Domainspecifickey
APPENDIX D
The Proposed Initial NL-AKA Protocol
# Free Variables
MT: MobileTerminal
Auth : AccessRouterAuthenticator
DA3C : DomainA3CServer
CA3C : CentralA3CServer
AuthID : Identity
Initauth : Flags
seq1 : initialSeq
seq2 : Sequence
se1: DomainA3CServer-> PresharedKeys se2 : AccessRouterAuthenticator-> Pre-
sharedKeys
uk : MobileTerminal-> PresharedKeys
AK : AuthenticationKeys
SK : SecretKeys
DSMK: Domainspecifickey
F1: PresharedKeys x initialSeq x Identity ->
Domainspecifickey
F2: initialSeq x Domainspecifickey ->
AuthenticationKeys
F3: initialSeq x Domainspecifickey
x Identity -> SecretKeys
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AccReq:AccReqMessage
AccRes:AcceResMessage
AuthReq:AuthReqMessage
Adv: AdvMessages
HoAckm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (AK, AK), (uk, uk) , (SK, SK),
(DSMK, DSMK),(se2, se2), (F1,F1), (F2,F2),(F3,F3), (se1,se1)
# Processes
INITIATOR(MT,seq1,AuthID,Initauth, AccReq, AuthReq)
knows uk(MT)
Authenticator(Auth,MT,DA3C, AuthReq, Adv,AccRes) knows se2(Auth)
DomainSERVER(DA3C,CA3C, seq2, HoAckm) knows se2(Auth), se1(DA3C)
CentralSERVER( CA3C) knows uk(MT), se1(DA3C)
# Protocol Description
0. -> MT : Auth, CA3C
1. Auth -> MT :Adv,DA3C
< DSMK := F1(uk(MT), seq1, AuthID)>
2. MT -> Auth: AccReq
3. Auth -> MT : AuthReq
<AK:= F2(seq1, DSMK)>
4. MT -> Auth : MT,seq1,AuthID, MT, Initauth
5. Auth -> DA3C : {MT,seq1,AuthID, MT, Initauth}{se2(Auth)}
6. DA3C -> CA3C : {MT,seq1,AuthID, MT, Initauth}{se1(DA3C)}
< DSMK := F1(uk(MT), seq1, AuthID)>
7. CA3C -> DA3C : {DSMK, seq1,AuthID, MT, Initauth}{se1(DA3C)}
< AK:= F2(seq1, DSMK)>
8. DA3C -> Auth: {({seq2, seq1}{AK}%z)%x}{se2(Auth)}
9. Auth -> MT : x%({seq2, seq1}{AK}%z)
[decryptable(z, AK)andnth(decrypt(z, AK), 2) == seq1]
< SK := F3(seq1, DSMK,AuthID);
seq2 := nth(decrypt(z, AK), 1) >
10. MT -> Auth : ({seq2}{AK}%y)%q
11. Auth -> DA3C: {(q%{seq2}{AK})%y}{se2(Auth)}
[decryptable(y, AK)andnth(decrypt(y, AK), 1) == seq2]
< SK := F3(seq1, DSMK,AuthID) >
12. DA3C -> CA3C : {HoAckm}{se1(DA3C)}
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13. DA3C -> Auth :{SK}{se2(Auth)}
14. Auth -> MT : {AccRes}{SK}
# Specification
Secret(MT,AK,[DA3C])
Secret(DA3C,AK,[MT])
Secret(MT,SK,[DA3C, Auth])
Agreement( MT, DA3C, [seq2])
Agreement(DA3C, MT, [AK])
WeakAgreement(MT, Auth)
WeakAgreement(Auth,MT)
WeakAgreement(Auth, DA3C)
WeakAgreement(DA3C, Auth)
Aliveness (Auth, MT)
Aliveness (MT, Auth)
# Actual Variables
mt, Mallory: MobileTerminal
auth : AccessRouterAuthenticator
da3c : DomainA3CServer
ca3c : CentralA3CServer
Authid : Identity
InitAuth : Flags
SEQ1 : initialSeq
SEQ2 : Sequence
ak : AuthenticationKeys
sk : SecretKeys
DSMK: Domainspecifickey
accReq:AccReqMessage
accRes:AcceResMessage
authReq:AuthReqMessage
adv: AdvMessages
hoackm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (DSMK, DSMK), (ak, ak), (sk, sk)
# Functions
symbolic uk, se2, se1, F1, F2, F3
# System
INITIATOR(mt,SEQ1,Authid,InitAuth, accReq, authReq)
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Authenticator(auth,mt,da3c, authReq,adv, accRes)
DomainSERVER(da3c,ca3c, SEQ2,hoackm)
CentralSERVER(ca3c)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {mt, da3c, Mallory, ca3c, Authid, auth, uk(Mallory), F2, F3}
Crackable = PresharedKeys
Crackable = Domainspecifickey
APPENDIX E
The Mobile Ethernet Secure NL-AKA for Vertical Handover
# Free Variables
M: MobileTerminal
EP : AccessRouterAuthenticator
AS : DomainA3CServer
AuthID : Identity
Initauth : Flags
R1 : initialSeq
R2 : Sequence
HOAID1: OldToken
HOAID2: NewToken
AK : AuthenticationKeys
SK : SecretKeys
MS: Domainspecifickey
F: AuthenticationKeys x initialSeq x Sequence -> NewToken
h : HashFunction
AccReq, AccRes,AuthReq, Adv: Messages
HoAckm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (AK, AK), (SK, SK), (MS, MS), (F,F)
# Processes
INITIATOR(M, EP, R1,AuthID,Initauth, AccReq, AuthReq, MS, AK, SK, HOAID1)
Authenticator(EP,AS, AuthReq, Adv,AccRes)
DomainSERVER(AS,M, R2, HoAckm, MS, AK, SK, HOAID1)
# Protocol Description
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0. -> M : EP, AS
1. M -> EP: AccReq
2. EP -> M : AuthReq
3. M -> EP : {M,R1, HOAID1}{SK}%w
4. EP -> AS : w%{M,R1,HOAID1}{SK}, h(w%{M,R1,
HOAID1}{SK})
5. AS -> EP: {R2,{R1}{AK}%z}{SK}%v
6. EP -> M : v%{R2,{R1}{AK}%z}{SK}
[decryptable(z, AK)andnth(decrypt(z, AK), 1) == R1]
# Specification
Secret(M,AK,[AS])
Secret(AS,AK,[M])
Secret(M,SK,[AS, EP])
Agreement(AS, M, [AK, R1])
WeakAgreement(M, EP)
WeakAgreement(EP,M)
Aliveness (EP, M)
Aliveness (M, EP)
# Actual Variables
m, Eve: MobileTerminal
ep : AccessRouterAuthenticator
as : DomainA3CServer
Authid : Identity
InitAuth : Flags
hoaid1: OldToken
hoaid2: NewToken
r1 : initialSeq
r2 : Sequence
ak : AuthenticationKeys
sk : SecretKeys
ms: Domainspecifickey
accReq, accRes,authReq, adv: Messages
hoackm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (ms, ms), (ak, ak), (sk, sk)
# Functions
symbolic F
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# System
INITIATOR(m,ep, r1,Authid,InitAuth, accReq, authReq, ms, ak,sk,hoaid1)
Authenticator(ep, as, authReq,adv, accRes)
DomainSERVER(as,m, r2,hoackm, ms,ak,sk,hoaid1)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = m, as, Mallory, Authid, ep
Crackable = Domainspecifickey
APPENDIX F
The Proposed NL-AKA Protocol for Secure Vertical Handover
# Free Variables
MT: Agent
SrcAuth : SrcAccessRouterAuthenticator
DesAuth : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator
SrcDA3C : SrcDomainA3CServer
DesDA3C : DesDomainA3CServer
CA3C : CentralA3CServer
AuthID : Identity
Initauth : Flags
seq1 : initialSeq
seq2 : Sequence
Srcse1 : SrcDomainA3CServer-> PresharedKeys
Desse1 : DesDomainA3CServer-> PresharedKeys
Srcse2 : SrcAccessRouterAuthenticator-> PresharedKeys
Desse2 : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator-> PresharedKeys
uk : Agent-> PresharedKeys
SrcAK, DesAK : AuthenticationKeys
SrcSK, DesSK : SecretKeys
DSMK: Domainspecifickey
AccReq, AccRes,AuthReq, Adv: Messages
HoAckm : AcknowledgementMessage
F1: PresharedKeys x initialSeq x Identity
-> Domainspecifickey
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F2: initialSeq x Domainspecifickey ->
AuthenticationKeys
F3: initialSeq x Domainspecifickey x Identity ->
SecretKeys
InverseKeys = (SrcAK, SrcAK), (uk, uk) , (SrcSK, SrcSK),
(DSMK, DSMK), (Srcse1,Srcse1),(Srcse2, Srcse2),
(Desse1,Desse1),(Desse2, Desse2),(DesAK,DesAK),(DesSK, DesSK), (F1, F1), (F2,F2),(F3,F3)
# Processes
INITIATOR(MT,seq1,AuthID,Initauth, SrcAK, SrcSK, AccReq ) knows uk(MT)
SrcAuthenticator(SrcAuth,MT,SrcDA3C,SrcSK, AuthReq)
knows Srcse2(SrcAuth)
DesAuthenticator(DesAuth,MT, DesDA3C, AuthReq, Adv,
AccRes) knows Desse2(DesAuth)
SrcAAASERVER(SrcDA3C,CA3C, SrcAuth, SrcAK, SrcSK) knows Srcse1(SrcDA3C), Srcse2(SrcAuth)
DesAAASERVER(DesDA3C,CA3C,DesAuth, seq2,HoAckm) knows Desse1(DesDA3C), Desse2(DesAuth)
CentralSERVER( CA3C, SrcDA3C, DesDA3C) knows
Srcse1(SrcDA3C), Desse1(DesDA3C), uk(MT)
# Protocol Description
0. -> MT : SrcAuth, DesAuth, SrcDA3C
1. DesAuth -> MT :Adv, DesDA3C
< DSMK := F1(uk(MT ), seq1, AuthID) >
2. MT -> DesAuth: AccReq
3. DesAuth -> MT : AuthReq
< DesAK := F2(seq1, DSMK) >
4. MT -> SrcAuth : {seq1,AuthID, MT, Initauth}{SrcSK}
5. SrcAuth -> SrcDA3C : {seq1,AuthID, MT, Initauth}{
Srcse2(SrcAuth)}
6. SrcDA3C -> CA3C : {seq1,AuthID, MT, Initauth}{Srcse1(SrcDA3C)}
< DSMK := F1(uk(MT ), seq1, AuthID) >
7. CA3C -> DesDA3C : {DSMK, seq1,AuthID, MT, Initauth}
{Desse1(DesDA3C)}
< DesAK := F2(seq1, DSMK) >
8. DesDA3C -> DesAuth: {({seq2, seq1}{DesAK}%z)%x}
{Desse2(DesAuth)}
9. DesAuth -> MT : x%({seq2, seq1}{DesAK}%z)
[decryptable(z,DesAK)andnth(decrypt(z,DesAK), 2) == seq1]
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< DesSK := F3(seq1, DSMK,AuthID);
seq2 := nth(decrypt(z,DesAK), 1) >
10. MT -> DesAuth : ({seq2}{DesAK}%y)%q
11. DesAuth -> DesDA3C: {(q%{seq2}{DesAK})%y}{Desse2(DesAuth)}
[decryptable(y,DesAK)andnth(decrypt(y,DesAK), 1) == seq2]
< DesSK := F3(seq1, DSMK,AuthID) >
12. DesDA3C -> CA3C : {HoAckm}{Desse1(DesDA3C)}
13. DesDA3C -> DesAuth :{DesSK}{Desse2(DesAuth)}
14. DesAuth -> MT : {AccRes}{DesSK}
# Specification
Secret(MT,DesAK,[DesDA3C])
Secret(DesAuth,DesSK,[MT, DesDA3C])
Agreement( MT, DesDA3C, [seq2])
Agreement(DesDA3C, MT, [seq1, DesAK])
WeakAgreement(MT, DesAuth)
WeakAgreement(DesAuth,MT)
WeakAgreement(DesAuth, DesDA3C)
WeakAgreement(DesDA3C, DesAuth)
Aliveness(MT, DesAuth)
Aliveness(DesAuth,MT)
# Actual Variables
mt, Mallory: Agent
srcAuth : SrcAccessRouterAuthenticator
desAuth : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator
srcDA3C : SrcDomainA3CServer
desDA3C : DesDomainA3CServer
ca3c : CentralA3CServer
authID : Identity
initauth : Flags
SEQ1 : initialSeq
SEQ2 : Sequence
srcAK, desAK : AuthenticationKeys
srcSK, desSK : SecretKeys
dsmk: Domainspecifickey
accReq : AccessReqmessages
accRes: AccessResmessages
149
authReq: Authmessage
adv:AdvMessages
hoAckm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (dsmk, dsmk), (srcAK, srcAK), (srcSK, srcSK), (desAK, desAK), (desSK,
desSK)
# Functions
symbolic Srcse1,Srcse2,Desse1,Desse2,uk, F1, F2, F3
# System
INITIATOR(mt,SEQ1,authID,initauth, srcAK, srcSK,accReq)
SrcAuthenticator(srcAuth,mt,srcDA3C,srcSK, authReq)
DesAuthenticator(desAuth,mt, desDA3C, authReq,adv, accRes)
SrcAAASERVER(srcDA3C,ca3c,srcAuth, srcAK, srcSK)
DesAAASERVER(desDA3C,ca3c,desAuth, SEQ2,hoAckm)
CentralSERVER( ca3c, srcDA3C, desDA3C)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {mt, srcDA3C,desDA3C, Eve, ca3c, authID, srcAuth,desAuth,
uk(Eve), F2, F3}
Crackable = PresharedKeys
Crackable = Domainspecifickey
APPENDIX G
The Initial SL-AKA Protocol
# Free Variables
MT: Agent
SP : Service
DesAuth : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator
DesDA3C : DesDomainA3CServer
CA3C : CentralA3CServer
r1, r2 : Nonce
ADname : AccessDomainname
Srvkey :Service -> ServiceSpecificKeys
F: ServiceSpecificKeys x Vectors x Vectors -> AssociationKeys
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SubID : ServiceSubscribtionID
ASKey : AssociationKeys
Vector1,Vector2:Vectors
SrvCookies: Cookies
Ackm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (Srvkey, Srvkey), (ASKey,ASKey), (F,F)
# Processes
INITIATOR(MT,Ackm,r1,Vector1, SubID,ADname) knows Srvkey(SP)
DesAuthenticator(DesAuth,SP,DesDA3C)
DesAAASERVER(DesDA3C,CA3C,DesAuth)
CentralSERVER(CA3C, DesDA3C,Vector1,SubID, ADname)
RESPONDER(SP, MT, DesAuth, DesDA3C, r2, Vector2, SrvCookies, Ackm) knows Srvkey(SP)
# Protocol Description
0. CA3C -> DesDA3C: Vector1, SubID, ADname
1. DesDA3C -> DesAuth: Vector1, SubID, ADname
2. DesAuth -> SP : Vector1, SubID, ADname
< ASKey := F (Srvkey(SP ), V ector1, V ector2) >
3. SP -> MT : {r2, Vector2, SrvCookies}{Srvkey(SP)}
< ASKey := F (Srvkey(SP ), V ector1, V ector2) >
4. MT -> SP : {r2, SrvCookies}{ASKey}%v1
[decryptable(v1, ASKey)andnth(decrypt
(v1, ASKey), 1) == SrvCookies]
5. SP -> MT : {Ackm}{ASKey}%w3
[decryptable(w3, ASKey)andnth(decrypt
(w3, ASKey), 1) == Ackm]
# Specification
Secret(SP,ASKey,[MT])
Secret(MT,ASKey,[SP])
Secret(SP,SrvCookies,[MT])
Agreement(SP,MT,[ASKey])
Agreement(MT,SP,[ASKey, SrvCookies])
WeakAgreement (SP, MT)
WeakAgreement (MT, SP)
# Actual Variables
mt, Mallory: Agent
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desAuth : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator
desDA3C : DesDomainA3CServer
sp : Service
ca3c : CentralA3CServer
R1, R2 : Nonce
ADNAME : AccessDomainname
VECTOR1,VECTOR2: Vectors
SRVCookies: Cookies
SUBID : ServiceSubscribtionID
ACKM : AcknowledgementMessage
ASKEY : AssociationKeys
InverseKeys = (ASKEY,ASKEY)
# Functions
symbolic Srvkey, F
# System
INITIATOR(mt, ACKM, R1, VECTOR1, SUBID, ADNAME)
DesAuthenticator(desAuth, sp, desDA3C)
DesAAASERVER(desDA3C, ca3c, desAuth)
CentralSERVER(ca3c, desDA3C, VECTOR1, SUBID, ADNAME)
RESPONDER(sp, mt, desAuth, desDA3C, R2, VECTOR2, SRVCookies, ACKM)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {mt, desDA3C, ca3c, authID}
Crackable = ServiceSpecificKeys
APPENDIX H
The Ligh-Weight SL-AKA Protocol for Handover
# Free Variables
MT: Agent
SP : Service
DesAuth : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator
DesDA3C : DesDomainA3CServer
CA3C : CentralA3CServer
r1, r2 : Nonce
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ADname : AccessDomainname
Srvkey :Service -> ServiceSpecificKeys
F: ServiceSpecificKeys x OldAssociationKeys x Vectors x Vectors -> NewAssoci-
ationKeys
SubID : ServiceSubscribtionID
NewASKey : NewAssociationKeys
OldASKey : OldAssociationKeys
Vector1,Vector2: Vectors
SrvCookies: Cookies
Ackm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (Srvkey, Srvkey), (NewASKey,NewASKey),(OldASKey,OldASKey) ,(F,F)
# Processes
INITIATOR(MT, Ackm,r1,Vector1, SubID,ADname, OldASKey) knows Srvkey(SP)
DesAuthenticator(DesAuth,SP,DesDA3C)
DesAAASERVER(DesDA3C,CA3C,DesAuth)
CentralSERVER( CA3C, DesDA3C,Vector1,SubID, ADname)
RESPONDER(SP, MT, DesAuth, DesDA3C, r2, Vector2, SrvCookies, Ackm, OldASKey) knows
Srvkey(SP)
# Protocol Description
0. CA3C -> DesDA3C:Vector1, SubID,ADname
1. DesDA3C -> DesAuth:Vector1, SubID,ADname
2. DesAuth -> SP : Vector1, SubID,ADname
< NewASKey := F (Srvkey(SP ), OldASKey,
V ector1, V ector2) >
3. SP -> MT : {Vector2}{OldASKey}
< NewASKey := F (Srvkey(SP ), OldASKey,
V ector1, V ector2) >
4. MT -> SP : {Ackm}{NewASKey}
# Specification
Secret(SP,NewASKey,[MT])
Secret(MT,NewASKey,[SP])
Secret(SP,SrvCookies,[MT])
Agreement(SP,MT,[OldASKey])
Agreement(MT,SP,[Ackm])
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WeakAgreement (SP, MT)
WeakAgreement (MT, SP)
# Actual Variables
mt, Mallory: Agent
desAuth : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator
desDA3C : DesDomainA3CServer
sp : Service
ca3c : CentralA3CServer
R1, R2 : Nonce
ADNAME : AccessDomainname
VECTOR1,VECTOR2: Vectors
SRVCookies: Cookies
SUBID : ServiceSubscribtionID
ACKM : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (newASKey,newASKey)
,(oldASKey,oldASKey)
newASKey : NewAssociationKeys
oldASKey : OldAssociationKeys
# Functions
symbolic Srvkey, F
# System
INITIATOR(mt, ACKM, R1, VECTOR1, SUBID, ADNAME, oldASKey)
DesAuthenticator(desAuth, sp, desDA3C)
DesAAASERVER(desDA3C, ca3c, desAuth)
CentralSERVER( ca3c, desDA3C, VECTOR1, SUBID, ADNAME)
RESPONDER(sp, mt, desAuth, desDA3C, R2, VECTOR2, SRVCookies, ACKM, oldASKey)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {mt, desDA3C, ca3c, authID}
Crackable = ServiceSpecificKeys
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